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This thesis focuses on three vulnerable groups in Europe that have
recently been highlighted both in media and in the economics lit-
erature; and that are policy priorities. Chapter 1 is a joint work
with Giovanni Mastrobuoni1 which focuses on prisoners and peer
effects in prison. Studies that estimate criminal peer effects need to
define the reference group. Researchers usually use the amount of
time inmates overlap in prison, sometimes in combination with na-
tionality to define such groups. Yet, there is often little discussion
about such assumptions, which could potentially have important
effects on the estimates of peer effects. We show that the date of
rearrest of inmates who spend time together in prison signals with
some error co-offending, and can thus be used to measure refer-
ence groups. Exploiting recidivism data on inmates released after
a mass pardon with a simple econometric model which adjusts the
estimates for the misclassification errors, we document homophily
in peer group formation with regards to age, nationality, and de-
grees of deterrence. There is no evidence of homophily with respect
to education and employment status.
Chapter 2 evaluates a policy in the English county of Essex that
1Collegio Carlo Alberto and University of Essex.
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aims to reduce domestic abuse through informing high-risk suspects
that they will be put under higher surveillance, hence increasing
their probability of being caught in case of recidivism, and encour-
aging their victims to report. Using a Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD), it underlines that suspects that are targeted by the
policy are more 9% more likely to be reported again for domestic
abuse. Although increasing reporting is widely seen as essential
to identify and protect victims, this paper shows that policies to
increase reporting will deter crime only if they give rise to a legal
response. Moreover, results highlight that increasing the report-
ing of events of that do not lead to criminal charges may create
escalation and be more detrimental to the victim in the long run.
Chapter 3 investigates how migrants in the United Kingdom re-
spond to natural disasters in their home countries. Combining a
household panel survey of migrants in the United Kingdom and
natural disasters data, this paper first shows, in the UK context,
that male migrants are more likely to remit in the wake of natural
disasters. Then, it underlines that to fund remittances male mi-
grants also increase labour supply, decrease monthly savings and
leisure. By showing how migrants in the UK adjust their economic
behaviours in response to an unexpected shocks i.e. natural dis-
asters, this paper demonstrates both how UK migrants may fund
remittances and that they have the capacity to adjust their eco-
nomic behaviours to increase remittances.
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Introduction
Various vulnerable individuals in Europe have been disregarded both
by governments and media in the past decades. Resource scarcity, potential
unpopular reforms and societal taboos prevented thousands of individuals in
Europe from geting enough attention to become a policy priority and see their
situation improved. However, recent events shed light on some of these vul-
nerable groups and they are now at the top of the policy agenda. This thesis
focuses on three vulnerable groups in Europe that have recently been high-
lighted both in media and in the economics literature; and that are policy
priorities. The first chapter of this thesis looks at prisoners in Italy and ex-
amines how peer groups develop in prisons. The second chapter sheds light
on victims of domestic abuse and investigates the impact of a policy to sup-
port them in the English county of Essex. Finally, the last chapter looks at
migrants from developing countries that live in the UK and shows how nat-
ural disasters in their country of origin affect their economic behaviours and
financial situations. All chapters use microeconometrics methods to establish
causal effects.
The first vulnerable group that this thesis studies is prisoners. More than
10 million people are currently imprisoned around the world (Walmsley, 2013),
and rates of incarceration are exhibiting increasing trends. This contributes
14
to the shocking overcrowding conditions that prisoners are facing in European
prisons, which were recently revealed by news media in France, Italy and in
the UK. Overcrowding leads to negative consequences for inmates privacy, out-
of-cell activities, healthcare, peace and safety. One of the main problems to
address for policymakers is that time in prison does not seem to effectively
reduce crime and a large fraction of inmates re-offend, which contributes fur-
ther to overcrowding. For instance, in Italy and in the United States more
than 2/3 of prisoners are re-incarcerated within three years (National Insti-
tute of Justice, 2016). This is a great concern for most governments around
the world, including the ones in Italy, the UK, and the United States who
spend on average between $30, 000 and $42, 000 per prisoner each year.
To cope with overcrowding and deal with financial pressure, more and
more European countries try to increase the prevalence of non-prison sentences
(Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems, 2016). How-
ever, prisons also protect societies from dangerous criminals and alternatives
to prison sentences cannot apply to all cases. Thus, it is crucial to better un-
derstand how prisons may affect post-release behaviours and recidivism. One
of the factors that may reinforce criminal activities is peer effects that develop
in prison. There is a growing economics literature on the impact of peer effects
in prison on recidivism (Bayer et al., 2009; Ouss, 2011; Drago et al., 2009).
These studies rely on sociology literature to define peer groups and, then,
they analyse the impact of peer effects in prison on recidivism. However, to
my knowledge, there is no empirical work that investigates directly how peer
groups develop in prison. The objective of the first paper of this thesis is to
bridge this gap and shed light on the characteristics that make inmates more
likely to form groups in prison that lead to joint recidivism.
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To do so, this chapter exploits the 2006 Italian prison pardon that gave
rise to a random release of large numbers of inmates across several prisons.
More specifically, we study inmates who benefited from the prison pardon
and re-offended in order to investigate the determinants that make them more
likely to re-offend in group with prisoners with whom they were released. The
key feature of our data that makes it unique for the purpose of our study,
is that we observe the post-release behaviour of groups of substantial size
that were released at the same time from different prisons. The two main
factors that influence the likelihood of partnerships are nationality and age.
Inmates are more likely to partner up when young and when partners are of
similar age. The fact that criminals are more likely to partner up with inmates
who previously committed different types of crime suggests that prisons might
sometimes allow inmates to learn new skills and move to a different crime.
The second chapter of this thesis focuses on a vulnerable group that,
mainly due to social taboos, has suffered silently for decades i.e. victims of
domestic abuse. In October 2017, the Me Too movement encouraged many
victims of domestic abuse to report on social media through using #MeToo as
a hashtag. It raised awareness worldwide on the prevalence of domestic abuse
and highlighted the necessity to push these victims that stay silent to report.
Violence against women and, particularly intimate partner violence and sexual
violence, is a major public health problem and a violation of women’s human
rights. Global estimates published by the World Health Organisation (2017)
indicate that about 1 in 3 women worldwide have experienced either physical
and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence in their
lifetime.
One of the issues that researchers and policymakers face to address do-
16
mestic abuse is that most events go unreported. For instance, in the UK,
according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), only 20% of abuse is
reported to the police (ONS, 2016). An important factor that leads to under-
reporting is that some victims do not trust the police. In the UK, in 2011-12,
one of the main reasons for not reporting abuse was that victims perceived
the police would not (or could not) do anything about it (ONS, 2016). In line
with this, a survey for the 2014 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
finds that 30% of victims do not report because of lack of trust or confidence
in the police to take action in the wake of their reporting.
Thus, the second chapter of this thesis analyses the impact of a policy in
the English county of Essex that pushes victims of domestic abuse to report
to the police through increasing trust in the police. The policy also informs
offenders that they will be put under higher surveillance. Using a Regression
Discontinuity Design, this chapter underlines that suspects who are targeted
by the policy are 9% more likely to be reported again for domestic abuse. Al-
though increasing reporting is widely seen as essential to identify and protect
victims, this paper shows that policies to increase reporting will deter crime
only if they give rise to a legal response. Moreover, results highlight that in-
creasing the reporting of events that do not lead to criminal charges may create
escalation and be more detrimental to victims in the long run. These results
are insightful to policymakers designing future policies to protect victims by
encouraging them to report violence.
Finally, the last vulnerable group covered in this thesis is migrants who
live in Europe and originate from developing countries. The migration crisis
in Europe that started in 2015 shed light on the precarity of refugees and,
more generally, on obstacles that migrants face. The media coverage of the
17
crisis created vivid debates on how to deal with large flows of migrants and
integrate them. Some countries implemented policies to welcome migrants.
For instance, in 2015 Germany allowed Syrian refugees who had already reg-
istered elsewhere in the European Union (EU) to enter Germany and register
there, temporarily suspending an EU law that requires asylum seekers to be
returned to the first country they entered (CNN, 2018). Unlike Germany, other
countries implemented hostile measures to dissuade refugees from staying in
the country. For instance, in March 2017, the Hungarian parliament approved
a law allowing all asylum seekers to be detained (Independent, 2017). In
France, until July 2018, citizens helping refugees could be prosecuted (RTL,
2018). Political responses to support migrants triggered a wave of scepticism
among many European citizens. As a result, political parties and movements
using anti-migrant rhetoric have gained increasing support in Europe in the
past 3 years. In the UK, the UKIP, which has taken a far-right turn, keeps
on attracting new members (The Guardian, 2018). In France, in 2017, Marine
Le Pen, the far-right candidate reached the second round of the presidential
election (Ministere de l’interieur, 2017), and in 2018, the far-right politician
Matteo Salvini became deputy prime minister in Italy (BBC, 2018). To pro-
tect migrants from detrimental policies, more work is needed to understand
problems they are facing.
In the third chapter I study how migrants in the United Kingdom ad-
just their economic behaviours in response to unexpected shocks, e.g. natural
disasters in their home countries. By combining a household panel survey
of migrants in the UK and natural disasters data, I demonstrate that male
migrants are more likely to remit in the wake of natural disasters. By investi-
gating mechanisms that are used by migrants to fund remittances, this chapter
18
shows that male migrants increase labour supply, decrease monthly savings and
leisure. Results suggest both how UK migrants may fund remittances and that
they have the capacity to adjust their economic behaviours to increase remit-
tances. However, results also emphasise that migrants report worse financial
situations when their countries are hit by natural disasters. This suggests that
sending money back home may make them vulnerable and supportive policies
should be designed to support these migrants in such situations.
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Chapter 1
Partners in Crime: Evidence
from Recidivating Inmates
1.1 Introduction
More than 10 million people are currently imprisoned around the world
Walmsley (2013), and rates of incarceration are exhibiting an increasing trend.
This is of great concern for most governments around the world, including the
ones in Italy, the UK, and the United States who per prisoner each year spend
on average between $30, 000 and $42, 0001. These trends lead to overcrowded
prisons and, in England and Wales, 71 of the 118 prisons are currently wel-
coming more prisoners than their actual capacity (Day et al. (2015)), which
is putting budgets even more under pressure. Moreover, a large fraction of in-
mates has been in prison a number of times. For instance, in Italy and in the
United States more than 2/3 of prisoners are re-incarcerated within three years
National Institute of Justice (2016). At times of resources scarcity, preventing
1See the US Federal Bureau of Prisons (https://www.bop.gov/), Ministry of Justice
(2013), and the Italian Justice Department (https://www.giustizia.it/)
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the curse of recidivism is a major priority.
One important channel that has been shown to worsen post-release re-
cidivism are peer effects that develop behind bars. The criminology literature
emphasised decades ago how interactions with other inmates, other peers, can
favour crime (Clemmer (1950)). There is now a growing literature in economics
on the role of such peer effects, where peers are either cellmates, or inmates
spending time in the same facility, and possibly sharing some socioeconomic
or criminal characteristics.
Bayer et al. (2009), for example, exploit the plausibly exogenous ex-
posure of individuals to different peers within prison facilities based on the
variation in the incarceration spells. They find that inmates who were in con-
tact in prison with criminals incarcerated for the same type of crime are more
likely to re-offend. Ouss (2011), using a French administrative dataset, and a
similar identification strategy, but this time at the prison cell-level, finds evi-
dence of peer effects for skill-intensive offences. Drago et al. (2009) exploit the
2006 Italian prison pardon in order to demonstrate how peers’ incentives not
to re-offend (larger future sentences) influence inmates’ post-release recidivism
behaviour. In this paper peers are inmates who spent time in the same prison
and share the same nationality.2
It is common in these papers to regress individual recidivism on the av-
erage recidivism or the average expected sentence of a peer group. A potential
limitation of these empirical studies is that peer status cannot be observed.
While it is plausible that inmates who share the same cell or belong to the
same ethnic group become peers, it is also plausible to think that peer status
2Using more aggregate data, Glaeser et al. (1996) find positive peer effects in criminal
behaviour but only for less serious crimes. Ludwig and Kling (2007), instead, find little
evidence of peer effects in deprived neighbourhoods.
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may be broader or narrower, introducing potential biases in the empirical find-
ings. As pointed out by Manski (1993), in order to infer any causal impact of
peer effects, measuring the proper reference groups is the cornerstone of peer
effects studies.
Peer effects can occur through different mechanisms such as skills trans-
fers or the elaboration of new partnerships for reoffending purposes. Papers on
peer effects in prison are usually not able to distinguish between these different
types of peer effects. The purpose of this paper is to show the driven factors of
co-offending. By doing so, it will also contribute to improve the understanding
of peer formation, which might also help designing better ways to distribute
inmates across prison facilities.
The criminology literature has emphasised that criminals may find it
attractive to co-offend for many reasons. McCarthy et al. (1998) point
out that partnering up enables labour division. Weerman (2003) highlights,
among other things, the financial benefits incurred by co-offending, while Fel-
son (2003) emphasises that co-offending can benefit the exchange of knowl-
edge. More related to our study, based on a small but rich panel survey, the
Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, Farrington et al. (1991) list a
number of characteristics that make co-offenders more likely to partner up,
such as similarity in terms of age, sex, race, and criminal experience. The
economics literature is relatively silent on co-offending and little is known on
what makes inmates form peer groups and, more specifically, peer groups in
prison.
Stevenson (2015), using data from juvenile facilities in Florida, shows
that peer criminal experience and gang affiliation of peers in prison only affect
recidivism when peers live close by. She interprets these results as a proof
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that network formation plays a role in recidivism. However, she is not able
to clearly identify peers when re-offending. One of the main purposes of our
study is to better understand the role of network formation in prison in order
to pave the way for more accurate studies on peer effects.
We contribute to the literature on peer effects exploiting information on
peer groupings that, in spite of being widely available in prison data, has been
widely disregarded: the date of re-incarceration. We show that, for individuals
who spent time in prison together, being re-incarcerated on the same day
is a strong signal of criminal partnership. We devise a simple identification
strategy that allows us to assess the probabilities of type-I and type-II errors
when estimating partnerships using same-day re-incarceration.
The two main factors that influence the likelihood of partnerships are
nationality and age. Inmates are more likely to partner up when young and
when partners are of similar age. They also look for partners who share the
same nationality, and thus the same language and culture.
Each additional year of age difference reduces the probability of part-
nership by 1.8 per cent relative to the mean. Instead, belonging to the same
nationality raises such probability by 44 per cent. The fact that criminals are
more likely to partner up with inmates who previously committed different
types of crime suggests that prisons might sometimes allow inmates to learn
new skills and move to a different crime.
The criminal type that sticks out in terms of partnerships is being a mafia
member. They are 130 per cent more likely to co-offend, and not just with
other mobsters, which justifies the monitoring and the increased care used by
the Italian prison system when dealing with mafia convicts.
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1.2 Data
For our study, we make use of two datasets from the Italian prison admin-
istration. The first one, which is the one we use to run our peer regressions,
comes from an internal database maintained by the Italian Department of
Prison Administration (DAP) on offenders under its supervision. The dataset
covers all individuals released as a result of the July 2006 collective pardon
law right after the law was passed. The full sample includes more than 25,000
individuals. The key feature of these data that makes it unique for the pur-
pose of our study is that we observe the post-release behaviour of groups of
substantial sizes that were released at the same time from different prisons.
This is ideal, as inmates have an extensive choice of partnerships, choices
that are less constrained when compared to the typical gradual release of
inmates. Since we are interested in understanding whether individuals re-
offended alone or with previous co-inmates, we focus on the 4,135 male in-
mates who re-offended. For each individual, we have information on whether
or not the former inmate re-offended between the date of release from prison
and December 2007.
Moreover, the data contain information concerning a wide range of vari-
ables at the individual and facility level. The following information is reported
for each individual: facility where the sentence was served, official length of
the sentence, actual time served, kind of crime committed (i.e., most recent
offense in an individual’s criminal history before the pardon), age, sex, level of
education, marital status, nationality, province of residence, and employment
status before being sentenced to prison. As data on successive convictions are
not available, we use subsequent criminal charges and imprisonment as our
measure of recidivism.
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Our main variable of interest is whether two individuals i and j have
partnered to re-offend Pij ∈ {0, 1}. We define inmates to have co-offended
when they spent time in prison together and were rearrested and imprisoned
on the same day. Table 1 and 2 describe our first and main dataset3. In this
dataset, there is no information on the new crime the inmates committed,
which would possibly lower the degree of misclassification of our partnership
variable. Though we can gauge the degree of misclassification using an auxil-
iary dataset that has precisely that information.
The second dataset covers inmates released from two prisons located in
the city of Milan, Bollate and Opera, between 2001 and 20094. For these
inmates, we observe the entire prison history, as well as information on the
type of crime inmates, commit when they recidivate. The data encompass
all observed crimes that an individual has perpetrated in his life as well as
individual characteristics such as: age, nationality, prison of incarceration,
dates of incarceration. The next section discusses in great detail how such
information helps us to uncover the degree of misclassification.
3Regression results are based on this dataset.
4We only use this dataset to uncover the degree of misclassification. The descriptive
statistics of this dataset are available upon request.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics (for individuals
who reoffended)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Co-offending ratea 12% n/a
Partner in crimeb 0.251% n/a
Age 36.194 9.065
Difference in agec 9.991 7.825
Years of education 3.675 3.36
Difference in years of educationd 3.34 3.136
Employed 0.086 n/a
Both employede 0.011 n/a
Same nationalityf 0.597 n/a
Sentence (in months) 39.215 30.208
Difference in sentenceg 29.654 29.571
Residual sentence (months)h 13.982 10.351
Difference in residual sentencei 11.614 8.783
Prison time (months) 25.252 26.525
Difference in prison timej 24.228 27.682
N = 224, 328
a Likelihood that an inmate was rearrested with at least one former co-inmate.
b Likelihood that two given former co-inmates were rearrested together.
c Average age difference within each pair of former co-inmates.
d Average difference in years of education within each pair of former co-inmates.
e Likelihood that two given former co-inmates were both employed.
f Likelihood that two given former co-inmates have the same nationality.
g Average difference in sentence within each pair of former co-inmates.
h Time in prison not served due to the prison pardon.
i Average difference in residual sentence within each pair of former co-inmates.
j Average difference in prison within each pair of former co-inmates.
From Table 1, we observe that about 12 per cent of our pardoned in-
mates re-offended on the same day as inmates they were in prison with5. In
order to analyse the partnership variable, we construct inmate ij pairs for all
5To do so, we look at whether a given inmate who was released in the wake of the prison
pardon was rearrested alone on a or with former co-inmates given date. Note that it implies
that the pairs are only based on prisoners released from the same prison.
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inmates who spent time in the same prison, recidivated, and could therefore
have recidivated together. We end up with more than 220,000 ij-pairs. The
summary statistics are shown in Tables 1 to 2.
We notice that if we take two recidivating inmates from the same prison,
there is a probability of 0.251% that they reoffended in partnership. This
number is small but on average recidivating inmates are exposed to about 43
recidivating co-inmates, which reduced the chances of matching with any given
inmate.
Inmates are on average 36 years old, and there is an average 10-year
age difference with the former co-inmates they were released with. Education
levels are very low and below 3.6 years of education, and the average difference
with respect to other inmates is 3.34. It appears that only a few of them are
employed and the probability that two inmates are both employed is around
1%. We also observe that almost 60% of the prisoners in our sample have
the same nationality, mainly the Italian one. Moreover, before being released,
inmates accomplished on average 25 months in jail for an initial sentence of
more than 39 months. This suggests that the prison pardon enabled them on
average to spend 13.9 months less in custody. Differences in sentences and
residual sentences are respectively 30 months and 12 months.
Table 2 exhibits the different types of crime that individuals committed.
Please notice that individuals can be included in several categories. More than
18% committed a crime against the public administration, about 22% against
the justice system, more than 2% against public order, about 2% against public
safety, 7.6% against the public belief, about 2% against their family, about 30%
against the person and 69% against property. In addition, 2% were involved
in mafia crimes, more than 34% were arrested for drug-related crimes, almost
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8% for traffic violation, about 10% for illegal detention of weapons and 4.9%
for illegal immigration.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics (for individuals
who reoffended)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Against public admin. (tit.2) 0.184 n/a
Against the justice system (tit.3) 0.219 n/a
Against public order (tit.5) 0.021 n/a
Against public safety (tit.6) 0.021 n/a
Against the public belief (tit.7) 0.076 n/a
Against family (tit. 11) 0.019 n/a
Against the person (tit. 12) 0.295 n/a
Against property (tit. 13) 0.695 n/a
Mafia crime 0.02 n/a
Drugs 0.343 n/a
Traffic violation 0.079 n/a
Illegal detention of weapons 0.103 n/a
Illegal immigration 0.049 n/a
Undefined crime 0.021 n/a
Other crime 0.095 n/a




The objective of this paper is to isolate the drivers of group formation of
former inmates for re-offending purposes. In order to do so, we exploit the 2006
Italian prison pardon that gave rise to a random release of large numbers of
inmates across several prisons in Italy. More specifically, we study inmates who
benefited from the prison pardon and re-offended in order to investigate the
determinants that make them more likely to re-offend in group with prisoners
they were released with.
Conditional on recidivating, we model the criminals’ decision to recidivate
with or without previous inmates. For a given individual i, we regress directly
his likelihood to re-offend with inmate j, who has spent time in prison with
him, on his characteristics, the characteristics of his potential peer as well as
potential interactions between own and peer characteristics. For continuous
variables X such as age, sentence length, and residual sentence length we
take the absolute difference between i and j. For categorical variables Z, like
nationality, education, employment, or crime type, we define a variable that is
equal to one when one when the two inmates share the same category.
We use a linear probability model,
Pij = α + β
′
X(Xi +Xj) + γ
′
X |Xi −Xj|+ β′Z(Zi + Zj) + γ′ZZiZj + εij, . (1.1)
where the error term may contain a series of fixed effects (including prison
facility) and is clustered at the prison facility level (there are a total of 120
different facilities in our final sample). βX and βZ measure the direct effect
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on the likelihood of partnering up versus acting alone, while −γX and γZ
measure how homophily influences partnerships. When interacting crime types
a positive γZ would mean that inmates specialise and look for inmates with
similar skills, while a negative γZ would mean that inmates are more likely
to partner up with inmates with different skills, potentially complementary
skills. The partnership variable is subject to miss-classification, meaning that
the true partnership between i and j, P ∗ij, is subject to error. The next Section
discusses how such bias can be adjusted for.
1.3.2 Misclassification of Criminal Partnerships
In the data on pardoned inmates two individuals (i and j) who spent
time in prison together (in the same facility F ) and re-offended on the same
day D are assumed to be partners (P ) in crime:
Pij = 1 if Di = Dj and Fi = Fj. (1.2)
The main empirical challenge we face is that our observed criminal part-
nership measure between individual i and j, Pij ∈ {0, 1} may be subject to
misclassification. If P is the observed partnership and P ∗ the true one, we can
distinguish two types of misclassification (disregarding the ij subscript):
α1 = Pr(P = 1|P ∗ = 0), (1.3)
is the probability of observing that two individuals re-offended in partnership
whereas they were not together, and
α0 = Pr(P = 0|P ∗ = 1), (1.4)
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the probability of observing that two individuals re-offended alone whereas
they were partnering up.
Misclassification can come from different sources. On one hand, we might
not observe all partnerships if some co-offenders are arrested on different dates
or if some manage to avoid an arrest altogether. On the other hand, two
individuals who spent time in prison together might end up being rearrested
on the same date even if both were acting on their own.
Misclassification in a limited dependent setting is not as innocuous as
classical measurement error in the dependent variable, as it attenuates all
coefficients towards zero Meyer and Mittag (2013). Estimates are conservative
and need be inflated by a factor that depends on α1 and α0.
Hausman et al. (1998) show that as long as misreporting is condition-
ally “random” and constant across individuals, which is what we assume, the
marginal effects in the observed data are proportional to the true marginal
effects
∂ Pr(Y = 1|X)
∂X
= (1− α0 − α1)f(X ′β)β;
where f(X ′β) is the link function of a limited dependent variable model, which
in the case of a linear probability model is simply equal to one.
In order to uncover the degree of adjustment (1 − α0 − α1)−1 we use
an auxiliary data set which contains additional information about recidivating
offenders. In particular, it contains information on the new type of crime
committed. This information allows us to get estimates of α0 and α1 under
fairly mild conditions.
The definition of peer groups that we use when running regressions with
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our first dataset carries the following signal6:
Pr(P ∗ = 1|Di = Dj, Fi = Fj) = Pr(P ∗ = 1|P = 1). (1.5)
Since our second dataset includes crime type (C) when re-offending, we
can use this information to quantify the measurement error caused by the
definition of peer groups we use in our regressions. In order to do so, we make
the following assumption:
Assumption 1.
Pr(P ∗ = 0|Di = Dj, Fi = Fj, Ci 6= Cj) = 1,
meaning that two individuals who are arrested on the same day and
spent time in prison together cannot be peers if they have not committed the
same type of crime. This appears to be true by definition when considering
criminal responsibility and the full set of crimes committed. For example,
during a robbery one criminal might be the sole responsible for having used
violence against a victim, though all criminals are going to be responsible for
the robbery, even those who might have just been on the watch.
Assumption 2.
Pr(Di = Dj, Ci = Cj|Fi = Fj) = Pr(P ∗ = 1|Fi = Fj),
meaning that on average the observed probability of observing a peer
based on same crime type and same day of arrest is equal to the true probability
of observing a peer.
6Note that we only consider two individuals as being peers if they were released from the
same prison.
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Let us first focus on the likelihood that we classify two individuals as
being peers whereas they are not re-offending together (α1). Since we are
always considering inmates who spent time in prison together we simplify the
notation by omitting that Fi = Fj From Assumption 1, it follows that
7:
Pr(P ∗ = 0|P = 1) = 1− [Pr(P ∗ = 1|Di = Dj, Ci = Cj)] Pr(Ci = Cj|Di = Dj).(1.6)
Using Assumption 2 and Equation (1.6), we obtain:
Pr(P ∗ = 0|P = 1) = 1− Pr(Ci = Cj|Di = Dj). (1.7)
Using our second dataset, we estimate Pr(Ci = Cj|Di = Dj) to be 0.44.
Moreover, such estimate can be computed for various thresholds of |Di −Dj|,
allowing us to assess the importance of false positive in the auxiliary dataset:
Pr(P ∗ = 1|Di = Dj, Ci = Cj). Figure 1.1 shows the estimated likelihood of
co-offending Pr(Ci = Cj| |Di −Dj|) depending on the time distance between
the arrest of two peers (conditional on having spent time in prison together).
Identifying co-offenders when |Di−Dj| is larger then zero immediately lowers
the likelihood that the criminals committed the same type of crime. This
suggests that the day of rearrest of two inmates who spent time in the same
prison is a strong signal for partnership. Plugging the estimated probability
Pr(Ci = Cj|Di = Dj) into Equation (1.7), we obtain Pr(P ∗ = 0|P = 1) = 0.66.
To find the probability of observing that two individuals re-offended in
partnership whereas they were not together, we use the Bayes formula and
7We express our main definition of partnership as a function of crime type Pr(P ∗ =
0|Di = Dj) = Pr(P ∗ = 0|Di = Dj , Ci = Cj) Pr(Ci = Cj |Di = Dj) + Pr(P ∗ = 0|Di =
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Figure 1.1: Probability of Committing the Same Crime Type
Notes: The first graph represents the probability that two inmates who spent time in
prison together were rearrested for the same crime within X days. The second graph
represents the probability that two inmates who spent time in prison together were
rearrested for the same crime X days apart.
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Assumption 2 and we obtain:
Pr(P = 1|P ∗ = 0) = Pr(P
∗ = 0|P = 1)Pr(P = 1)
1− Pr(Di = Dj, Ci = Cj)
(1.8)
Using our second dataset we estimate Pr(P = 1) = 0.043 and Pr(Di =
Dj, Ci = Cj) = 0.013. Plugging these numbers into Equation (8) and using
Pr(P ∗ = 0|P = 1) = 0.66, we find α1 = Pr(P = 1|P ∗ = 0) = 0.03.
The intuition here is that there are few inmates who commit the same
crime in the same day that if they are not peers it is unlikely to observe such
combinations. This confirms that observing criminals released from the same
prison and then rearrested on the same day is a very strong signal for being
partners in crime.
Next, we have to consider the likelihood that someone is not classified
as a peer when in reality he or she is, α0. In our definition of partnerships,
individuals can only be peers if they were re-incarcerated on the same day
and met in prison before. We note three cases where we could have defined
individuals as not being peer whereas, in reality, they were. We enumerate
these three cases below and try to find the corresponding probabilities:
1. Pr(Di = Dj, Fi 6= Fj|P ∗ = 1) and Pr(Di 6= Dj, Fi 6= Fj|P ∗ = 1)
2. Pr(Di 6= Dj, Fi = Fj|P ∗ = 1)
There are 120 different prison facilities in our data, or slightly more than
one facility per Italian province. Since prison rules dictate to serve time in
prison close to one’s residence, inmates from different facilities have a chance
of just 1 over 119, or less than 1 per cent, to have spent time in different prisons
residing in the same province. We assume that inmates that live in different
provinces have a chance that is indistinguishable from zero to be partners in
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crime. Moreover, since our focus is on partnerships that develop in prison,
partnerships developed outside of prison would be of little use.
Next we discuss Pr(Di 6= Dj, Fi = Fj|P ∗ = 1), the possibility that
criminals are co-offending but end up in prison at different times. Again we
can use the evidence from Figure 1.1. The right panel shows that there is a
clear jump in the probability that two offenders are committing the same crime
when moving from offenders arrested on the same day to offenders arrested one
day apart. After that first jump, there is no evidence that the probability keeps
on decreasing as we increase |Di−Dj|, suggesting that a negligible fraction of
peers are arrested on different days, driving Pr(P = 0|P ∗ = 1) to zero.
Summing up, in order to adjust our estimates we need to inflate them
by 1/(1 − 0.03) ≈ 1.03. Considering the low magnitude of misclassification,
we present regression results without inflating coefficients and consider them
as lower bound estimates.
1.4 Results
We start by documenting how the likelihood of criminal partnership
varies with respect to age, total sentence, residual sentence, and the corre-
sponding difference in these variables between inmate pairs. The top left panel
of Figure 1.2 shows an inverted U-shaped relationship between the probability
of partnering up and age, with a peak that is close to the average age. The
right panel shows that the inverted U-shaped relationship is likely to be driven
by the fact that inmates of average age are more likely to find partners of
crime of similar age, as the likelihood of partnership decreases monotonically
when the age difference between potential partners increases. The evidence
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Partnerships by Difference in Sentence
Figure 1.2: Probability of Partnerships against Continuous Variable
Notes: Local linear regressions and corresponding 95 percent confidence interval using the
rule-of-thumb bandwidth. Except for the residual sentence we truncate the variables at the
95th percentile.
The patterns are less clear with respect to residual sentence, however,
partnerships appear to be more likely when inmates face similar residual sen-
tences. This is consistent with the findings of Drago and Galbiati (2012),
where inmates are shown to respond to the deterrence effects faced by their
peers. Finally, we observe no clear relationship between partnerships and sen-
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tence length, which is consistent with the lack of homophily with respect to
crime types we document later. Table 1.3 presents the estimates of Equation
1. In order to control for the fact that the number of inmates influences the
likelihood of partnership, each specification contains a full set of prison fixed
effects. In column (1) we control for socioeconomic characteristics, and each
subsequent column adds additional controls to the specification. Column (2)
has information on sentences, column (3) adds information on crime types and
whether criminal pairs committed the type of crime.
Table 1.3: Partnership Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ij-Partners of crime (×100)
Age -0.0022* -0.0021** -0.0018* -0.0018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Difference in age -0.0045** -0.0045** -0.0045*** -0.0044**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education unknown -0.0484 -0.0477 -0.0481 -0.0435
(0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047)
Years of education -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0021
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Difference in years of education -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Employed 0.0470 0.0461 0.0434 0.0495
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
Both employed 0.2441 0.2426 0.2377 0.2500
(0.187) (0.188) (0.188) (0.190)
Same nationality 0.1485*** 0.1448*** 0.1213** 0.1127**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
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– continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ij-Partners of crime (×100)
Sentence (in months) -0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Difference in sentence 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Residual sentence (months) 0.0026* 0.0028** 0.0024*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Difference in residual sentence -0.0036** -0.0035** -0.0030*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Against public admin. (tit.2) -0.0076 -0.0131
(0.044) (0.043)
Against the justice system (tit.3) -0.0031 -0.0018
(0.042) (0.043)
Against public order (tit.5) -0.1418*** -0.1428***
(0.045) (0.046)
Against public wellbeing (tit.6) 0.0269 0.0330
(0.098) (0.100)
Against the public belief (tit.7) -0.0684 -0.0657
(0.051) (0.052)
Against family (tit. 11) -0.0946* -0.0875
(0.055) (0.053)
Against the person (tit. 12) 0.0175 0.0232
(0.035) (0.035)
Against property (tit. 13) -0.0724 -0.0618
(0.069) (0.070)
Mafia crime 0.2822*** 0.2831***
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(1) (2) (3) (4)




Traffic violation -0.0539 -0.0471
(0.044) (0.044)
Illegal detention of weapons -0.0642** -0.0610**
(0.030) (0.030)
Illegal immigration 0.0016 0.0138
(0.056) (0.055)
Undefined crime 0.0682 0.0635
(0.096) (0.099)
Other crime -0.1104*** -0.1118***
(0.035) (0.033)
Both Against public admin. (tit.2) -0.0910 -0.0755
(0.106) (0.106)
Both Against the justice system (tit.3) -0.0173 -0.0353
(0.069) (0.068)
Both Against public order (tit.5) -0.1267* -0.1344*
(0.074) (0.076)
Both Against public wellbeing (tit.6) -0.3166* -0.3263*
(0.185) (0.190)
Both Against the public belief (tit.7) 0.4802 0.4911
(0.309) (0.314)
Both Against family (tit. 11) -0.1802* -0.1795
(0.106) (0.109)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ij-Partners of crime (×100)
Both Against the person (tit. 12) -0.0091 -0.0307
(0.056) (0.055)
Both Against property (tit. 13) 0.0788 0.0714
(0.072) (0.071)
Both Mafia crime 0.5416 0.5526
(1.456) (1.477)
Both Drugs 0.1128 0.1098
(0.078) (0.079)
Both Traffic violation -0.0275 -0.0326
(0.075) (0.077)
Both Illegal detention of weapons -0.0001 -0.0032
(0.134) (0.136)
Both Illegal immigration 0.0461 0.0516
(0.326) (0.345)
Both Undefined crime -0.5044*** -0.4816***
(0.165) (0.169)
Both Other crime 0.1041 0.0201
(0.145) (0.113)
Observations 224,328 224,328 224,328 219,172
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Nationality fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Prison fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Notes: All regressions include 120 prison fixed effects and nationality fixed effects. Clustered
robust standard errors (by prison facility) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ij-Partners of crime (×100)
The sample used in column (4) excludes all the observations where i and j
entered prison in the same month, and therefore might have been partners before
even entering prison. We observe that our main results are robust when adding
more controls. First of all, we notice that older inmates tend to partner up less with
former inmates. Moreover, all the parametric regressions suggest that in line with
the evidence shown in Figure 1.2 the age difference between two inmates plays a
significant role in group formation. Inmates tend to sort by age and two inmates
whose age is closer are more likely to partner up. When looking at regression (4),
we observe that two inmates with an age difference of 10 years are 0.044 percentage
points less likely to partner up. Relative to the baseline probability of partnership
this corresponds to a 17.5 per cent reduction. This finding implies that when es-
timating criminal peer effects, researchers should take into account age differences
when defining peer groups. Another strong predictor of partnerships is when inmates
share the same nationality. Inmates with the same nationality are 0.11 percentage
points more likely to partner up (or 44 per cent). These results support most of the
literature on peer effects in prison that considers that peer groups should be defined
with respect to nationality. The direct effects of the nationality dummies are shown
in Figure 1.3, together with their 95% confidence intervals.
It does not appear that some nationalities are more likely to partner up com-
pared to the Italian one (the excluded nationality). Countries for which we find
a significant difference in terms of partnership decisions compared to Italians are
countries whose citizens constitute a marginal proportion of our sample. So, Capo
Verde is the only country for which citizens are significantly less likely to partner
and Lithuania and Rwanda are the only two countries whose inmates are more
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Figure 1.3: Differences Across
Countries
Notes: The Figure shows the differences
in the likelihood of partnering up
compared to Italians, together with the
95% confidence interval. The estimates
are taken from Column 4 of Table 1.3.
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likely to partner up. We observe no impact of education or employment status on
peer group formation. In line with the graphical evidence, we observe that inmates
with higher residual sentences prefer to partner up, preferably with inmates with
a similar residual sentence. The first result might be explained by the fact that
a higher residual sentence increases the expected punishment. In response to the
increased punishment inmates may partner up to reduce the likelihood of an arrest.
The second result is in line with Drago and Galbiati (2012), who show that peers’
average residual sentence influences an inmate’s recidivism behaviour. Individuals
with similar residual sentence will face similar incentives, which is likely to help the
matching process. Inmates with a 10-month difference in terms of residual sentences
are 0.3 percentage points less likely to associate (12 per cent). When it comes to
crime types, we observe that mafia criminals are the most likely to partner up, while
those who committed crimes against the family and against the public order are the
least likely to partner up. We do not observe that inmates partner up with inmates
of similar skills. If anything, there is evidence of complementarities among inmates
whose crimes one does not associate with a criminal career (i.e. crimes against the
family, the public order, and the public safety). As a result of spending time in
prison, these inmates might look for more profitable crimes. Figure 1.4 shows the
effect by crime type of interacting with a member of an organised crime group, to-
gether with the 95% confidence interval. Power is clearly an issue as only 2 per cent
of the inmates have committed a mafia related crime. Yet we do find that inmates
who were in prison because of crimes against the public administration (mainly cor-
ruption) are more likely to partner up when encountering a mafioso, which is in line
with the many corruption scandals involving the mafia. We also find that inmates
who were in prison for crimes against the public order, or traffic violations, somehow
sporadic crimes, are less likely to partner up with mafiosi.
44






Illegal detention of weapons
Drugs
Against the public belief (tit.7)
Against the person (tit. 12)
Against the justice system (tit.3)
Against public safety (tit.6)
Against public order (tit.5)
Against public admin. (tit.2)
Against property (tit. 13)
Against family (tit. 11)
Figure 1.4: The Organised Crime
Effect
Notes: The Figure shows the effect of
interacting with a member of an




This paper emphasises the driving factors of partnership decisions of former
inmates for re-offending purposes. We find evidence that nationality, age and resid-
ual sentence are key determinants of peer group formation. Mafia criminals are more
likely to partner up, and more generally career criminals, are more likely to partner
up. As for matching across crime types, there is some evidence of complementarities,
and possibly learning across crime types. Mostly from what appear to be sporadic
crimes by unprofessional criminals to career crimes.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on peer effects in prison in
several ways. Firstly, we present a method to measure partnerships based on the
date of re-incarceration of inmates who spent time in prison together. We also show
how to deal with the misclassification probabilities when there is information on the
new crime that has been committed. We show evidence that the likelihood that we
classify two individuals as being peers whereas they are not re-offending together
(α1) is equal to 3% and that the likelihood that someone is not classified as a peer
when in reality he or she is (α0) is close to 0. We then show how to inflate regression
coefficients to recover their true values.
Secondly, peer effects in prison can depend on information dissemination, skills
transfer, and matching for re-offending purposes, as well as combinations of all these
factors. We show that matching for re-offending purposes is an important driver of
peer effects, and we show which dimensions drive the matching. Moreover, our find-
ings pave the way to more accurate studies on peer effects in prison. As explained
previously, authors rely on arbitrary definitions to define peer groups such as na-
tionality or they use findings from other disciplines. However, defining peer groups
correctly is crucial to avoid misleading conclusions. Since we model directly peer
group formation in prison, our study suggests ways to improve current definitions of
peer groups when studying peer effects in prison. For instance, most of the current
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literature defines peer groups based on nationality. As stated above, nationality is a
driving factor of peer group formation, which supports the inclusion of nationality
as a criterion to define peer groups in current studies. However, we also observe
that age and incentives (in the form of residual sentence) are important factors to
take into account. With respect to crime types we observe that career criminals
are likely to influence inmates who committed crimes that are not associated with
a criminal career, like crimes committed against the family (violence against chil-
dren, incest, etc.), or crimes committed against the public order (disorderly conduct,
public drunkenness, etc.).
Our results also have practical implications for policy purposes and can enable
policymakers to design more accurate prevention policies based on the following
information: the characteristics of the prisoners that were released with any of the
other inmates who are still in custody. For instance, if two inmates are released on
the same day from the same prison, authorities should be concerned if they have the
same nationality or similar ages.
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Chapter 2
Can predictive policing reduce
domestic abuse? Evidence from
Essex
2.1 Introduction
Domestic abuse is a major concern for police forces in the UK since many
of them face over 100 related calls every hour (HMIC, 2015). In the UK, 488,000
domestic abuse offences were recorded by the police in the year ending in March 2017
while the Crime Survey estimated two million victims in England and Wales (ONS,
2017). Domestic abuse accounts for 10% of all recorded crime (Women’s Aid, 2018)
and associated costs are estimated to be £5.5bn a year in England including £1.6bn
for physical and mental health costs and £1.2bn in criminal justice costs (Trust for
London, 2017). However, researchers have estimated that the overall social cost of
abuse is at least £15.7 bn per year (Walby, 2009).
In 2010, the government recommended to switch from a top-down policy re-
sponse to a more localised response in order to better address this national issue.
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They emphasised prevention, provision of support to victims, working in partner-
ship with other agencies and risk reduction (Matczak et al., 2011). In March 2011,
it confirmed the utmost importance of domestic abuse in the policy agenda and
to support the new policy orientation it introduced a new £28 million action plan,
”Call to End Violence against Women and Girls: Action Plan”.
One of the main issues in designing policies to reduce domestic abuse is that,
to deal with offenders, the police need victims to report offences. According to
the Office of National Statistics (ONS), only 62% of the victims in the UK report
abuse to anyone (ONS, 2013) and only 21% of abuse is reported to the police (ONS,
2016). In addition to enabling the police to take actions, reporting is essential as
underreporting or late reporting1 can have long-term consequences, which can be
even more detrimental to victims. Underreporting also gives rise to substantial
economic costs and the Early Intervention Foundation (EIF) estimated in 2016 that
the cost of late intervention in England and Wales was £5.23 billion per year. So,
in order ro be efficient, policies that target offenders should also be combined with
measures that support victims and encourage them to report.
In Essex, the policy targets both offenders and their victims. To better identify
high-risk offenders, data intelligence units work hand in hand with policymakers
and use risk assessment to trigger policy implementation. Since 2014, the main
assessment tool on which the Essex Police have been relying on is the Strathclyde
model. This model is based on a risk score that measures how dangerous each
suspect2is and it is updated every week. In this model, the higher the risk score, the
more dangerous a suspect3. When the risk score is above a certain threshold, police
forces inform suspects who they will be put under higher surveillance, which increases
1As opposed to early reporting, late reporting corresponds to a situation where victims
do not report small incidents of domestic abuse and they end up reporting more serious
incidents later on as their situation escalated.
2Suspects are all the individuals that were reported for domestic abuse at least once
during the time span of the data.
3The risk score lies between 0 and 100. See Section 2.4 on the Strathclyde model for
more information on how to construct the risk score.
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their expected probability that the police will respond upon being reported by their
victims. Moreover, the police contact their victims to encourage them to report and
aim to increase victims’ trust that the police will respond to their reporting.
One of the biggest obstacles to analyse policies to reduce domestic abuse is
the lack of good data. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) set up, I
exploit unusually rich data from the Essex Police and show that suspects just past
the threshold are 9% more likely to be reported again for domestic abuse within one
month compared to those that stayed just below. It is challenging to understand
whether an observed increase in domestic abuse incidents is the result of higher
rates of reporting by victims or higher rates of the underlying crime. My model
and empirical approach distinguish between these two channels, and I suggest that
the deterrence of the offender caused by the increasing probability of punishment is
outweighed by an increase in reporting from the victims4.
This paper also investigates the heterogeneous impact of the policy across
types of observed recidivism and shows evidence that results are driven by an in-
crease in the number of calls related to domestic abuse for which the police could
not establish criminal charges. A potential explanation for this is that the policy
pushed victims to report low-type events of domestic abuse that they would not
have reported otherwise. Although this effect of increasing reporting may appear
positive, this paper highlights that policies encouraging the reporting of events of
domestic abuse that do not give rise to a legal response can have a perverse effect
and lead to escalation.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 summarises the
literature, section 2.3 presents the policy context in Essex, section 2.4 explains the
Strathclyde model, section 2.5 shows the data, section 2.6 describes the behavioural
response to the policy, section 2.7 presents the empirical strategy, section 2.8 shows
4Note that, since suspects are not aware of the fact they have risk scores, they cannot
modify their behaviours accordingly and manipulate the risk score.
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the empirical results, section 2.9 investigates heterogeneity, section 2.10 underlines
potential perverse effects of the policy, section 2.11 presents robustness checks and
section 2.12 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
There is a growing economics literature that investigates predictors of domes-
tic abuse. A wide range of papers studies how intra-household allocations can affect
domestic abuse. Aizer (2010) studies the role of the gender wage gap on domestic
violence in the US and emphasises that reductions in the gender wage gap explain 9
per cent of the decline in domestic abuse witnessed between 1990 and 2003. Bobonis
et al. (2013) find that transfer programmes in Mexico in which funds are targeted
to women decrease the incidence of spousal abuse. So, beneficiary women are 40 per
cent less likely to be victims of physical abuse, but are more likely to receive vio-
lent threats with no associated abuse. Using a randomised experiment in Ecuador,
Melissa et al. (2016) investigate whether cash, vouchers, and food transfers targeted
to women and intended to reduce poverty and food insecurity also affected intimate
partner violence. Results indicate that transfers reduce controlling behaviours and
physical and/or sexual violence by 6 to 7 percentage points.
Other papers anchor on different literatures and investigate the impact of
various factors on domestic abuse such as sport events or political representation.
For instance, Card and Gordo (2011) look at the impact of football results in the
American National Football League (NFL) on domestic abuse. They find that losses
in games that the home team was predicted to win by more than 3 points lead to
an 8 per cent increase in police reports of at-home male-on-female intimate partner
abuse. Iyer et al. (2012) find that an increase in female representation in local
governments in India induces a large and significant rise in crimes against women.
They suggest that this increase is good news, driven primarily by greater reporting
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rather than greater incidence of such crimes. These papers underline predictors of
domestic abuse but results are hard to exploit for policy purposes and they give
little insights on how to design feasible interventions to reduce domestic abuse.
Research is scant on the impact of policies that are specifically designed to
reduce domestic abuse or increase reporting. In one of the rare papers on the topic,
Iyengar (2010) analyses the impact of mandatory arrest laws in the United States
(US) on subsequent domestic abuse. She exploits the fact that mandatory arrest
laws do not exist in all US states and that the timing in the implementation of the
existing laws differed across states. Mandatory arrest laws require the police to arrest
abusers when a domestic abuse incident is reported. Using the FBI Supplementary
Homicide Reports (SHR), she finds that mandatory arrest laws actually increased
intimate partner homicides. This paper intends to contribute to this literature by
studying the impact of a policy to reduce domestic abuse in Essex.
As discussed, one of the issues in designing policies to reduce domestic abuse
is that incidents go unreported. According to the ONS (2013), only 62% of victims
report to someone. Among victims that report, almost 50% told friends, relatives or
a neighbour, 12% called the police, 10% a counsellor or therapist and 8% a health
professional. Another study from the ONS (2016) finds that only 20% of abuse
is reported to the police (ONS, 2016). Many factors can affect the reporting of
domestic abuse such as the financial situation of the victims or their dependence on
their offender, having children, or having a temporary immigration status (APPG,
2015). Unfortunately, there is very little room for policymakers to impact these
factors and induce victims to report in order to protect them.
Another important factor that leads to underreporting is the fact that some
victims do not trust the police. According to data from the ONS, in 2011-12 one
of the main reasons for not reporting abuse was that victims perceived the police
would not (or could not) do anything about it. In line with this, a survey for the
2014 HMIC Inspection finds that 30% of the victims do not report because of lack
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of trust or confidence in the police to take actions in the wake of their reporting. By
contacting victims of known suspects and informing them that the police would take
actions to carefully investigate any future reporting from them, the Essex Police aim
to increase trust in the police. This is a potential cost-efficient channel to increase
reporting and, by quantifying the impact of this policy, this paper aims to pave the
way for more domestic abuse policies that trigger these channels.
2.3 Policy context in Essex
2.3.1 Key facts in Essex
An interesting feature of Essex for policy analysis is that this county of south-
east England has socio-economic characteristics that are close to the average for the
country. To understand how Essex performs within the UK, I use deprivation deciles
to see where Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA)5 in Essex belong. By defini-
tion, the lower the decile, the more deprived the area. Table 2.1 presents the average
deprivation deciles that LSOAs from Essex belong to for 6 indices of deprivation.









From Table 2.1, I observe that the average crime decile in which LSOAs in
Essex belong to is close to the national average i.e. 5.85. Average Income, Employ-
5LSOAs are geographical areas with a population of around 1500. Figures are obtained
from the English Indices of Deprivation 2015.
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ment and Health deprivation indices lie into the 6th decile, which means that Essex
performs slightly better than the national average in these areas. The housing de-
privation index lies into the 5th decile. To better understand crime trends in Essex
compared to national trends, I look at how crime rates per 1000 inhabitants within
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Figure 2.1: Quarterly crime rates per 1000 inhabitants (based on a rolling
12-month window).
1st 2010 and June 1st 2015, we observe that crime rates per 1000 inhabitants in the
UK slightly decreased from 68 to 66 reported crimes per 1000 inhabitants. Over the
same period, crime rates in Essex decreased from 75 to 71 per 1000 inhabitants but
remained slightly above the national average7.
2.3.2 Policy tools in Essex
A main obstacle that may have prevented economists from carrying out studies
on the efficacy of policies to reduce domestic abuse is the quality of available data.
For instance, in Essex, the main assessment method that was implemented before
the Strathclyde model is the Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Harassment and Honour-
6Figures are computed using crime counts from the Crime Survey for England and Wales
(CSEW) and population census levels in 2011.
7Although aggregate crime rates are informative, they may not represent trends in do-
mestic abuse. Unfortunately, aggregate data that would enable us to consistently compare
trends in domestic abuse in Essex to trends at the country level are not available.
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based abuse risk identification (DASH) risk tool. This model was launched in 2009
and is still the main model that is used in the UK8. In this model, victims are
classified in three distinct risk levels (standard, medium, or high risk) by frontline
officers depending on their answers to a 27-question questionnaire. A main issue
of the DASH model for policy evaluation purposes is that officers must use their
professional judgement to classify victims in these three distinct risk levels (Robinson
et al., 2016). Moreover, once frontline officers have classified victims, police forces
decide at the local level which risk level they want to respond to and there is no
data on how each police force proceeds. For instance, some police forces trigger a
policy response for all victims classified as medium risk or high risk while others just
focus on high-risk victims. Finally, re-assessment depends on the will of the officers
and on their subjective perception of the situation of a victim. As a consequence,
the DASH is not updated consistently and researchers can wrongly rely on an initial
assessment that may differ over time.
Unlike the DASH risk tool, the Strathclyde model relies on an algorithm that
is applied to administrative data on the domestic abuse history of each suspect9 in
the past 12 months. This model was created to help the police to better identify
high-risk suspects of domestic abuse. More specifically, it enables the police to attach
a dynamic risk score to each suspect that indicates how dangerous they are10. Since
it is computed by officers from the central office in Chelmsford, it also ensures that
the procedure is uniform across suspects as well as over time. Moreover, since policy
responses are driven by a common threshold of the risk score across police units,
it guarantees that the policy response is applied consistently for a given level of
risk. Finally, unlike the DASH model, the risk score is systematically updated every
8In 2009, National Policing leads endorsed a risk model to support and improve the
police response to cases of domestic abuse: the Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Harassment
and Honour-based abuse risk identification, assessment and management model (DASH).
9Recall that suspects are individuals that were reported at least once during the time
span of the data i.e. from 2013 to 2015. The police calculated the algorithm for each suspect
only from 2014, which corresponds to the start of the policy.
10See Section 4 for more information on how the risk score is computed.
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week, which enables the police to reassess, weekly, how dangerous offenders are and
allocate resources accordingly. These are the main reasons for why the Essex Police
opted for the Strathclyde model in early 2014. From a policy evaluation point of
view, all these features of the Strathclyde model are essential as they enable one
to examine the causal impact of the policy in Essex on observed recidivism. The
following section describes in details how the risk score is calculated in practice by
the police.
2.4 The Strathclyde model
As discussed, in order to identify the most dangerous suspects of domestic
abuse and trigger policy response, the Essex police rely on the Strathclyde model.
This model was constructed for risk assessment purposes and intends to help the
police to better target high-risk individuals. The cornerstone of this model is an
index i.e. a risk score designed to evaluate how dangerous a suspect of domestic
abuse is. To compute it, the police apply an algorithm to administrative data on
the domestic abuse history of each suspect. When the risk score is above a certain
threshold, they implement policies to deter recidivism and increase reporting11. This
index is updated every week and the police can reassess over time how dangerous
suspects are.
2.4.1 The risk score
To compute the risk score on a particular date, the police use administrative
data at the suspect level for the previous 12 months. The risk score relies on three
main components that define how dangerous a suspect is according to the Strath-
clyde model: how many times an individual has been reported in the past 12 months,
11Suspects that pass the threshold and their victims are targeted by the policy until the
suspects go back below the threshold.
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when these events occurred in the past 12 months and the types of events in the
past 12 months. According to the model, these components characterise respectively
the frequency, the recency and the gravity of the events of domestic abuse that a
suspect was involved in. The police then apply an algorithm to these components
in order to attach subscores to each of them that capture their intensity12. The risk
score is based on a weighted average of these three subscores: the Frequency score,
the Recency score and the Gravity score (RFG). Each subscore and, subsequently,
the risk score is computed over the past 12 months and, updated every Monday.
So each week, offenders get a risk score that may change compared to the previous
week. The score lies between 0 and 100. When it goes above 67.5, policy responses
are implemented. The risk score is calculated as follows:
RiskScoreit = (FrequencyScoreit +RecencyScoreit +GravityScoreit)/4 (2.1)
with FrequencyScoreit the frequency score of individual i at date t, Recency Scoreit
the recency score of individual i at date t and GravityScoreit the gravity score of
individual i at date t. The Frequency score is computed over 200 while the other
2 subscores are both computed over 100. The risk score is the sum of these three
scores divided by 4 and is computed over 100. Therefore, in the Strathclyde Model,
the frequency score has more weight than the Recency score and the Gravity score.
2.4.2 The frequency score
To calculate the frequency score at date t, one needs to calculate first the
number of incidents that were reported for each suspect in the preceding 12 months
i.e. the frequency. The value is then compared to thresholds defined in a table
to obtain the frequency score. Table 2.2 shows the correspondence between the
number of incidents within the calendar date and 12 months before. For instance, if
12Subsection 2.4.2 to 2.4.4 describe in details how the police compute each subscore.
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an individual was responsible for 5 incidents in the past 12 months, his/her frequency
score is 150.
Table 2.2: Frequency score
Incidents Frequency











2.4.3 The recency score
To calculate the recency score at date t, one needs to first to obtain the average
recency i.e. the average number of days between date t and all the incidents that
were reported for each individual in the preceding 12 months. For instance, let us
assume that there were two incidents within 12 months before the calendar date.
One incident was reported 20 days before t and the other one 60 days before. To
calculate the average recency, one has to add up these two periods of time and divide
by the number of incidents over the past 365 days i.e. the frequency, which is 2.
The average recency score would then be (60+20)/2, which is equal to 40. Finally,
one needs to look this number up in a table to get the recency score. From Table
2.3, one can observe that an average recency of 40 corresponds to a recency score of
50.
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Table 2.3: Recency score
Average recency Recency
score
0 - 14 Days 100
15 -30 Days 75
31 - 60 Days 50
61 - 90 Days 30
91 - 120 Days 20
121 - 150 Days 10
151 - 180 Days 5
2.4.4 The gravity score
To calculate the gravity score at date t, one needs to get first the most serious
offence that was reported for each suspect in the 12 months before t i.e. the gravity.
Each type of offence corresponds to a gravity score that can be found in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: Gravity score
Gravity 100 Gravity 75 Gravity 50
Attempted Murder Committing an Offence with Intent to Commit a Sexual Offence Sexual Activity with a Child Family Member ABH Female Breach of the Peace
GBH Female Controlling a Child Prostitute ot a Child Involved in Pornography Sexual Assault ABH Male Criminal Damage
GBH Male Engaging in Sexual Activity in the Presence of a Child Sexual Assault of a Child Under 13 Abduction Female Drugs Possession
Malicious Wounding with Intent Exposure USI Abduction Male Prevent Breach of Peace
Manslaughter Gross Indecency Voyeurism Affray Civil Tresspass
Murder Incest Abandonment Female Assault Constable in exec of duty Attempted Criminal Damage
Possession of an Offensive Weapon Inciting a Child Family Member to Engage in Sexual Activity Abandonment Male Assault by Beating (Battery) Deception
Abuse of Position of Trust: Causing a Child to Watch a Sexual Act Indecency towards child Aggravated Burglary Common Assault Female Disqualified Driving
Abuse of Position of Trust: Sexual Activity with a Child Indecent Assault Female Breach of ASBO Common Assault Male Drink and Drive
Administering a Substance with Intent Indecent Assault Male Breach of Bail Conditions Drunk in Charge of a minor Drunk and Disorderly
Arranging or Facilitating the Commission of a Child Sex Offence Indecent Exposure Breach of Court Bail Obstruct/Resist Constable in exec of duty Going Equipped
Assault by Penetration Indecent Photos of Children Breach of Exclusion Order Resisting Arrest Offences Against Telecommunications Act
Assault of a Child Under 13 by Penetration Indecent photographs of Children aged 16 or 17 Breach of Injunction Robbery Other Indictable/Triable Offences
Attempted Rape Meeting a Child Following Sexual Grooming Etc. Breach of Non Molestation Order Arson Sect 4 RTA
Bestiality Paying for Sexual Services of a Child Breach of Prison Licence Blackmail TWOC
Buggery Female Pornography making /keeping Breach of Restraining Order Harassment Theft
Buggery Male Pornography on the Internet Cruelty Public Order Act Section 4 Theft of Motor Vehicle
Causing a Child to Watch a Sexual Act Position of Trust Offences Sexual Activity/Intercourse False Imprisonment Burglary Threats to Cause Criminal Damage
Causing a person to Engage in Sexual Activity Without Consent Rape Kidnapping Malicious Communications Unlawful removal of child from care
Causing or Inciting a Child Under 13 to Engage in Sexual Activity Rape of a Child Under 13 Neglect Outraging Public Decency
Causing or Inciting a Child to Engage in Sexual Activity Sex with an Adult Relative: Penetration Recall to Prison Perverting the course of Justice
Child Sex Offences Committed by Children or Young Persons Sexual Activity With A Child Threats to Kill Public Order Act Section 5
Trafficking out of the UK for Sexual Exploitation Violence to Secure Entry Witness Intimidation Threatening Violence to Secure Entry
Threats to Cause GBH
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For instance, consider an individual who committed a murder and also ha-
rassed a victim in the past 12 months. From Table 2.4, we can observe that murder
is considered as an offence of high gravity, which gives it a gravity of 100. We also
observe that an harassment is considered as an offence of medium gravity with a
gravity of 75. Since to compute the gravity score, what matters is only the most
serious offence, the gravity score of the individual will be 100.
2.5 Data
The dataset was collected by the Essex Police and contains information on all
30,000 suspects of domestic abuse in Essex from 2013 to 2015. It includes charac-
teristics of the suspects such as their age, gender, and where they live, as well as
information on the crimes they were suspected of perpetrating. This dataset was
collected for policy response purposes. It enables us to calculate a risk score for
each individual based on the Strathclyde Model described in Section 4. Recall that
the risk score is based on the following three subscores: the Frequency score, the
Recency score, and the Gravity score (RFG).
Recidivism is the probability that a suspect was reported for domestic abuse
within 1 month after the calendar date t13. Recidivism can be divided into two
components i.e. Offence and Incident. Offence is the probability that a suspect
is reported within 1 month after date t for domestic abuse events for which the
police established criminal charges. Incident is the probability that a suspect is
reported within 1 month after the calendar date t for domestic abuse events for
which the police could not establish any criminal charges. Table 2.5 presents the
descriptive statistics for data within bandwidth 20 of the threshold, which is the
main bandwidth I use in my analysis14.
13Although the risk score is updated every week, we look at recidivism within 1 month
as it allows us to have enough inmates that reoffended over this time span. Results taking
recidivism within 1 week are also significant but the data is more noisy.
14Table A.2 from Appendix A present the descriptive statistics for the whole data.
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics (Bandwidth 20)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Recidivism 0.135 0.342 77608
Offence 0.057 0.232 77608
Incident 0.078 0.269 77608
Age 34.075 11.181 68310
Female 0.09 0.286 81393
White 0.774 0.418 81393
RecencyScore 22.141 29.421 81393
GravityScore 88.182 14.494 81393
FrequencyScore 125.226 43.546 81393
RiskScore 58.887 7.809 81393
RiskScoreAbove 0.156 0.362 81393
From Table 2.5, results show that 13.5% of the suspects are reported again
for domestic abuse within one month. Among these individuals, 5.7% are reported
for offences that led to criminal charges and 7.8% for incidents. Suspects were,
on average, 34 years old, 9% female and 77% white. The average RecencyScore,
GravityScore and FrequencyScore are respectively 22, 88 and 125. The average risk
score is almost 59 and 15.6% of the suspects have a risk score above the threshold15.
2.6 Behavioural response to the policy
2.6.1 General set up
Domestic abuse can be represented in a simple game theoretic model with two
players i.e. an offender and a victim. To show the impact of the policy on players’
decisions, I opt for a simple two-step sequential game that is repeated monthly.
First, I assume that an offender decides whether or not he wants to abuse a domestic
partner. Then, the victim must decide whether or not she wants to report it to the
15Notice that the risk score is highly discrete with a small number of mass points (72) that
have a large number of observations each (on average 23,000). See Figure 2.3 from Section
7.2 for the distribution of the risk score
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Ot + v − γt(v)αOt (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] ;
Ut − v + αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v))− c(r(v))]− (1− αVt (v))τ(r(v))
) (Ot + v ; Ut − v) (Ot ; Ut)
Figure 2.2: Game tree representation
Formally, this extensive game can be defined as follows: 〈N,H;P, (i)〉 where:
N = {Offender, V ictim}; H consists of the 6 histories ∅, (A), (NA), (A, R), (A,
NR), (NA, NR)16; P (∅) = Offender and P (h) = V ictim for every nonterminal
history h 6= ∅. The following subsections define the payoffs of each player and how
the policy can affect them and, subsequently, the outcome of the game.
2.6.2 Victims’ reporting decisions
Assume that the victim gets utility from her relationship and that being ex-
posed to domestic abuse negatively affects the quality of her relationship. Assume
also that the victim faces the following tradeoff when deciding whether or not to
report to the police. On the one hand, if reporting to the police triggers a legal
response, sanctions may deter future domestic abuse and lead to an expected gain.
16A stands for abuse, NA for no abuse, R for reporting and NR for no reporting.
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On the other hand, the punishment of the offender may negatively affect her rela-
tionship or financial situation, which gives rise to a potential cost17. Note that legal
sanctions on the offender can only occur if the reporting of the victim triggers a
police intervention in first place. However, reporting does not always give rise to a
police response and, if a victim sees that her complaint is left unheard, she may feel
even more lonely and psychological distress will give rise to an emotional cost. This
cost can also be thought of as victim’s perception of the potential reprisal from the
offender if he learns that the victim reported him and the police did not respond. As
a consequence, before deciding to report, victims may evaluate whether they believe
that the police will trust them and that their complaint will trigger police actions18.
The situation can be represented as follows:
Ut(V ictim) =

Ut − v + αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v))− c(r(v))]
−(1− αVt (v))τ(r(v))
if v > 0 and r = 1
Ut − v if v > 0 and r = 0
Ut if v = 0
(2.2)
where Ut(V ictim) is the expected utility of the victim at time t. Ut is the
utility of the relationship for the victim at time t. v is a real positive number that
represents the cost of being exposed to domestic abuse19. αVt (v) represents the trust
of the victim in the police to respond to her reporting of an event of domestic abuse
v at time t. It is an expected probability that lies between 0 and 1. σ(v) represents
the expected probability that the reporting of an event of domestic violence v leads
to legal sanctions. r(v) is a binary variable equal to 1 if an individual reports an
17For instance, an offender may decide to leave the victim that reported him and she may
lose her main source of income.
18Recall that according to data from the Office of National Statistics, in 2011-12 one of
the main reasons for not reporting abuse was that victims perceived the police would not (or
could not) do anything about it. In line with this, a survey for the 2014 HMIC Inspection
finds that 30% of the victims do not report because of lack of trust or confidence in the
police to take actions in the wake of their reporting.
19For now, I hypothesise that domestic violence is binary and the cost of domestic abuse
is equal to v in case of violence and 0 otherwise.
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event v and 0 otherwise20. π(r(v)) is a real positive number that corresponds to the
expected benefit of the victim from a reporting of v that leads to legal sanctions,
conditional on being abused. c(r(v)) is a real positive number that corresponds
to the expected negative consequences of the punishment of the offender for the
victim, conditional on being abused and reporting an event v. τ(r(v)) represents
the expected emotional/potential reprisal cost of reporting an event v of domestic
abuse that does not lead to any response from the police. We assume that αVt (v),
σ(v), c(r(v)) and τ(r(v)) are all monotonic and increasing functions in v.
Conditional on being exposed to domestic abuse, a victim will decide to report
if there is a gain from it. In other words, a victim will report if and only if:
Ut − v + αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v))− c(r(v))]− (1− αVt (v))τ(r(v)) > Ut − v (2.3)
⇔ αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v))− c(r(v))]− (1− αVt (v))τ(r) > 0 (2.4)
From equation (4), we can observe that an individual will only report if the
expected net gain from reporting i.e. αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))], is greater than
the expected emotional and/or reprisal cost from a complaint left unheard i.e. (1−
αVt (v))τ(r(v)). Let us define the probablity of reporting γt(v), which is a function
equal to 1 if condition (4) holds and 0 otherwise21.
γt(v) = 1{(αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v))−c(r(v))]−(1−αVt (v))τ(r(v))>0)} (2.5)
2.6.3 Offenders’ decisions
Assume that an offender gets utility from his relationship with his victim
and that domestic abuse increases his utility. For instance, domestic abuse can be
thought of as an enforcement tool for the offender to induce the victim to make an
20For the sake of simplicity, I assume that individuals either do not report or fully report
and that victims can only report if they were victimised in first place.
21I assume that individuals play in pure strategies i.e. they do not mix.
65
action to increase his utility. Let us also assume that the offender gets a disutility
from the punishment he gets when his victims reports him. His expected utility can
be defined as follows:
O(Offender)t =

Ot + v − γt(v)αOt (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] if v > 0
Ot if v = 0
(2.6)
Where O(Offender)t is the expected utility of the offender at time t. Ot is
the utility of his relationship for the offender at time t. v represents the expected
gain from exerting a level of violence v. γt(v) is the expected probability that the
offender is reported by his victim for a given event of domestic abuse v at date t,
conditional on abusing her. αOt (v) is the expected probability of the offender at
time t that the police will respond to the reporting of his victim, conditional on
exerting a level v of domestic violence. σ(v) represents the expected probability of
getting legal sanctions after being reported for a level of domestic violence v. S(v)
corresponds to the expected legal sanctions for the offender if he exerts a level of
domestic violence v, conditional on being reported. I(v) represents the expected
cost of the police intervention for the offender if he exerts a level of domestic abuse
v and he is reported. αOt (v), σ(v), S(v) and I(v) are all monotonic and increasing
functions in v.
An offender will exert domestic abuse if the gain from it is greater that the
expected punishment. In other words, he will perpetrate domestic abuse if and only
if:
Ot + v − γt(v)αOt (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > Ot (2.7)
⇔ v − γt(v)αOt (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > 0 (2.8)
In other words, an offender will only abuse if the gain v from it is greater than the
expected punishment γt(v)α
O
t (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)].
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2.6.4 Potential outcomes of the game
Assume that the victim and the offender have complete information. In other
words, both players know their potential payoff when playing as well as the potential
payoff of the other player. To find the potential equilibria of this extensive game,
I proceed by backward induction and investigate the conditions under which each
outcome can occur. First, I look at the best response of the victim, conditional
on the action of the offender. Then, I look at the best response of the offender,
conditional on the strategies of the victim. I tally 3 different potential outcomes of
the game: (A, R), (A, NR) and (NA, NR).
In order for (A, R) to be the outcome of the game, the victim must find it
more profitable to report i.e. αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v))− c(r(v))]− (1−αVt (v))τ(r(v)) > 0,
conditional on being abused. So, the best response for the victim (V) will be to
report the abuse of the offender (O) i.e. BRV (A) = R. In order for this outcome to
be a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, the best response of the offender, knowing
that he will be reported if he abuses his victim, must be to exert domestic abuse i.e.
BRO(R) = A. This is true if the gain v from exerting violence is greater than the
expected punishment i.e. v − αOt (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > 022.
In order for (A, NR) to be the outcome of the game, the victim must find it
more profitable not to report i.e. αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v))−c(r(v))]−(1−αVt (v))τ(r(v)) 6
0, conditional on being abused. So, the best response for the victim (V) will be not
to report the abuse (A) i.e. BRV (A) = NR. Conditional on not being reported, the
best response of the offender will be to abuse his victim since, by definition, abusing
gives rise to a gain v such that v > 0. Under this condition, BRO(NR) = A and
(A, NR) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
In order for the outcome of the game to be (NA, NR), the victim must find
it profitable to report the offender, conditional on being abused i.e. αVt (v)σ(v)
[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] −(1 − αVt (v))τ(r(v)) > 0. Recall that domestic abuse gives rise
22Notice here that abusing is a dominant strategy for the offender
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to a gain v and, if the victim does not report, the offender always will be better off
offending. Knowing that he will be reported if he offends, to reach this equilibrium,
the offender must be better off not offending than offending and being reported i.e.
v − αOt (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] 6 0. Under these conditions, (NA, NR) is a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
2.6.5 Impact of the policy
As discussed, the objective of the Essex Police is to increase the trust victims
have that the police will respond to their reporting. I define αVt1(v) as the trust





From equation (2.4), it can easily be shown that, conditional on π(r(v)) − c(r(v))
being greater than 0, an increase in trust in the police increases the likelihood of
reporting23. In other words, if a victim has a net expected gain from reporting a
given event of domestic abuse, then perceiving that the police are more likely to
respond to her complaint will increase the likelihood that she reports. So, the policy
is expected to increase reporting.
Since the policy informs suspects that they will put under higher surveillance,
it increases their expected probability αOt (v) that the police respond to a reporting
from their victims. I define the expected probability of the offender at t1 that the
police will respond to the reporting of his victim under the policy i.e αOt1(v) such
that αOt1 > α
O
t0(v). From equation (2.8), it can be easily shown that an increase in
αOt (v) has a deterrence effect on the offender
24. Therefore, the policy is expected to
reduce crime25.
23If we take the first derivative of the expression from equation (2.4) with re-
spect to αVt (v), we obtain the following expression:d[α
V
t (v)σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] − (1 −
αVt (v))τ(r(v))]/dα
V
t (v) = σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] + τ(r(v)), which is always positive if
π(r(v))− c(r(v)) > 0.
24d[v − γt(v)αOt (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)]]/dαOt (v) = −γt(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)], which is always
negative, conditional on γt(v) > 0
25Recall that offenders are not aware that victims are contacted by the police and encour-
aged to report. They might however understand from their victims that the police contacted
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Potential changes in the parameters of the utility functions of both players
may affect their payoffs and, subsequently, their decisions. Let us assume that the
extensive game presented in Section 6.1 is played once at t0 and that the policy
takes place right after t0. The game is played a second time at t1. In order to
understand how the policy may affect each potential equilibrium, I hypothesise a
given equilibrium at t0 and investigate how changes in parameters as a result of
the policy being introduced right after t0 may affect the equilibrium at t1. More
specifically, I will show which equilibria at t0 will potentially change at t1 under the
policy.
Assume that at t0 the SPNE of the game was (A, R). As discussed, in order for
this outcome to occur, the two following conditions must hold: αVt0(v)σ(v)[π(r(v))−
c(r(v))] − (1 − αVt0(v))τ(r) > 0 and v − αOt0(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > 0. The pol-
icy introduction at t1 potentially increased trust in the police such that α
V
t1(v) >
αVt0(v). As a consequence, α
V
t1(v)σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] − (1 − αVt1(v))τ(r(v)) >
αVt0(v)σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] − (1 − αVt0(v))τ(r(v)) > 0. Therefore, conditional
on being abused, the victim will still report. Whether the initial equilibrium will
stay in the wake of the policy will depend on the offender and, more specifically,
on how he perceives the increase in the likelihood of the police to respond to
a potential reporting from his victim. At t1, the equilibrium will be (A,R)t1
if v − αOt0(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > v − αOt1(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > 0. However, if
v − αOt1(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > 0 > v − αOp (v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)], the offender will
not find it profitable anymore to abuse his victim, conditional on the victim report-
ing him. As a consequence, he will stop offending and the new equilibrium will be
(NA,NR)t1.
Assume that at t0 the SPNE of the game was (A, NR). Recall that for (A,
NR) to be the outcome of the game, the victim must be better off not reporting i.e.
them but let us assume for now that they do not update their beliefs on the payoffs of the
victims. As a consequence, we can assume that for the offender, γt(v) is taken as constant
between t0 and t1
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αVt (v)σ(v)[π(r(v))− c(r(v))]− (1−αVt (v))τ(r(v)) < 0, conditional on being abused.
In order for this SPNE at t0 to stay at t1 i.e. (A,NR)t1 , the victim must not find
it profitable to report at t1 and α
V
t1(v) must be such that 0 > α
V
t1(v)σ(v)[π(r(v))−
c(r(v))] − (1 − αVt1(v))τ(r(v)) > αVt0(v)σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] − (1 − αVt0)τ(r(v)).
However, if αVt1(v) is such that α
V
t1(v)σ(v)[π(r(v))− c(r(v))]− (1−αVt1(v))τ(r(v)) >
0 > αVt0(v)σ(v)[π(r(v))− c(r(v))]− (1−αVt0(v))τ(r(v)), the victim will now be better
off reporting, conditional on being abused and the outcome at t1 will be (A,R)t1 .
The value of αOt1(v) does not affect the outcome since the offender still believes that
the victim will not report him. As a consequence, he assumes that abusing is still a
dominant strategy.
Assume now that at t0 the SPNE of the game was (NA, NR). This suggests
that the offender was better off not committing domestic abuse26 at t0. In other
words, αOt0(v) was such that v−αOt0(v)[σ(v)S(v)+I(v)] < 0 and αVt0(v)σ(v)[π(r(v))−
c(r(v))]−(1−αVt0(v))τ(r(v)) > 0. Since the policy increases αOt (v) such that αOt1(v) >
αOt0(v), v − αOt1(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] 6 v − αOt0(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] < 0 and this
equilibrium does not change in the wake of the policy.
To sum up, the two SPNE that may change under the policy are (A,R)t0 and
(A,NR)t0, whereas (NA,NR)t0 will not be affected by the policy. As discussed,
the policy may deter recidivism and, the equilibrium (A,R)t0 at t0 can become
(NA,NR)t1 at t1, which may have a negative effect on observed recidivism. The
deterrence effect of the policy can also make the SPNE (A,NR)t0 at t0 become
(NA,NR)t1 at t1. Although in this case the policy is effective in reducing crime,
since victims were not reporting crime initially, this will not be captured by empirical
results. Since the policy leads to increased in trust in the police, reporting may
increase and the SPNE (A,NR)t0 at t0 can become (A,R)t1 at t1. This is expected
to have a positive effect on observed recidivism. Section 2.7 will test empirically
whether the reporting effect dominates the deterrence effect.
26Conditional on being reported. Otherwise, he is better offending.
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2.6.6 Heterogenous impact of the policy on reporting
So far, the model assumed that domestic abuse was a binary outcome, which
does not take into account the intensity of the events of domestic abuse. However,
the impact of the policy may be heterogeneous across events of domestic abuse of
different intensity. To understand the heterogeneous impact of the policy across
different intensity levels, imagine that domestic violence has either high (vh) or low
intensity (vl), with vh > vl. For instance, vh may correspond to a rape and vl to an
attempt of light coercive control.
Victims may have varying levels of trust in the police to respond to their
reporting depending on the type of crime they report. For instance, a victim that
wants to report a very serious event such as a rape may be more certain that her
complaint will trigger a police response. On the contrary, if she is subject to a
relatively less serious event of domestic abuse such as light coercive control, she may
expect that the police are very unlikely to respond to her complaint. Let αVt (vh) be
the trust of the victim in the police to respond to the reporting of a high-intensity
event and αVt (vl) be the the trust of the victim in the police to respond to the
reporting of a low-intensity event, with αVt (vh) > α
V
t (vl).
Offenders may expect initially that the probability that the police respond
to the reporting of their victims for events of high intensity αOt (vh) is higher com-
pared to low-intensity events αOt (vl) i.e α
O
t (vh) > α
O
t (vl). For instance, conditional
on being reported, an offender may expect that the police will put high efforts to
investigate a potential rape and low efforts or no effort to investigate light coercive
control.
As discussed, the potential decrease in observed recidivism in the wake of the
policy will be driven by the switch from the SPNE (A,R)t0 at t0 to (NA,NR)t1 at
t1 under the following condition: conditional on being reported, the offender must
find it initially more profitable to offend and, then, be deterred by the policy i.e.
v − αOt0(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > 0 > v − αOt1(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)]
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In order for the policy to deter high-type observed recidivism, we must have
the following condition:
vh − αOt0(vh)[σ(vh)S(vh) + I(vh)] > 0 > vh − αOt1(vh)[σ(v)S(vh) + I(vh)] (2.9)
When being reported for a rape, offenders may expect that the police will
investigate with certainty i.e. αOt (vh) = 1 and equation (9) becomes:
vh − [σ(vh)S(vh) + I(vh)] > vh − αOt1(vh)[σ(vh)S(vh) + I(vh)] (2.10)
⇔ αOt1(vh) > 1 (2.11)
However, by definition, αOt1(vh) 6 1 and condition (2.11) cannot hold. As
a consequence, the policy will not deter recidivism for high-type events for which
offenders already perceive that the police with respond with certainty. In order
for the policy to deter low-type observed recidivism, we must have the following
condition:
vl − αOt0(vl)[σ(vl)S(vl) + I(vl)] > 0 > vl − αOt1(vl)[σ(vl)S(vl) + I(vl)] (2.12)
For instances of coercive control, offenders may have a feeling of impunity and
they may expect αOt (vl) ' 0. Therefore equation (2.12) becomes:
vl > 0 > vl − αOt1(vl)[σ(vl)S(vl) + I(vl)] (2.13)
So, even a small increase in the probability that the police response may be
enough to deter low-type recidivism and ensure that condition (2.13) holds.
To sum up, through analysing these two extreme cases, we can infer that the policy
will be a stronger deterrent for low-type events compared to high-type events for
which offenders may already expect high police efforts, conditional on being reported.
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As discussed in Section 6.5, the potential increase in observed recidivism will
be driven by the switch from the SPNE (A,NR)t0 at t0 to (A,R)t1 at t1 in the
wake of the policy under the following conditions: αVt1(v)σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] −
(1 − αVt1(v))τ(r(v)) > 0 > αVt0(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))]− (1 − αVt0(v))τ(r(v)) and v −
γ(v)αOt1(v)[σ(vl)S(v) + I(v)] > 0. In order for the policy to increase the reporting of
high-type events, we must have the following condition:
αVt1(vh)σ(vh)[π(r(vh))− c(r(vh))]− (1− αVt1(vh))τ(r) > 0 > αVt0(vh)σ(vh)
[π(r(vh))− c(r(vh))]− (1− αVt0(vh))τ(r(vh))
(2.14)
When reporting a high-type event such as a rape, victims may expect that the
police will investigate their complaint with certainty i.e. αVt (vh) = 1. So, equation
(2.14) becomes:
αVt1(vh)σ(vh)[π(r(vh))−c(r(vh))]−(1−αVt1(vh))τ(r) > 0 > σ(vh)[π(r(vh))−c(r(vh))] (2.15)
However, by definition, αVt1(vh) 6 1. As a consequence, equation (2.15) cannot hold
and the policy is expected to have no impact of the reporting of high-type events for
which victims already believe with certainty that the police would put high efforts
to investigate their complaint. In order for the policy to increase the reporting of
low-type events, we must have the following condition:
αVt1(vl)σ(vl)[π(r(vl))− c(r(vl))]− (1− αVt1(vl))τ(r) > 0 > αVt0(vl)σ(vl)
[π(r(vl))− c(r(vl))]− (1− αVt0(vl))τ(r(vl))
(2.16)
When reporting a low-type event such as a low-intensity coercive control,
victims may expect that the police will not allocate much resources to investigate
their complaint i.e. αVt1(vl) ' 0. So, equation (2.16) becomes:
αVt1(vl)σ(vl)[π(r(vl))− c(r(vl))]− (1− αVt1(vl))τ(r) > 0 > −τ(r(vl)) (2.17)




t0(vl) may increase reporting if con-
dition (2.17) holds. These two extreme examples show that the policy is expected
to have a greater impact on the reporting of low-type events for which victims did
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not believe initially that the police would put efforts to investigate their complaint
and less impact on the reporting of high-type events.
To sum up, the policy is expected to give rise to a greater increase in the
reporting of low-type events compared to high-type events. It should also deter
domestic abuse more for low-type events than for high-type events. Through in-
vestigating the net effect of the policy on observed recidivism across different types
of domestic abuse, this paper will first test empirically across types of recidivism
whether the reporting effect dominates the deterrence effect.
2.6.7 Longer term impact and potential perverse effect
of the policy
As discussed, the policy may decrease recidivism and, if the SPNE at t0 was
(A,R)t0, it may become (NA,NR)t1 at t1 under some conditions. This change
in outcome occurs if, conditional on being reported, the increase in the expected
probability that the police respond to a reporting from his victim at t1 i.e α
O
t1(v)
deters the offender (unlike at t0). Since the offender stops offending at t1, he cannot
learn from experience whether αOt1+n(v) changes after t1 and he will assume that it
is always equal to αOt1(v). Therefore, he will stop reoffending and at t2, the outcome
of the game will be (NA,NR)t2. Likewise, if at t0 the outcome of the game was
(A,NR)t0 and it becomes (NA,NR)t1, the offender will stop offending and the
outcome will stay identical at t2 i.e (NA,NR)t2. For both cases, the short-term
effect of the policy at t1 will be similar to the long-term effect.
On the contrary, if the SPNE at t0 was (A,NR)t0 and it became (A,R)t1
at t1, the outcome of the game in the following period will depend on the best
strategy of the offender, knowing that he will now be reported27. Recall that in
order for this switch from t0 to t1 to happen, the victim must not report at t0
27Recall that, conditional on not being reported, abusing is always a dominant strategy
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and start reporting in the wake of the policy at t1. In other words, the following
condition must hold: αVt1(v)σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] − (1 − αVt1(v))τ(r(v)) > 0 >
αVt0(v)σ(v)[π(r(v)) − c(r(v))] − (1 − αVt0(v))τ(r(v)). Recall that the offender is not
aware that the police contacted his victim at t1 to encourage her to report. So, he
believes that for his victim αVt1(v) = α
V
t0(v), hence he thinks that the victim will not
report him and he bases his reasoning at t1 on γt0(v), which is equal to 0, and not
on γt1(v). However, γt1(v) is equal to 1 and his victim will report him.
When he gets reported at t1, whether or not he will reoffend at t2 depends on
how he updates his expected payoffs at t2. The offender will abuse at t2 only if he
gets a positive net expected payoff, conditional on being reported. In other words,
he will reoffend at t2 if v − αOt2(v)[σ(v)S(v) + I(v)] > 0 and the SPNE at t2 will be
(A,R)2. However, if v−αOt2(v)[σ(v)S(v)+ I(v)] < 0, he will stop offending at t2 and
the SPNE at t2 will be (NA,NR)2. Empirical regressions will test how individuals
that were reported in the wake of the policy at t1 adjust their behaviour at t2.
Whether the offender stops reoffending may also depend on the punishment
he gets after being reported and on whether he updates his beliefs on the likelihood
of getting legal sanctions. Let us now assume that the probability of getting legal
sanctions can change over time i.e σ(v) now depends on t as follows: σt(v). Recall
that σt(v)S(v) + I(v) is his expected punishment and the actual punishment may
make him update his beliefs on future punishments. If the police establish criminal
charges at t1 i.e σt1(v) = 1, the offender may believe that σt2(v) will be higher. For
instance, he may learn that a given type of abuse may trigger legal sanctions, which
makes his expected payoff from abusing lower. Therefore, it is more likely that he
gets an expected negative payoff and he stops abusing in the future.
Inducing victims to report their offenders is seen as essential to deter future
recidivism. However, in some cases, reporting might give rise to an increase in the
intensity of crime, which may jeopardise the efficacy of the policy. To understand
this potential issue, let us now get back to the two heterogeneous cases developed in
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subsection 2.6.6 and let us assume that an individual can choose between exerting
high-type abuse vh or low-type abuse (vl). Since, by definition, vh > vl, an individual
will choose low-type domestic abuse only if he believes that his victim would report
him for both types of violence or only for high-type abuse. If an individual believes
he will be reported only if he exerts high-type domestic abuse, he will decide to exert
low-type domestic abuse at t0 if:
vl > vh − αOt0(vh)[σ(vh)S(vh) + I(vh)] (2.18)
Assume that the policy pushed a victim to report a low-type domestic abuse at t1.
If the reporting led to a police response at t1, and the offender knows that from
now on he will be reported, he might now be better off exerting high-type domestic
abuse at t2 if
28:
vl − αOt2(vl)[σ(vl)S(vl) + I(vl)] < vh − αOt2(vh)[σ(vh)S(vh) + I(vh)] (2.19)
Notice that, even in a case where the reporting would lead to legal sanctions
only for high-type domestic abuse, the cost of the police intervention I(vl) might be
enough to cause escalation to high-type abuse.
2.7 Empirical strategy
2.7.1 Econometric model
As discussed, the objective of this paper is to understand the effectiveness
of the policy based on the Strathclyde model to reduce domestic abuse in Essex.
The main challenge researchers face while analysing the impact of policies to reduce
domestic abuse is that the data only contain events that were reported i.e. observed
28Conditional on vh − αOt2(vh)[σ(vh)S(vh) + I(vh)] > 0
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recidivism. Recall that the effect of the policy on observed recidivism is a combina-
tion of the deterrence effect on the offenders and the reporting effect on the victims.
Moreover, the effects of the policy on offenders and victims may lead to the observed
recidivism going in opposite directions and the main challenge researchers face is to
disentangle them. To do so, I look at observed recidivism from offenders across dif-
ferent types of recidivism and subgroups. More specifically, since the police define
a threshold of the risk score above which they trigger policy responses, I compare
recidivism for individuals just above the threshold with those that stayed just below.
So, the risk score of the Strathclyde model provides a natural set up for a Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD). The main econometric model is as follows:
Yimt = RiskScoreAboveitγ + f(RiskScoreAdjit)+
f(RiskScoreAdjit)RiskScoreAboveitσ +Wiβ + εit
(2.20)
with Yim a measure of recidivism for individual i within m months after the calendar
date t. RiskScoreAboveit is a dummy equal to 1 if the risk score was above the 67.5
threshold at date t and 0 otherwise. RiskScoreAdjit is the risk score of individual
i minus the 67.5 threshold at date t; f(.) is a polynomial function of degree n; Wi
is a vector of characteristics of individual i. The parameter of interest is γ, which
measures the local causal effect of the police response on recidivism, around the
cutoff.
2.7.2 Validity of the econometric design
In order for the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to be valid, individuals
must not be able to precisely manipulate the assignment variable i.e. the risk score
(Lee, 2008). As discussed, offenders are not aware they are given a risk score,
and therefore, there is no reason to believe that they could manipulate it. Figure
2.3 shows the distribution of the risk score. The vertical line on the histogram
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corresponds to the 67.5 threshold. As expected, since offenders are not aware that
they are assigned a risk score, we do not observe any discontinuity in the density of
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of the risk score (20 bandwidth)
If individuals cannot manipulate the running variable around the threshold, it
can then be assumed that the variation in the treatment near the threshold is ran-
domised as though from a randomised experiment. The key implication of the local
randomisation result implies that, if the variation in the treatment near the thresh-
old is approximately randomised, then it follows that all baseline characteristics -
all those variables determined prior to the realisation of the assignment variable -
should have the same distribution just above and just below the cutoff.
Table 2.6 presents the descriptive statistics of my three control variables on
both sides of the threshold using a bandwidth of 2029. We observe that on both
29Main regressions are based on a bandwidth of 20 since it allows me to have enough
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sides of the threshold, descriptive statistics of the control variables are of similar
magnitude. So, the average age is slightly greater than 34 years old below the
threshold compared to almost 34 years old above the threshold. 9% are female
below the threshold versus 7% for individuals above the threshold. Finally, below
the threshold 77% are white versus 82% on above the threshold.
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics (By side of the threshold, bandwidth 20)
Below the threshold Above the threshold
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 34.12 11.24 14 88 33.77 10.81 16 67
Female 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1
White 0.77 0.42 0 1 0.82 0.39 0 1
N=58976 N=10665
In order to show evidence that there is no discontinuity at the threshold in
the baseline characteristics, I show nonparametric regressions between the risk score
and each control variable. Figure 2.4 depicts the nonparametric relationship between
the risk score and the baseline control variables. The graph in the top left corner
corresponds to the link between the offender’s gender and the risk score. I observe
no clear pattern between the risk score and gender. Moreover, there is no clear
discontinuity at the threshold. The graph in the top right corner represents the
nonparametric relationship between the risk score and the ethnicity. Likewise, I do
not observe a clear pattern, or a sharp discontinuity at the threshold. The graph in
the bottom left corner shows the link between the risk score and the age and does
not show any clear pattern, or a discontinuity at the threshold.
mass points while comparing suspects on both sides of the threshold that are as similar as
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Link between the age and the risk score (Threshold 67.5; bandwidth 20)
Figure 2.4: Link between the risk score and the baseline control variables
(Bandwidth 20, polynomial of degree 1)
Although nonparametric graphs do not suggest clear discontinuities at the
threshold between the risk score and control variables, I run parametric regressions
to test the significance of these relationships. Table 2.7 shows Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) regressions of the treatment on each control variable. Column (1), column
(2) and column (3) depict the impact of the policy on the gender, the ethnicity and
age respectively. None of the regressions are significant, which is consistent with
the fact that graphs do not exhibit any clear discontinuity at the threshold on the
graphs.
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Table 2.7: Link between the risk score and the
baseline control variables (OLS regressions,
polynomial of degree 1)
(1) (2) (3)
Female White Age
Treatment 0.0127 0.0100 -0.541
(0.0174) (0.0131) (0.362)
Bandwidth [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20]
Observations 67,172 67,172 67,172
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002
Robust standard errors clustered at the risk score level
in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%. Regressions include the following controls: risk
score, interaction between the risk score and the treat-
ment dummy, age, female and white.
2.8 Empirical results
2.8.1 Impact of the policy on observed recidivism
Figure 2.5 represents a nonparametric graph of the relationship between the
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Figure 2.5: Impact of the risk score on the probability of recidivism within 1
month (Threshold 67.5, bandwidth 20)
Figure 2.5 depicts an increasing relationship between the dangerousness of
the offenders i.e. their risk score and their likelihood to be reported again for do-
mestic abuse within 1 month. Moreover, we observe that there is a clear positive
discontinuity in recidivism at the 67.5 threshold.
The model predicts that the policy should deter recidivism from the offend-
ers30 and increase the likelihood that victims report. This positive discontinuity in
observed recidivism at the threshold suggests that the reporting effect outweighs the
expected decrease in recidivism.
Recall that recidivism includes both reported events that led to a criminal
offence (or charges) and those that did not. Looking at the impact of the policy
separately on both types of events can help to disentangle the different effects of the
30Recall that, since individuals were not aware that they were allocated risk scores, there
is no reason to believe that they modified their behaviours accordingly.
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policy. Recall that the variable Offence corresponds to the probability that an event
of domestic abuse for which the police established criminal charges occurred within
1 month after date t31. Figure 2.6 depicts the nonparametric relationship between
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Figure 2.6: Impact of the risk score on the probability of offence within 1
month (Threshold 67.5, bandwidth 20)
Unlike in Figure 2.5, there is no discontinuity at the threshold and so, there
is no increase in the probability of being charged in response to the policy. As dis-
cussed, the impact of the policy on reported crime is the net effect of the deterrence
effect on the offenders and the increase in victims’ reporting. As explained in Section
6, this may suggest either that the decrease in recidivism caused by the policy is
compensated by an increase in reported recidivism. Another interpretation is that
31Notice that the justice system may take time to respond to incidents highlighted by the
police and Offence corresponds to events that gave rise to charges but it does not imply that
offenders have been judged or sentenced yet.
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the policy has no effect on deterrence, and on reporting.
Figure 2.7 graphs the relationship between the risk score and the probability
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Figure 2.7: Impact of the risk score on the probability of incident within 1
month (Threshold 67.5, bandwidth 20)
Recall that Incident corresponds to the probability that a suspect was reported
within 1 month after date t for domestic abuse events for which the police could not
establish criminal charges. There is a clear jump at the threshold. Since, according
to the model, the policy should deter crime as well as increase reporting, this suggests
that the potential decrease in incidents as a result of the increasing probability of
punishment is outweighed by the increase in the reporting of incidents. To assess the
magnitudes and statistical significances of the discontinuities visible in these figures,
I turn to formal RDD estimates.
Table 2.8 shows Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of the impact of
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the policy response on subsequent domestic abuse within one month. All these
regressions include a polynomial of degree 1 and are based a bandwidth of 2032. In
addition to a treatment dummy, the risk score and the interaction between both, all
regressions include the following controls: Age, White and Female. Standard errors
are clustered at the Risk score level 33.
Table 2.8: Impact of the risk score on the prob-
ability of recidivism within 1 month
(1) (2) (3)
Recidivism Offence Incident
Treatment 0.0891*** -0.00895 0.0981***
(0.0276) (0.0111) (0.0198)
Bandwidth [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20]
Observations 64,256 64,256 64,256
R-squared 0.023 0.009 0.014
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the
risk score level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following con-
trols: risk score, interaction between the risk score and
the treatment dummy, age, female and white.
Results are in line with graphical evidence and exhibit a positive impact of
the policy on reported recidivism. Column (1), show that offenders with scores past
the threshold i.e. who were affected by the policy are almost 9% more likely to
be reported again within 1 month. As expected, I do not observe any impact of
the policy on the likelihood of the offenders being reported for events for which the
police could establish criminal charges i.e. offences. The probability that offenders
were reported for incident of domestic abuse for which the police could not establish
32In Section 11, I show that results are entirely robust to a selection of different band-
widths and a polynomial of degree 2. As explained in Cattaneo et al. (2017), higher-order
polynomials tend to produce over-fitting of the data and unreliable results near the cufoff
points. This issue is particularly important when using discrete data with a few mass points.
Therefore, I present results only with polynomials of degree 1 and degree 2.
33Following Lee and Card (2008), we interpret the difference between the true conditional
expectation and the estimated regression function as a random specification error that in-
troduces a group structure in the standard errors and we cluster the standard errors at the
risk score level to correct for this.
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criminal charges is almost 10% higher for offenders under the policy. Considering
that I observe the net effect of the impact of the policy on crime and reporting, this
underlines that the effect of the policy on reporting may be even higher. So the 10%
increase in reported incidents can be thought of as a lower bound of the increase in
reporting in response to the policy.
To sum up, results emphasize that the policy shed light on events of domestic
abuse that would have gone underreported. More specifically, they show that sus-
pects under the policy are more likely to be reported for incidents that do not lead
to criminal charges but there is no evidence of an increase in reported crime. One
interpretation of these results is that the policy makes victims more likely to start
reporting small events of domestic abuse for which they were not expecting initially
a response from the police. Moreover, for events that lead to criminal charges, vic-
tims and/or witnesses may be more likely to report them in general, which that may
explain why the policy has no clear effect on the reporting of such events. Although,
this increase in reporting is positive as it enables to identify events of domestic
abuse, whether it is beneficial to the victims in the long term will depend on how
their reporting will affect the actual payoffs of their offenders. As discussed, the
increase in reported events comes from changes initial SPNE (A,NR) that became
(NA,NR) in the wake of the policy at t1. Section 2.10 will examine whether these
changes at t1 will deter domestic abuse and it will investigate the long-term impact
of the policy.
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2.9 Heterogeneity of the policy on subgroups
Many exogenous factors may affect how individuals respond to the policy. For
instance, female offenders might be more deterred than male offenders. Moreover,
the ethnicity of the offenders may affect their belief that the police will take actions
against them. Likewise, offenders’ age may also influence their response to the
policy. To understand whether the impact of the treatment is heterogeneous across
different types of offenders, this section investigates the impact of the treatment
across gender, ethnicity and age groups.
Figure 2.8 describes the relationship between the risk score and the probability
of recidivism by gender. The first graph looks at the impact of the treatment on
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Figure 2.8: Impact of the risk score on the probability of recidivism within 1
month (By gender, bandwidth 20)
The policy seems to have no effect on female offenders whereas I observe a
positive effect of the treatment for male offenders. Table 2.9 shows OLS regressions
of the impact of the policy on subsequent domestic abuse within one month. All
these regressions include a polynomial of degree 1 and are based on a bandwidth of
20. Column (1) and column (2) show respectively regression results for women and
men. In line with graphical evidence, they emphasize that the impact of the policy
is positive but not significant for women while it increases observed recidivism by
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almost 9.5% for male offenders.
One explanation for this is that women are more deterred by the policy than
men. So, female offenders may reduce crime more than male offenders, which at-
tenuates the effect on observed recidivism of the potential increase in reporting
from their victims. Another explanation for this results is that female offenders
are treated differently by the police than male offenders due to the context of their
offences. According to the police, female offenders are usually part of troubled rela-
tionships where they usually perpetrate offences in response to domestic abuse from
their partners34. As a consequence, the police may be less keen to encourage their
victims to report against them.
Figure 2.9 describes the relationship between the risk score and the probability
of recidivism across ethnicities. The first figure corresponds to individuals that are
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Figure 2.9: Impact of the risk score on the probability of recidivism within 1
month (By ethnicity, bandwidth 20)
The graphs exhibit a sharper discontinuity for non-white offenders. Columns
(3) and (4) from Table 2.9 show that white offenders are 7% more likely to re-offend
while non-white offenders exhibit an average increase of almost 35%. This might
reflect the fact that offenders from minorities ethnic groups are less deterred by the
34For my sample, female offenders are more likely to be both victims and offenders (50%
versus 18%).
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policy. Finally, if minority offenders are more likely to have minority victims, the
results could be driven by the fact that usually minorities trust the police less and
so the efforts of the police to encourage victims to report might have more impact
than in populations that usually report more.
Figure 2.10 describes the relationship between the risk score and the proba-
bility of recidivism across age groups. The graph in the top left corner corresponds
to offenders whose age is in the lowest 25th percentile i.e. less than 25 years old.
The graph in the top right corner corresponds to suspects whose age lies between
the median age and the 25th percentile i.e. between 25 and 34 years old. The graph
in the bottom left corner represents individuals whose age is above the median and
below the 75th percentile i.e. between 34 and 44 years old. Finally, the graph in the
bottom right corners corresponds to individuals whose age is in the top 75 percentile
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Figure 2.10: Impact of the risk score on the probability of recidivism within 1
month (By age groups, bandwidth 20)
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The graphs from Figure 2.10 do not emphasise any clear pattern in the impact
of the treatment across age groups. Implying that deterrence may be similar across
age groups.
Regressions results do not show any clear difference across age groups either.
Column (5) from Table 2.9 emphasises that young offenders are 6.27% more likely
to re-offend when exposed to the treatment. Point estimates go up to 10.5% for
individuals aged 25 to 34 (see column (6)) and fall to approximately 9% for offenders
between 34 and 44 years old. Offenders above 44 are about 11% more likely to exhibit
recidivism.
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Table 2.9: Impact of the risk score on recidivism by individual characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Recidivism
Treatment 0.0255 0.0949*** 0.0715** 0.349*** 0.0627* 0.105** 0.0898*** 0.108***
(0.0388) (0.0283) (0.0261) (0.0596) (0.0312) (0.0410) (0.0310) (0.0238)
Sample Female Male White Non-white Age ≤ 25 25¡Age≤ 34 34¡Age≤ 44 Age¿44
Bandwidth [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20]
Observations 64,256 64,256 59,255 5,001 17,063 19,656 15,631 11,882
R-squared 0.009 0.014 0.021 0.063 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.027
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the risk score level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%,
*** 1%. Regressions include the following controls: risk score, interaction between the risk score and the treatment dummy,
age, female and white.
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2.10 Longer term impact and potential per-
verse effects of the policy
Empirical results confirm that the policy increased reporting within 1 month
after it took place. The policy pushed victims to report events of domestic abuse
at t1 (or within one month) that they would not have reported otherwise. Whether
the unexpected reporting changes the future behaviour of the offender at t2 (or
in the second month after the policy takes place) depends on his payoff after being
reported. If the punishment of the offender at t1 is lower than his gain from violence,
he will keep on abusing at t2 and we have the following situation: (A,NR)t0 at tt0
becomes (A,R)t1 at t1 and stays at t2 such that the SPNE is (A,R)t2. However, if
the punishment of the offender at t1 is greater than his gain from violence, he will
stop abusing at t2 and we have the following situation: (A,NR)t0 at t0 will become
(A,R)t1 at t1 and (NA,NR)t2 at t2, which will deter crime at t2.
To test whether the increase in reporting at t1 deters recidivism at t2, we
investigate the impact of the policy in the second month after it took place (at t2),
conditional on being reported within one month (at t1). Table 2.10 shows Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regressions of the impact of the policy response in the second
month conditional being reported within one month. Recidivism2 corresponds to
the probability that a suspect was reported for domestic abuse in the second month
after the calendar date t. Recidivism2 can be divided into two components i.e.
Offence2 and Incident2. Offence2 is the probability that a suspect is reported in the
second month after date t for domestic abuse events for which the police established
criminal charges. Incident2 is the probability that a suspect is reported in the second
month after the calendar date t for domestic abuse events for which the police could
not establish any criminal charges. All these regressions include a polynomial of
degree 1 and a bandwidth of 20. In addition to a treatment dummy, the risk score
and the interaction between both, all regressions include the following controls: Age,
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White and Female. Standard errors are clustered at the Risk score level.
Regression (1) from Table 2.10 shows the impact of the policy on recidivism
in the second month after the policy took place, conditional on the offender being
reported in the first month35. Under the policy, we observe almost a 8% increase in
the probability of being reported in the second month, conditional on being reported
in the first month. This suggests two things. First, on average, the policy does not
deter offenders in a longer run. Moreover, the gain from reporting is important
enough for the victims in the first month to make them keep on reporting in the
future. So, although their offender does not get legal sanctions, revealed preferences
may suggest that victims get an indirect benefit from reporting. For instance, the
police may put them in touch with charities that support them.
Table 2.10: Impact of the risk score on the probability of recidivism
within the second month after passing the threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Recidivism2 Incident2 Incident2 Offence2 Offence2
Treatment 0.0785*** 0.137*** 0.0341 0.0992*** -0.109**
(0.0214) (0.0192) (0.0396) (0.0345) (0.0402)
Incident Yes Yes No Yes No
Offence Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 7,979 4,544 3,435 4,544 3,435
R-squared 0.019 0.022 0.002 0.028 0.043
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the risk score level in parenthe-
ses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions also include the following
controls: risk score, interaction between the risk score and the treatment dummy,
age, female and white.
As explained by the model, the higher the increase in the probability that the
police respond, the more likely the deterrence effect and the efficacy of the policy
in the long run. Moreover, for a given event of domestic abuse, legal sanctions at
t1 makes it more likely that the payoff of the offenders is negative, which deters
35Regression results investigating recidivism in the third month after suspects come under
the policy are qualitatively similar to those I present in Table 2.10 and are available upon
request. However, due to the smaller sample size, I do not present these results.
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future recidivism if it increases the expected future probability of the offender to get
legal sanctions for such events. Furthermore, under some conditions, the reporting
of low-intensity events may lead to escalation, which may jeopardise the effect of
the policy in the long term. To further understand the longer term effect of the
policy, I consider how the reporting of events of different intensity within one month
after the policy took place affects the observed recidivism of different intensity in
the following month.
Column (2) shows the impact of the policy on the probability of events of
domestic abuse in the second month for which the police could not establish criminal
charges (Incident2 equal to 1), conditional on being events of domestic abuse for
which the police could not establish criminal charges were reported in the first
month after the policy (Incident equal to 1). Regression results show that suspects
are about 14% more likely to be reported for an incident in the second month if they
were already reported for an incident in the first month (if Incident is equal to 1).
One explanation for this is that they were reported in the wake of the policy within 1
month but the punishment they got did not deter them. In this situation, although
being reported can already be seen as a punishment, the fact that the reporting
did not lead to criminal charges did not deter them on average. From the victim’s
side, there is no evidence that they lose trust in the police after reporting events
in the wake of the policy for which the police could not establish criminal charges.
They may keep on reporting because their expected gain from it is now higher than
before the policy. As suggested, they may get indirect benefits from reporting such
as getting support from charities.
Column (3) shows the impact of the policy on the probability of being reported
for events of domestic abuse in the second month for which the police could not
establish criminal charges if an offence was reported in the first month after the
policy i.e. if Offence was equal to 1. If suspects were reported in the first month
for incidents of domestic abuse for which the police established criminal charges
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(Offence is equal to 1), they are not more likely to be reported again for an incident
that does not lead to criminal charges in the second month. This suggests that the
potential punishment of the suspects deters future domestic abuse and the potential
increase in victims’ reporting compensates the decrease in crime.
Column (4) underlines the impact of the policy on offence in the second month
after the policy took place, conditional on suspects being reported for an incident
that did not lead to criminal charges in the first month (Incident equal to 1). Results
show almost a 10% increase in the probability of being reported for an offence in
the second month if suspects were reported in the first month for an incident that
did not lead to criminal charges. As explained by the model, one explanation for
this is that offenders that were reported in the first month after the policy took
place were exerting low-intensity violence because their expected payoff was higher
than when exerting high-intensity abuse that would be reported. So when reported
for low-intensity abuse, the punishment given rise to the efforts of the police made
offenders become better off committing high-intensity crime, knowing that in both
cases they would be reported. Recall that the effect of the policy is driven by an
increase in the reporting of events of domestic abuse of low intensity. So, these
results cast doubt on the long-term efficacy of the policy.
Column (5) presents regression results of the impact of the policy on offence in
the second month after the policy took place, conditional on suspects being reported
for an incident that led to criminal charges in the first month in the wake of the
policy (Offence equal to 1). I notice almost a 11% decrease in crime in the second
month. This suggests that a high punishment can deter future crime.
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2.11 Robustness checks
2.11.1 Main robustness checks
As described in Lee (2008), researchers face a trade-off in using RDD . On the
one hand, using a larger bandwidth yields more precise estimates as more observa-
tions are available to estimate the regression. On the other hand, larger bandwidths
increase the potential bias of the estimates. In the main regressions, I use a band-
width of 20 in order to get enough distinct data points36 while reducing potential
biases that may arise from using a larger bandwidth.
To test the robustness of my results, I show main regressions both with a
larger bandwidth (30) and with a smaller bandwidth (10). Table 2.11 shows OLS
regressions of the impact of the policy response on subsequent domestic abuse within
one month. All these regressions include a polynomial of degree 1. Columns (1), (2)
and (3) from Table 2.11 show OLS regressions of the impact of the policy respectively
on recidivism, offence and incident using a bandwidth 30. Columns (4), (5) and (6)
from Table 2.11 show OLS regressions of the impact of the policy respectively on
recidivism, offence and incident using a bandwidth 10. In line with main regressions
results, in Table 2.8 the results are driven by incidents and I find no significant effect
of the treatment on recidivism that led to criminal charges.
Due to the discreteness of the data, as a robustness check, I follow Cattaneo
et al. (2017) and run regressions with a polynomial of degree 237. Figure 2.11 shows
the nonparametric relationship between the risk score and Recidivism (column (1)),
Offence (column (2)) and Incident (column (3)) respectively fitting a polynomial of
degree 2. Results are in line with the graphs with polynomials of degree 1 and the
positive effect of the treatment on recidivism (graph in the top left corner) is driven
36Recall that the data is highly discrete with a small number of mass points (72) that
have a large number of observations each (on average 23,000).
37For continuous data, the literature recommends to run regressions with polynomials up
to degree 4 or degree 5 as a robustness check.
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Table 2.11: Impact of the risk score on recidivism within 1 month (different band-
width)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Recidivism Offence Incident Recidivism Offence Incident
Treatment 0.0919*** -0.00584 0.0978*** 0.152*** 0.00551 0.147***
(0.0237) (0.0101) (0.0170) (0.0298) (0.0143) (0.0197)
Bandwidth [-30;30] [-30;30] [-30;30] [-10;10] [-10;10] [-10;10]
Observations 159,932 159,932 159,932 32,159 32,159 32,159
R-squared 0.031 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.004 0.015
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the risk score level in parentheses. Sig-
nificance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following controls: risk score,
interaction between the risk score and the treatment dummy, age, female and white.
by the increase in the probability of incident (graph in the bottom). I observe no
impact of the treatment on recidivism that led to criminal charges (graph in the top
right corner).
Table 2.12 present OLS regression regressions with a polynomial of degree
2. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the impact of the treatment on Recidivism,
Offence and Incident respectively with a 20 bandwidth. Regression results are similar
qualitatively and line up with the graphs from Figure 2.11. Once again, the increase
in observed recidivism (column (1)) is driven by the increase in incidents (column
(3)) and not by the probability of offence (column (2)).
As a robustness check, I also present OLS regressions with a polynomial of
degree 2 with different bandwidths. Columns (1), (2) and (3) from Table 2.13 show
OLS regressions of the impact of the treatment on Recidivism, Offence and Incident
respectively with a bandwidth 10. Columns (4), (5) and (6) show the impact of the
treatment on Recidivism, Offence and Incident respectively with a bandwidth of 30.
In line with all previous results, the impact of the policy on observed recidivism
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Figure 2.11: Impact of the risk score on recidivism within 1 month (Bandwidth
20, polynomial of degree 2)
Table 2.12: Impact of the risk score on recidi-




Treatment 0.161*** 0.00664 0.155***
(0.0337) (0.0157) (0.0214)
Bandwidth [-20;20] [-20;20] [-20;20]
Observations 64,256 64,256 64,256
R-squared 0.024 0.009 0.016
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at
the risk score level in parentheses. Significance levels: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following
controls: age, female and white.
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Table 2.13: Impact of the risk score on recidivism (Polynomial of degree 2, dif-
ferent bandwidth)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Recidivism Offence Incident Recidivism Offence Incident
Treatment 0.161*** 0.00664 0.155*** 0.111** 0.00379 0.108***
(0.0337) (0.0157) (0.0214) (0.0494) (0.0237) (0.0320)
Bandwidth [-30;30] [-30;30] [-30;30] [-10;10] [-10;10] [-10;10]
Observations 159,932 159,932 159,932 32,159 32,159 32,159
R-squared 0.031 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.004 0.015
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the risk score level in parentheses. Sig-
nificance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following controls: risk score,
interaction between the risk score and the treatment dummy, age, female and white.
2.11.2 Difference in difference approach
As a further robustness check, I perform a Difference in Difference (DiD)
analysis. More specifically, I look at whether having a risk score above the threshold
when the policy is implemented increases the probability of being reported again
for domestic abuse. As discussed previously, the data spans over two years. To
calculate the risk score, one needs information on offenders within 12 months before
each date at which the risk score is calculated and the policy takes place in the
second year of the data. Therefore, I can only get an unbiased measure of the risk
score for the second year of the data which is the same period of time during which
the policy is implemented. Moreover, earlier in time that risk scores are calculated
in the first year of the data, the less information there is and the potential bias. To
better understand potential biases when computing risk scores over the first year of
the data i.e. before the policy is implemented, it is worth looking at each component
of the risk score.
Recall that the gravity score is based on the most severe event that occurred
within 12 months before risk scores are calculated at t. When computing the gravity
score with less data than the 12 months it requires, the challenge is that I might miss
events that are more severe than the ones I capture within the available time span
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of the data38. As a consequence, the gravity score I obtain may be biased downward
and can be considered as a lower bound.
To calculate the frequency score, I need to get the total number of events
that occurred in the 12 months preceding calculation at t. The more the number
of events, the higher the frequency score. So, calculating a risk score with less data
than the 12 months it requires may cause me to miss events. As a consequence, the
frequency score may be biased downward and can be considered as a lower bound.
To obtain the recency score, recall that I need to calculate the average time
between calculation at date t and all the events that occurred in the previous 12
months. Using less data to compute the risk score potentially removes events that
occurred further back in time. As a consequence, I potentially deflate the average
time between a given calendar date and events in the past. The lower the average
recency, the higher the recency score. As a consequence, by using less data, I
potentially inflate the recency score.
So, when I compute a risk score with less data than the 12 months it requires,
I obtain a biased risk score. The gravity score and frequency score are potentially
biased downward and the recency score is potentially biased upward. As a bench-
mark, I first perform a DiD analysis with this biased risk score. The identification
relies on a common trends assumption. Figure 11 shows the average probability of
recidivism within 1 month over time for both the control group (individuals below
the threshold) and the treatment group(individuals above the threshold). The policy
takes place in week 6239.
From Figure 2.12, I observe that average recidivism in the control group i.e.
individuals below the threshold is around 5% and does not vary much over time. On
38Notice that, since the gravity score is based on the most severe offence within 12 months,
events for which I do not have data and that are less severe will not affect the computation
of the gravity score.
39Since the risk score may be more biased using earlier data, I show figures using data
from 3 months before and after the implementation of the policy. Graphs with other time
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Figure 2.12: Average probability of recidivism within 1 month
Notes: This figure enables me to compare the average recidivism of individuals on both
side of the threshold before and after the policy took place i.e. the common trends
assumption. The vertical line represents the time when the policy was implemented.
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the contrary, the average probability of recidivism in the treatment group increases
over time and lies between 15% and 22% before the policy and between 20% and
31% under the policy. So, it seems that there is an increase in observed recidivism
for individuals above the threshold while under the policy. To test the significance
of this relationship, I run OLS regressions to investigate whether being above the
threshold when the policy takes place i.e. being treated affects observed recidivism.
Table 2.14 presents the results.
Table 2.14: Impact of the risk score on recidivism
(Difference in difference (DinD))
(1) (2) (3)
Recidivism Incident Offence
Treatment 0.0447** 0.0415** 0.00317
(0.0186) (0.0161) (0.0144)
Observations 3,490,892 3,490,892 3,490,892
R-squared 0.005 0.002 0.004
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the
risk score level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following con-
trols: risk score, risk score above dummy, treatment time
dummy, interaction between the risk score and the time
dummy, age, female and white.
Column (1) from Table 2.14 shows the impact of the treatment (i.e. being
above the threshold when the policy is implemented) on observed recidivism. Re-
gression results underline that individuals who are above the threshold under the
policy are 4.47% more likely to be reported again for domestic abuse. Column (2)
and column (3) highlight the impact of the treatment on Incident (i.e. the probabil-
ity of being reported within a month for domestic abuse that did not lead to criminal
charges) and Offence (i.e. the probability of being reported within a month for do-
mestic abuse that led to criminal charges) respectively. Like in the RDD framework,
results are driven by Incident, the probability of which increases by 4.5% whereas I
do not observe any impact on Offence. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient
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is two times smaller compared to the RDD set up, which could be explained by the
fact I look at the average effect over the whole data and not at the effect around the
threshold.
As discussed, risk score computed over the whole data are likely biased. More-
over, this bias could go both ways since the gravity score and the frequency scores are
potentially biased downward while the recency score is potentially biased upward.
In order to obtain lower bound estimates, I create a lower bound of the risk score by
computing risk scores with a recency score equal to 0 (using the frequency score and
the gravity score obtained over the whole data). Figure 2.13 presents the average
probability of recidivism within 1 month for both the control group (individuals be-
low the threshold) and the treatment group(individuals above the threshold)40 over
time.
Table 2.15 show OLS regression results when using these lower bounds of the
risk score. Column (1), column (2) and column (3) show the impact of the treatment
on Recidivism, Incident and Offence respectively.
Table 2.15: Impact of the risk score on recidivism




Treatment 0.0514*** 0.0383*** 0.0130
(0.0166) (0.00886) (0.00935)
Observations 3,490,892 3,490,892 3,490,892
R-squared 0.004 0.002 0.003
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the
risk score level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following controls:
risk score, risk score above dummy, treatment time dummy,
interaction between the risk score and the time dummy,
age, female and white.
In line with previous results, I observe that the policy has a positive impact on
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Figure 2.13: Average probability of recidivism within 1 month
Notes: This figure enables me to compare the average recidivism of individuals on both
side of the threshold before and after the policy took place i.e. the common trends
assumption. The vertical line represents the time when the policy was implemented.
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observed recidivism within one month. Moreover, the increase in observed recidivism
is driven by Incident and there is no impact on Offence. To test the robustness of
these results, I perform a DiD using lower bounds estimates of the risk score with
different time windows around the implementation of the policy. Table 2.16 presents
OLS regressions of the impact of the treatment on Recidivism using all the data
(column (1)), a one month window before and after the policy (column (2) and a
one week window (column (3)) respectively.
Table 2.16: Impact of the risk score on recidivism
(Difference in difference (DinD), lower bound esti-
mates, different time windows.
(1) (2) (3)
Recidivism Recidivism Recidivism
Treatment 0.0514*** 0.0814*** 0.0617**
(0.0166) (0.0102) (0.0219)
Time window All data 3 months 1 week
Observations 3,490,892 788,121 94,575
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the risk
score level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%,
*** 1%. Regressions include the following controls: risk score,
risk score above dummy, treatment time dummy, interaction
between the risk score and the time dummy, age, female and
white.
I observe that the impact of the policy on observed recidivism is robust across
all window and always significant and positive. One may worry that the increase in
incidents is due to the fact that victims minimised high-type events. In other word,
in the wake of the policy victims may report being victims of low-type domestic abuse
incidents while facing serious crimes in reality. As a robustness check, I aggregate
the number of events of domestic abuse at the weekly level in order to compare
trends before and after the policy (that takes place in week 62). Figure 2.14 shows
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Figure 2.14: Total number of events of domestic abuse (per week, individuals
above the threshold)
From the first graph in Figure 2.14, I observe that, before the policy, the total
number of incidents for individuals that are above the threshold lies between 6 and
17. The number of incidents reported increases under the policy to between 10 and
25. When I look at trends in offences in the second graph from Figure 2.14, offences
lie between 2 and 10 before the policy takes place and between 3 and 15 under
the policy. So, graphs do not suggest a transfer from high-type events to low-type
events.
2.11.3 Placebo
I construct Placebo tests using different risk score thresholds. Recall that the
risk score threshold with regards to which the policy is based is 67.5. I look at the
impact of artificial thresholds i.e. 57.5 and 77.5 on my main variable of interest
i.e. Recidivism. The graph in the top left corner of Figure 2.14 shows the impact
of the risk score on the probability of recidivism using a 57.5 threshold. I see no
discontinuity at the threshold. When I look at the impact of the risk score on the
77.5 threshold, I see a small jump for recidivism (graph in the top right corner).
Table 2.17, shows OLS regressions of the impact of the risk score on recidi-
vism using different Placebo thresholds and bandwidth. Columns (1), column (2)
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Figure 2.15: Impact of the risk score on recidivism within 1 month (Placebo
thresholds, polynomial of degree 1)
57.5 placebo threshold with a bandwidth 30, a bandwidth 20 and a bandwidth 10.
Column (4), column (5) and column (6) are analogous to columns (1), column (2)
and column (3) except that I use the 77.5 threshold. None of the regressions show
any impact of the treatment on recidivism.
Table 2.17: Impact of the risk score on recidivism (Placebo, different thresholds)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Recidivism
Treatment 0.0260 0.0189 0.0207 0.0473 0.0466 0.0864
(0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0232) (0.0504) (0.0495) (0.0543)
Cutoff 57.5 57.5 57.5 77.5 77.5 77.5
Degree Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth [-30;30] [-20;20] [-10;10] [-30;30] [-20;20] [-10;10]
Observations 237,215 32,937 10,388 64,258 32,937 10,388
R-squared 0.032 0.015 0.008 0.021 0.015 0.008
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the risk score level in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following controls: risk
score, interaction between the risk score and the treatment dummy, age, female and white.
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2.12 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of a policy based on the Strathclyde model to
reduce domestic abuse in Essex. It shows evidence that suspects of domestic abuse
that are targeted by the policy are 9% more likely to be reported again for domestic
abuse events within 1 month. Recall that the policy aims to deter offenders through
informing them they will be under higher surveillance and also to encourage victims
to report by increasing domestic abuse recognition and trust in the police response.
So, the effect of the policy on observed recidivism corresponds to the net effect of the
policy on both victims and offenders. As a consequence, the increase in reporting
from the victims may be even greater than 9%. So, this result can be thought of as
a lower bond of the effect of the policy on reporting.
Interestingly, the effect of the policy on reporting is driven by events of do-
mestic abuse for which the police could not establish any criminal charges. More
precisely, I observe a 10% increase in the probability that suspects targeted by the
policy are reported again for events of domestic abuse that did not lead to criminal
charges. However, there is no evidence that the policy has an effect on the reporting
of crime. This may be because the policy has no impact on both the deterrence of
the suspects neither on the reporting of crime or that these effects cancel each other
out.
One interpretation of the heterogeneous effect of the policy on different types of
domestic abuse is that, when committing domestic abuse that could lead to criminal
charges, offenders may already expect that the police would put efforts to investigate
their case. So, the policy may not change greatly their expected beliefs about being
punished and, subsequently, their behaviour. Moreover, when reporting more severe
events of domestic abuse, victims may also already expect a police response. On
the contrary, for low-type events, victims may not have reported in the absence of
the policy but they may now understand that it is legitimate for them to report
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these low-type events and they may now believe that the police will respond to their
complaints.
Although the fact that the policy increased reporting in the short term is
positive, the long-term impact of the policy will depend on the actual response of
the police in the wake of the reporting. Results show that, conditional on being
reported within one month after the policy took place, offenders are also more likely
to be reported again in the second month. This result does not show evidence that,
on average, the policy deterred crime in the long run. However, this suggests that
victims keep on reporting and, subsequently, that reporting has a gain for them.
Interestingly enough, when we look at the impact of being reported in the wake
of the policy for different levels of violence, we observe that reporting may only
deter crime in the medium run if it leads to criminal charges. On the contrary, the
reporting of events that do not lead to criminal charges appears to increase observed
recidivism. Considering that the short-term impact of the policy seems to be driven
by events of domestic abuse that did not lead to criminal charges, this casts doubts
on the efficacy of the policy in reducing crime.
Social workers, as well as the police or the justice system, have developed
several approaches to prevent domestic abuse. For instance, social workers en-
gage in teaching skills that promote respectful, nonviolent relationships through
individual, relationship, community, and societal level change are key strategies.
Moreover, NGOs create protective environments, shelters and/or try to strengthen
economic support for families. All these methods to prevent domestic abuse are
more or less expensive and some preventive tools may be more cost-effective than
others. For instance, annual funding to provide core support for refugees and other
accommodation-based services, rape support centres and national helplines exceed
£80 million (Allen and Strickland (2017)).
Another way to tackle domestic abuse and its long-term consequences is to
increase reporting and, in particular, early reporting. Recall that improving report-
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ing is also essential under limited resources as, underreporting and especially, late
reporting gives rise to substantial economic costs and the Early Intervention Founda-
tion (EIF) estimated in 2016 that the cost of late intervention in England and Wales
is £5,230 million per year. One way to promote reporting is to increase trust in the
police among victims, which is relatively cheap to implement. By demonstrating
empirically and quantifying how an increase in the trust in the police can increase




Natural disasters and migrants’
responses: Evidence from the
United Kingdom
3.1 Introduction
Natural disasters have huge impacts both on human beings and on the econ-
omy. According to Yang (2008), from 1970 to 2002, 2.74 million people were killed
by natural disasters and 2.70 million people were injured. This corresponds to 85,425
deaths and 84,325 people injured per year. Natural disasters also caused substantial
economic damages worldwide. Over the same period, they amounted to US$987
billion. These phenomena are not restricted to specific regions since 39% of world
population lives in countries that experienced damages of at least 3% of GDP (Yang,
2008). Moreover, many people live in environments at risk since about 19 per cent of
the Earths land area and 3.4 billion people are relatively highly exposed to natural
disasters (World Bank, 2005). Natural disasters may remain an issue in the future
as trends are increasing and figures should go beyond the current average of 600
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disasters per year worldwide (World Bank, 2005). In line with this, the number of
individuals affected by disasters is expected to increase since populations are grow-
ing in disaster-prone areas (Kellenberg et al., 2011). Natural disasters also have a
negative effect on poverty and, due to their high prevalence and impact in developing
countries, they may jeopardise the 2030 policy agenda of the United Nations (UN)
to eliminate extreme poverty (ODI, 2013).
Remittances are at the top of the research agenda of international organisa-
tions due to their important impact on economic development. They represent sub-
stantial amounts of money and, in 2015, migrants remitted US$441 billion through
formal channels. They are often the largest flows of money sent to developing coun-
tries and, in 2015, they amounted to 10 per cent of GDP for 25 developing countries
and represented 3 times the volume of aid flows (World Bank, 2016). In the af-
termath of natural disasters, remittances play an important role in mitigating the
effects of natural disasters. They can contribute to the replacement of the capital
destroyed by shocks, and help people compensate for income losses or to relocate.
International organisations believe that remittances could increase even further and
that more understanding of the behaviours of the senders is needed to unleash the
full potential of remittances (House of Commons, 2007; World Bank, 2013). The
main contribution of this paper is to shed light on how migrants living in the UK
modify their economic behaviours to fund remittances when facing natural disasters
in their home countries.
First, this study provides evidence that migrants living in the UK modify their
remitting behaviours in the wake of natural disasters. Furthermore, it examines how
migrants manage to fund remittances when facing unexpected shocks like natural
disasters. More specifically, it investigates several potential channels through which
migrants may increase remittances: labour supply, savings and leisure consumption.
For this analysis, I compile a dataset from 3 different sources: the Understanding
Society household panel survey (USS), the World Bank Indicators (WBI) and the
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Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). Regressing directly measures of past nat-
ural disasters on current outcome variables, this paper emphasises two main results.
It underlines that male migrants living in the UK and originating from developing
countries1 are more likely to remit in response to natural disasters. Moreover, it
shows evidence that male migrants increase labour supply, and decrease monthly
savings and leisure in response to natural disasters. Modifications in migrants’ be-
haviours emphasise that migrants have the capacity to make economic adjustments
in the wake of natural disasters. The fact that migrants can increase labour supply
shows that UK labour markets are flexible enough to enable migrants to adjust.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 summarises the lit-
erature, section 3 contains the identification strategy, section 4 describes the data,
section 5 presents the results, section 6 shows robustness checks and section 7 con-
cludes.
3.2 Literature review
Migrants send remittances for various reasons and researchers distinguish be-
tween two main types of remittances. The first main category of remittances de-
scribed in the literature encompasses all monetary transfers sent for personal mo-
tives. For instance, in their seminal paper on Botswana, Lucas and Stark (1985) em-
phasise that altruism is an important personal motive behind remitting behaviours.
Another kind of remittances that falls into this category corresponds to remittances
sent to buy a wide range of services (Rapoport and Docquier, 2005). For instance, a
migrant who has a house in his home country may need to pay for upkeep. Remit-
tances sent for personal motives also include monetary transfers sent to relatives in
order to gain their support in case of migration failure. This occurs, for instance, if
1The data contain information from 2009 to 2015 on migrants originating from the fol-
lowing 12 developing countries with the higher stocks of migrants in the UK: Bangladesh,
China, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey
and Uganda.
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a migrant does not find a job in his host country and needs to move back. This is
what Amuedo-Dorantes (2008) describes as a self-insurance motive. Finally, it also
corresponds to regular flows of money to pay back loans contracted by migrants in
order to finance their migration (Rapoport and Docquier, 2005). The second main
type of remittances corresponds to remittances sent due to family arrangements. It
includes remittances sent for risk-diversification and consumption smoothing pur-
poses. Migration decisions are often taken at the family level (Azam and Gubert,
2006) and it is common that migrants are sent to serve as an insurance against in-
come shocks. Then, in case of shocks such as natural disasters, migrants are expected
to compensate income losses by sending remittances.
There is an extensive literature, both at the macro and the micro levels show-
ing evidence that remittances play an important role in smoothing the effects of
natural disasters. At the country level, Yang (2008) shows that an increase in hur-
ricane exposure is associated with greater remittance flows. Likewise, Ebeke et al.
(2013) underline that countries with an increase in natural disasters receive more
remittances. In line with these findings, Mohapatra et al. (2012) find the same
phenomenon but for countries with larger emigrant stocks as a share of the home
country population. There is also extensive evidence at the individual level that mi-
grants increase remittances as a result of disasters in their home countries. Lucas and
Stark (1985) provide evidence that migrants from Botswana increase remittances in
response to droughts. Miller and Paulson (2007) emphasise the same phenomenon
looking at income shocks caused by rainfall in Thailand. Clarke and Wallsten (2003)
find similar findings after the hurricane Gilbert in Jamaica. Unlike these papers that
all focus on one receiving country and one type of natural disaster, this study will
focus on several types of disasters in all the source countries of the migrants of my
sample. Moreover, to my knowledge, no paper has investigated how migrants living
in the UK and originating from developing countries respond to natural disasters
in their home countries. Thus, a main contribution of this paper is to provide evi-
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dence that migrants from developing countries are more likely to remit in the wake
of natural disasters in their home countries2. Results suggest that migrants can
increase remittances to compensate for losses caused by natural disasters in their
home countries.
There is very little understanding of how migrants make decisions over re-
mittances, other economic variables and behavioural factors. Using German data,
Dustmann and Mestres (2010) show that changes in migrants’ return plans are re-
lated to large changes in remittance flows. In line with this, Bauer and Sinning
(2009) and Sinning (2011), underline that migrants who intend to stay in Germany
only temporarily have a higher propensity to save, save larger amounts and remit
more than permanent migrants. Interestingly, they observe that economic char-
acteristics and the composition of households in home and host countries do not
seem to affect these behaviours. Sinning (2011) also shows that the correlation be-
tween household size and migrants’ remittances is significantly negative and that
remittances are higher if close relatives live in the sending country. In these pa-
pers, researchers analyse choices that are made ex-ante and are endogenous. Unlike
the current literature, this paper will exploit natural disasters, which are exogenous
shocks, in order to better understand what kind of economic adjustments migrants
make to fund an increase in remittances. The assumption behind this is that natu-
ral disasters at a given time are orthogonal to migrants’ characteristics. This paper
underlines that migrants increase labour supply and decrease savings and leisure as
a result of natural disasters.
Recent work commissioned by international organisations has attempted to
shed light on the impediments and hurdles that could prevent migrants from in-
creasing remittances. In line with this, the World Bank commissioned a project in
3 European cities including London (Greenback Project, 2013) to understand which
2This paper focuses on migrants from developing countries since the latter have weaker
institutions, which makes remittances crucial to cope with natural disasters.
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policy reforms could boost the increase in remittance outflows from Europe (Geen-
back Project, 2013). They emphasise that the speed of the transactions and the
costs are the two major factors affecting the amounts of remittances. A key ques-
tion that has not been addressed is whether migrants have the capacity to increase
remittances and send more than they usually do. Looking at unexpected shocks and
how migrants respond to them is a way to investigate this question. Modifications in
migrants’ behaviours such as the fact that men increase labour supply and decrease
savings support the hypothesis that there is room to increase remittance outflows in
the UK. Moreover, by showing evidence that labour markets are crucial in enabling
migrants to increase remittances, this paper suggests that easing migrants’ access
to labour markets may be a valuable policy tool to boost remittances.
An inherent drawback in most European remittance datasets is that they only
include migrants’ remitting status. Those that do contain remittance amounts tend
to have smaller samples and lack panel dimension. Most UK data suffer from these
features and no analysis with individual panel data has been performed. Clark and
Drinkwater (2007), using a cross-section survey data, carried out the only empiri-
cal study on remittances at the household level in the UK. They show that richer
households and those with more immigrants tend to remit more. However, some
unobservables such as behavioural characteristics of the migrants may be correlated
with explanatory variables and jeopardise the results. In order to remove of all po-
tential unobservables that are fixed over time, this paper uses a micro-panel data and
regressions include individual fixed effects. When looking at the impact of disasters
in migrants’ home countries on remittances, only analysing remitting statuses can
be misleading. For instance, let us assume that in year t there were natural disasters
and a migrant sent money both in response to natural disasters and to repay a loan.
Let us suppose now that one year later (in year t+1) there were no natural disasters
and this migrant only sent money to repay his loan. In both years, his remitting
status, i.e. the extensive margin of remittances was the same and one may wrongly
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assume he did not respond to natural disasters in his country of origin. Also, as
previously exposed, migrants may anticipate natural disasters in their country of
origin and send regular amounts of money, which will not be captured either. By
looking at how migrants adjust their behaviours in response to natural disasters in
their home countries, this paper proposes a method to overcome data limitations
and to obtain information on the intensity of remittances. The underlying assump-
tion is that migrants’ changes in response to natural disasters underline changes in
remittances.
3.3 Identification strategy
As stated above, the main objective of this paper is to examine whether mi-
grants in the UK modify their behaviours in the wake of natural disasters in their
country of origin. First, I test the impact of a contemporaneous natural disaster
shock on the extensive margin of remittance behaviour, that is, the probability of
remitting. However, given the problem of only looking at the extensive margin, as
discussed above, I also look at the intensive margin. To do so, I then turn to the
margins along which remitters adjust in the labour market so as to fund the change
in remittances. Specifically, I test the probability of switching from unemployment
to employment, the number of hours worked conditional on being in the labour
force, and the probability of having a second job. I also investigate the role of other
potential margins of adjustments that migrants may use to fund remittances such as
monthly savings and leisure consumption like the probability of doing sport. Finally,
I investigate how these changes affect migrants through looking at their subjective
financial situation.
In order to show how migrants respond when their countries are experiencing
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more natural disasters, I use the following flexible specification:
Yist = α+ topXCitsβ +Nitγ +Wstσ + ηtδ + ηiτ + εist (3.1)
where Yist is an outcome of interest for migrant i from source country s and in-
terviewed at date t ; topXCits is a natural disasters dummy variable that I further
describe below; Nit is a set of individual characteristics of migrant i at time t ; Wst
is a set of characteristics of the source country at time t ; ηi is a migrant fixed effect
and ηt is a set of year dummies.
For this analysis, I assume that migrants decide how much to remit annually
based on ex-ante expected levels of disasters in their source countries. These ex-
pectations are based on past natural disasters, i.e. the baseline incidence of natural
disasters over a reference period (the reference period is discussed below). To fund
these remittances, they make ex-ante choices with regards to economic variables
such as labour supply or savings. If their expectations differ from contemporane-
ous shocks, migrants may readjust how much they remit ex-post and modify other
economic variables accordingly to fund remittances. To identify this phenomenon,
I compare contemporaneous disasters to past disasters using disasters dummies.
topXCits is a dummy equal to 1 if contemporaneous disasters experienced by a mi-
grant i from source country s between his interview at date t and 12 months before
are above the X% of a baseline distribution of past disasters of this variable over a
reference period. The intuition behind this method is that the higher the value of X,
the more likely that migrants formed expectations that are below contemporaneous
natural disasters. As a consequence, the higher the value of X, the more important
the adjustments ex-post.
Besides enabling me to capture the impact of current natural disasters relative
to past disasters through dummies, this flexible specification also has three main ad-
vantages. First, it allows me not to impose any assumptions on the structural form
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of the relationship between natural disasters and remittances. Second, it enables
me to clearly determine whether disasters of all magnitudes affect remittances and,
if not, above which threshold natural disasters affect migrants’ behaviours. For
instance, one can think that small disasters may be easier to handle for local pop-
ulations without the need for extra help from abroad. Third, the dummies enable
me to compare the thresholds from which natural disasters affect remittances and
transmission mechanisms are similar.
Yist corresponds either to the remitting status, labour outcomes, monthly sav-
ings, the probability not to do sport or migrants’ subjective financial situation. Nit
includes migrants’ age, education, number of children, marital status and net income.
It is important to condition on age since older migrants may have experienced more
natural disasters and may find it easier to anticipate shocks. Likewise, education
may affect anticipations. Family factors like the number of children and marital
status can also play a role in how migrants respond. So, controlling for the number
of children captures the fact that migrants’ share of income available for remittances
purposes may depend on the composition of the family. Moreover, when a couple is
married, individuals may pool money and only one spouse may send money. Finally,
richer migrants may be more likely to remit so I condition on net income3.
Wst contains the log of the GDP per capita in the source country and the
log of the exchange rate. Countries with higher levels of GDP tend to be more
diversified and recover better from disasters. Moreover, variations in productivity
among countries are driving factors of remittances. Since disasters can affect the
GDP, destroy capital and affect productivity, I control for the log of the GDP per
capita. Conditioning on the exchange rate enables me to take into account the fact
that migrants tend to think of amounts in local money when they remit and natural
disasters can affect it.
Some unobservables both at the country and the individual levels may be cor-
3All regressions include net income except labour regressions
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related to past disasters and affect migrants’ responses. For instance, countries with
higher natural disasters and higher variations may also be those whose migrants have
the lowest level of education. This may affect the way they anticipate disasters and,
subsequently, how they react to change in past disasters. Finally, some behavioural
characteristics or migrants’ taste may affect their expectations on disasters. For
instance, people may read more general news and subsequently be exposed to more
information on future disasters. So, their anticipations may be based on a richer
set of information. As a consequence, they may react less to current disasters since
they formed better expectations. To remove unobservables that are fixed over time,
all regressions include migrant fixed effects.
3.4 Data description
To examine how migrants respond to natural disasters in their country of
origin, I compile a dataset from 3 different sources: the Understanding Society Sur-
vey (USS), the World Bank indicators (WBI) and the Emergency Events Database
(EM-DAT).
3.4.1 Survey data and economic indicators
The USS tracks about 2,400 migrants from developing countries for 6 waves
over the period 2009-2015. Migrants from developing countries included in the sur-
vey are those with the highest stocks of migrants in the United Kingdom: Bangladesh,
China, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Turkey and Uganda. The dataset contains information on individual characteristics
including labour market, leisure and savings decisions as well as remitting behaviour.
The WBI dataset provides information on country macroeconomic indicators such
as GDP, GDP per capita and exchange rate. Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics
120
of the variables of the USS and the WBI 4.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics (all genders, all waves)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Remit (=1)a 0.28 n/a 0 1
Weekly Hours of work 28.72 15.30 0 97
Employed (=1b) 0.88 n/a 0 1
2ndJob (=1) 0.035 n/a 0 1
Hourly Wage 5.29 10.43 0 60
Monthly Savings 85.44 441.35 0 10000
Financial (=1)c 0.51 n/a 0 1
Nosports (=1)d 0.54 n/a 0 1
Children 0.48 0.95 0 8
Married (=1) 0.63 n/a 0 1
Monthly net income 1277.61 1251 0 15000
Age 44.51 15.95 16 101
Degree (=1) 0.43 n/a 0 1
ln (GDP pc) 8.02 1.34 6.32 11.12
ln (Exchange rate) 3.21 2.01 -0.36 7.86
N=3754
a Remit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a migrant remitted in the last
12 months.
b Employed refers to all migrants in the labour force
c Financial is a dummy equal to 1 if a migrant declares being just about
getting by financially or having difficulties. It is based on a variable
containing integers from 1 to 5 corresponding to migrants’ subjective
financial situation. Migrants responding 1 declare Living comfortably, 2
Doing alright, 3 Just about getting by, 4 Finding it quite difficult and 5
Finding it very difficult.
d Nosports is a dummy variable equal to 1 if migrants reported doing no
sport in the past 12 months.
From Table 3.1, we observe that almost 28% of the migrants remitted in the
past 12 months5. Migrants work on average almost 29 hours per week, 88% are
employed and 3.5% have a second job. The average hourly wage is about £5.29 and
the net monthly income is £1277. Individuals report saving, on average, more than
£85 monthly. 54% of the migrants did not do sport in the last 12 months, they
4See Table A1 and Table A2 from Appendix A for descriptive statistics by gender.
5Using the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in the UK, Clark and Drinkwater
(2007) find that on average 23.65% remit. Their cross-section survey data was collected
between 1993 and 1994 and as discussed in the introduction trends in remittances have been
increasing over the past decades.
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have on average 0.48 child, 63% are married, the average age is 44 years old and less
than half of them have a degree. 51% of the migrants report just about getting by
financially or facing financial difficulties. Finally, the log of the GDP per capita of
the home country is 8.02, the log of the GDP in the home country is 26.65 and the
log of the exchange rate 3.21.
3.4.2 Natural disasters
Information on natural disasters is provided by the EM-DAT, which is hosted
by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) of the Universit
Catholique de Louvain (UCL) in Brussels. It encompasses information on natural
disasters, including the location and the exact date at which they occurred. It
includes reliable daily information on the human impact of disasters such as the
number of people affected by disasters between 2000 and 2015 worldwide. This
dataset has the advantage of providing a clear measure of the number of people
affected by natural disasters in source countries. For a disaster to be recorded in
the data, it must satisfy one of following criteria: 10 or more people dead; 100
or more people affected; declaration of a state of emergency; call for international
assistance. The types of disasters recorded over the period of this study include:
drought, earthquake, epidemic, extreme temperature, flood, landslide and storm.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the types of natural disasters for my sample.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics on disaster types










From Table 3.2, we observe that there were 521 natural disasters in the 12
countries included in the survey data between 2009 and 2015. This corresponds to
a yearly average number of disasters of 7.2 in each country. Floods are the main
type of disaster and they amount for almost 40%. Storms are also a major type
of disaster and correspond to 27% of the sample. Then, by order of frequency, we
observe: earthquake(10.5%), landslide (8.25%), epidemic (6.91%), extreme temper-
ature (4.03%) and drought (3.20%).
To capture the intensity of natural disasters, I create a variable that measures
the proportion of the population affected by natural disasters in the country of origin
of each migrant within 12 months before his interview. To do so, I first sum the
number of people affected by natural disasters for the 12 months before the date of
the interview of a migrant. For instance, if during this period of time there were 2
natural disasters, with respectively 20,000 and 5,000 people affected, the sum of the
number of people affected over the period of interest would be 25,000. Then, I divide
this value by the population in their source country in 20106. Finally, I multiply this
variable by 100 to get the percentage of people affected by natural disasters in the
source country of a migrant 12 months before his interview, i.e. POPAFFECsurvey.
Table 3.3 shows summary statistics of POPAFFECsurvey by country. We
observe that, on average, 2.21% of the population in migrants’ home countries were
affected by natural disasters within 12 months before the interview of migrants,
with a standard deviation of 3.37. Figures show important disparities both within
and between countries. For instance, in China disasters are high and 7.56% of
people are affected on average by disasters before migrants’ interviews. There is a
6I obtain the information on population stocks from the World Bank indicators dataset.
Since disasters variables are constructed at the daily level but population is at the yearly
level, to avoid the fact that variations in the population from one year to another jeopardise
the ratio, I need to use a fixed value of population. For instance, one could wrongly overes-
timate the ratio if there were deaths or migrations due to disasters in the previous year (at
t-1) and the ratio is based on the current year t. One may also argue that the population
may vary across years and that this will also make estimates less precise when fixing the
value of the population. Results using yearly values for population do not change and are
available upon request.
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high variance in natural disasters and the standard deviation is greater than 5%.
As discussed in the identification strategy section, I assume that migrants form
expectations about future disasters. If disasters are higher than expected, they may
adjust their behaviour. A high variance in disasters makes it harder for migrants to
anticipate disasters correctly and, subsequently, they may be more likely to adjust
their behaviour. To see whether migrants adjust ex-post, it is then crucial to have
high within-country variation.
Table 3.3: Percentage of the population af-
fected by natural disasters within 12 months
before the interview of each migrant∗
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All 2.21 3.37 0 19.87
Bangladesh 1.57 1.36 0 4.71
China 7.56 5.08 0 19.87
Ghana 0.24 0.24 0 0.66
India 0.75 0.39 0 1.55
Jamaica 1.28 2.90 0 8.02
Kenya 3.74 4.26 0 11.19
Nigeria 0.95 1.57 0 4.44
Pakistan 3.86 4.37 0 12.04
Sri Lanka 6.05 3.04 0 14.55
South Africa 0.13 0.16 0 0.41
Turkey 0.02 0.02 0 0.06
Uganda 0.74 0.99 0 3.41
*POPAFFECTEDsurvey
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There are several advantages in using the accumulation of disasters over 12 months.
First, this time span provides enough variation with regards to disasters both within
and between countries. Second, it ensures that the results are not driven by season-
ality. Third, some transmission mechanisms such as labour market responses may
not be immediate and migrants need time to adjust.
As discussed previously, this paper assumes that migrants form their expec-
tations of future disasters based on past disasters. Since the distribution of natural
disasters may vary over time, a migrant may form different expectations of future
disasters at different points in time i.e. interviews. As a consequence, for each mi-
grant, I construct a distribution of past disasters before each of his interviews. To
construct these migrant-specific distributions, I need information at the daily level
on all natural disasters that occurred before their interview and over a period of
time from which they may form their expectations. Recall that POPAFFECsurvey
corresponds to the percentage of the population affected by natural disasters within
12 months before the interview at date t of a migrant m from source country s.
So, I need to compare natural disasters that took place within 12 months before the
interview of a migrant to a distribution of natural disasters based on what happened
within 12 months before each data point over a period of reference.
To do so, for each country, I create the percentage of the population affected
by disasters in the past 12 months before each calendar date i.e. day of the disasters
data. I name this variable POPAFFECall. It is analogous to POPAFFECsurvey,
except that it is created for each day of the time span of the disasters data and not
just before the interviews of the migrants. I then create time-and- migrant-specific
distributions of this variable over a period of reference starting from 12 months
before the interview and going back in time. It enables me to compare natural
disasters that occurred within 12 months before the interview of a migrant to what
migrants experienced during this time period of reference.


















































































(Vertical lines correspond to the mean of POPAFFECTsurvey)
Figure 3.1: Distribution of the population affected by natural disasters
12 months before each data point of the administrative data by country
(POPAFFECall)
126
that some countries have important variations in natural disasters and POPAFFECall
takes a wide range of values like in China or in India. On the contrary, other coun-
tries do not face many natural disasters and values of POPAFFECall are always
low like in South Africa. Interestingly enough, for some countries, disasters values
are very different when we compare figures based on the administrative data and
those based on the survey sample. So, although a migrant can experience high ex-
posure to natural disasters before his interview compared to other migrants from
the sample and originating from the same country, this exposure can be relatively
low compared to what the population from this country usually experiences. For
instance, in India, the average of POPAFFECsurvey is low (0.75%) with a low stan-
dard deviation (0.39) and a maximum value of 1.55 (see Table 3.3). So, at first
glance, a migrant with a value of POPAFFECsurvey of 1.55% seems to face big nat-
ural disasters. However, when we look at Figure 3.1, POPAFFECall can go beyond
8%. So, if one was just looking at the distribution of disasters before the interviews
of the migrants from the sample i.e. POPAFFECsurvey, he could wrongly assume
that 1.55% of the population affected by natural disasters is an extremely high value
whereas, in reality, it is not as extraordinary for India as we can see from Figure
3.1. This confirms that it is essential to compare the values of POPAFFECsurvey
based on migrants’ dates of interviews with an exogenous distribution based on the
administrative data. To see further graphical evidence of how the distribution of
POPAFFECsurvey and POPAFFECall may vary, vertical lines from Figure 1 on
the histograms depict the average of POPAFFECsurvey for each country based on
my sample.
To obtain migrant-and-time-specific distributions, I construct a distribution of
POPAFFECall based on the disasters data between 12 months and the past 9 years
before the interview of each migrant. In other words, I attach to each migrant a dis-
tribution of POPAFFECall that is specific to his source country using a rolling win-
dow of 8 years starting from one year before his interview. Since POPAFFECsurvey
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is a measure of disasters over 12 months before the interview, it is essential to start
building migrant-specific distributions before this period of time in order for the
distribution not to be affected by disasters captured by POPAFFECsurvey. Also, I
use this time span because it is the longest period of time that the data allow me to
compute7. The main advantage of using the longest time span is that it gives me as
many as possible data points to create the richest distribution.
Finally, I create a set of dummies based on these distributions. The identi-
fication strategy relies on these dummies. For each migrant, at each interview, I
create the following set of disasters dummies: topXits. More precisely, topXits is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if migrants’ value of POPAFFECsurvey is greater than
X% of the disasters measure in his reference distributions8 (i stands for migrants, t
for time of the interview and s for source country). For instance, top70its is equal
to 1 if a migrant i experienced disasters in the past 12 months in his source country
s whose magnitude is greater than 70% of those that occurred within 12 months
before each date of the disasters data in his country between 1 year and 9 years
before his interview at time t.
As one may expect, the distribution of POPAFFECsurvey based on migrants’
interview in the survey sample and the distribution of POPAFFECall based on
daily observations from the whole disasters data are slightly different. So, the dis-
tribution from migrant-specific dummies based on the survey sample slightly dif-
fers from migrant-and-time-specific distributions computed with the whole disasters
data. Table 4 shows summary statistics of migrant-specific dummies.
7Regressions results based on a 7 year-rolling window are included in Section 3.9.1. Re-
gressions with other shorter distributions are available upon request but results do not
change qualitatively when shortening distributions.
8Recall that distributions are based on POPAFFECall
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Table 3.4: Distribution of dummies based on migrant specific distributions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
top10C (=1) 0.88 0.33 0 1
top20C (=1) 0.80 0.40 0 1
top30C (=1) 0.67 0.47 0 1
top40C (=1) 0.60 0.49 0 1
top50C (=1) 0.48 0.50 0 1
top60C (=1) 0.37 0.48 0 1
top70C (=1) 0.28 0.45 0 1
top80C (=1) 0.16 0.37 0 1
top90C (=1) 0.10 0.30 0 1
For instance, we observe that 28% of the individuals experienced shocks greater
than 70% of the natural disasters in their individual and time specific distributions
computed with the whole disasters data. 16% of the individuals faced shocks greater
than 80% and 10% had shocks greater than 90%. For more information on disasters
distributions, check Tables B.4, B.5 and B.6 from the Appendix B to see how dum-
mies’ cutoffs vary over time for the three countries of the sample with most migrants
(Bangladesh, India and Pakistan).
3.5 Results
Notice that disasters dummies are non-exclusive so all regressions include one
dummy. As a consequence, in all regression tables, each combination between a line
and a column corresponds to a regression. Recall that all regressions include controls
for migrants’ age, their education, the number of children they have, their marital
status, the log of the GDP per capita in the source country, the log of the GDP in
the source country and the log of the exchange rate. All regressions except labour
regressions also contain monthly net income. Moreover, all regressions include year
fixed effects and individual fixed effects. In the USS data, remittances are only
included in wave 1 and wave 4. As a consequence, in all regressions, I use wave
1 and wave 4 of the survey in order to have a sample that contains most outcome
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variables I use. The only outcome variable that is not included in wave 1 is savings.
As a consequence, savings regressions are based on waves 2, 4 and 6.
3.5.1 Remittances
Table 3.5 shows regression results of the impact of natural disasters on the
probability to remit. All regressions are estimated through Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) and include year and individual fixed effects. Results show evidence that
migrants are more likely to remit when natural disasters hit their home countries.
Column (1) shows regression results for all migrants, column (2) for all men and
column (3) for all women. Columns (4), (5) and (6) show regression results for
migrants in the labour force. Column (4) corresponds to all migrants in the labour
force, column (5) only for men in the labour force and column (6) for women in the
labour force.
Not surprisingly, we notice that disasters need to be of a certain magnitude
to modify migrants’ remitting behaviour. So, if we look at disasters lying above the
bottom 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% of the distribution, we do not observe any effect
of natural disasters on the probability of remitting. The latter is true no matter
which subsample, i.e. column we are analysing (Column (1) to column (6)). Two
phenomena may explain these results. First, since natural disasters on average are
not very high, natural disasters in expectation may be low and, as a consequence,
migrants do not modify much their ex-ante behaviours. So, they may be more
likely to adjust ex-post behaviours when disasters are of high magnitude. Another
possibility is that migrants who anticipated higher levels of disasters than actual
shocks just increase consumption. Due to the limitations of the data with regards
to consumption, it is hard to test this hypothesis. When natural disasters are falling
in the top 50% of migrants’ distributions, the latter become more likely to remit.
If we take into account the whole sample, migrants become 5% more likely to start
remitting in response to a shock in the top 50% of the distribution (see column
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Table 3.5: Impact of disasters on the probability to remit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Remit = 1
top10C 0.0323 0.0763 0.0791 .06344 0.106 0.0208
(0.0353) (0.0681) (0.0604) (0.0702) (0.0822) (0.0220)
top20C 0.0448 0.0327 0.0604 0.0430 0.0148 0.0557
(0.0285) (0.0423) (0.0400) (0.0404) (0.0544) (0.0692)
top30C -0.0108 0.00539 -0.0262 -0.0190 0.0337 -0.0466
(0.0271) (0.0402) (0.0379) (0.0411) (0.0562) (0.0731)
top40C -0.000594 0.0198 -0.0182 -0.00958 0.0394 -0.0932
(0.0282) (0.0411) (0.0397) (0.0422) (0.0551) (0.0698)
top50C 0.0508* 0.0869** 0.0150 0.0486 0.105** -0.0530
(0.0284) (0.0409) (0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0519) (0.0644)
top60C 0.0720** 0.0931* 0.0493 0.0672 0.130** -0.0600
(0.0343) (0.0497) (0.0478) (0.0484) (0.0627) (0.0768)
top70C 0.0379 0.122** -0.0307 0.0411 0.176** -.0460
(0.0393) (0.0568) (0.0541) (0.0543) (0.0728) (0.0621)
top80C 0.0376 0.0920 -0.0126 0.0690 0.201** -0.0433
(0.0473) (0.0659) (0.0672) (0.0664) (0.0884) (0.110)
top90C -0.0194 0.0775 -0.108 0.0193 0.158 0.366
(0.0579) (0.0775) (0.0786) (0.0867) (0.107) (0.530)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 2,306 1,108 1,198 1,194 734 458
Migrants 1,153 554 599 597 367 229
Linear probability model with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%. Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital
status, monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of
the GDP in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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(1)). Likewise, disasters above the bottom 60% of the distribution are affecting
positively migrants’ remitting behaviour but the magnitude is slightly greater and
goes up to 7.2%. These are important variations considering that 28% of migrants
from my sample remit on average. When we look at disasters above the bottom
70%, the effect of natural disasters on remittances is positive but not significant
anymore. Moreover, it is twice smaller in magnitude. Likewise, when we look at
the impact of natural disasters when the latter fall above the bottom 80%, the
coefficient on top80C has similar magnitude as the one on top70C and is positive
but not significant. Finally, the coefficient becomes negative although not significant
when disasters are above the bottom 90% of migrants’ distributions.
Two main phenomena are responsible for this. First, disasters of high mag-
nitude are less frequent. As a consequence, standard errors tend to be higher and
lead to less precise estimates. Second, there is some heterogeneity in the response
to natural disasters across gender. More specifically, if we look at column (2) and
column (3) that represent respectively men and women, we observe that only men
respond to natural disasters. So, men who experienced disasters above the bottom
50% are 8.68% more likely to remit. When disasters fall above the bottom 60%
of the distribution of natural disasters, men are 9.31% more likely to remit. The
coefficient is even bigger when disasters are in the above the bottom 70% of the
distribution and reaches 12.2%. Coefficients are still positive but not significant
when looking at the top 20% and 10% of the distribution. However, for the latter,
standard errors go up and estimates are less precise. Unlike for men, the coefficients
are never significant for women and become negative when disasters are above the
bottom 70% of the distribution. As a consequence, although the coefficient on men
is positive for instance on top70C (column (2)), the aggregate effect is much smaller
and not significant (column (1)).
The fact that women do not adjust their behaviour may be subject to two main
interpretations: either women anticipate shocks perfectly and smooth remittances
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or they just do not send more money in response to disasters. Another possibility is
that women already send money for other purposes and the fact they might increase
the intensive margin is not captured in regressions. Another interpretation is that
households may be pooling resources and men may be in charge of sending remit-
tances. So women could adjust to increase remittances but since they send through
men, we do not observe any effect. The next section on transmission mechanisms
shows scant evidence that women respond to natural disasters. One of the expla-
nations for this to happen is that women are more constrained by children. Due to
the small sample size, it is hard to test this hypothesis and analyse the behaviour of
women with no children. Finally, one may think that, since women have lower net
incomes on average, they have less margins on which to respond.
Other characteristics may make migrants more likely to remit in response to
disasters. For instance, migrants in the labour force may be able to adjust one more
variable i.e. labour supply in order to fund remittances compared to pensioners for
instance. As a consequence, it may then be easier for them to start remitting when
in the aftermath of natural disasters. The next section on transmission mechanisms
will investigate whether migrants in the labour force adjust labour supply. Before
doing so, it is worth looking at whether migrants in the labour supply are more likely
to start remitting in response to natural disasters. Columns (4), (5) and (6) from
Table 3.5 underline the impact of natural disasters on migrants in the labour force.
Once again we see that only men are likely to change remitting behaviour in the wake
of natural disasters when the latter are in the top 50% of disasters or above. There
is a positive effect at the aggregate level but not significant and a negative effect
for women, which is not significant either. Once again, the positive and significant
effect on men is offset by the one on women, which makes coefficients shrink at the
aggregate level and become insignificant despite smaller standard errors. When we
look at men in column (5), we observe that when natural disasters in men’s home
countries are above the 50% of the disasters they experienced in the past, they are
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10% more likely to remit. The impact is bigger for disasters lying above the bottom
60%, 70%, 80% and 90% of the distribution. It is respectively 13%, 17.6%, 20.1%
and 15.8%. All these coefficients are significant except the one on top90C. However,
the sample size for individuals experiencing natural disasters in the top 10% is much
smaller and standard errors are almost twice bigger than for disasters larger than
the 50th percentile of the reference period (10.7 versus 5.19).
When we compare the magnitude of the coefficients between all men and only
men in the labour force (column (2) and column (5)), we observe that the magnitude
is higher for men in the labour force. So, they seem more responsive to disasters.
When we look at coefficients from top50C to top90C, the coefficient for men is
systematically lower than for men in the labour force. From top50C to top90C we
get respectively 8.69% versus 10.5%; 9.31% versus 13%; 12.2% versus 17.6%, 9.2%
versus 20.1% and 7.75% versus 15.8%. As discussed, this may be because men in
the labour force are more able to adjust their income stream.
Notice that migrants may already be remitting for other reasons. So, although
they may increase the amount they send, this is not captured in regressions. So,
these results can be considered as a lower bound of the impact of disasters on the
probability to remit for this purpose. The rest of the result section will give some
insights on the intensity of remittances. It will also shed light on the types of
economic adjustments that migrants may make in the wake of natural disasters to
fund remittances. The empirical challenge to tackle is to show evidence of whether
modifications in migrants’ behaviours reflect changes in the intensive margin of re-
mittances. In order to do so, it will first show that migrants increase labour supply
and decrease savings. Then, to support the fact that these changes are not caused
by an increase in consumption, I will show that migrants consume less leisure and
report worse financial situations.
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3.5.2 Labour supply
As described in the previous section, migrants in the labour force appear to
be more reactive to natural disasters in their countries of origin. Labour supply
is then a potential transmission mechanism that would explain why these migrants
are more reactive to disasters. Figure 3.2 shows nonparametric regressions of the
variation in migrants’ hours of work and the variation in the percentage of people
affected by disasters in their home countries 12 months before their interview, i.e.
POPAFFECsurvey. The first graph that includes all migrants shows a slight positive
correlation between migrants’ variation in weekly hours of work and the variation in
the percentage of people affected by natural disasters in their home countries. When
we look at men, we observe a clear positive correlation between these two variables.
Unlike for men, there is no clear relationship for women.
Table 3.6, shows OLS regressions of the impact of natural disasters on labour
supply. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the impact of natural disasters on the exten-
sive margin. In line with previous findings, it seems that only men react to natural
disasters. The fact that only men are both more likely to remit and to be more
employed in the wake of natural disasters suggests that they use labour income to
fund remittances. Moreover, like in the previous section, only disasters of high mag-
nitude give rise to a response from male migrants. From column (2), we observe
that when male migrants face disasters that are in the bottom 70% of their distri-
bution, they do not adjust the extensive margin of labour supply. However, when
they face disasters above the top 70% of their distribution, they are 7.71% more
likely to work. The figure increases when disasters lie in the top 80% and it makes
migrants 9.8% more likely to work. These results underline that male migrants that
were unemployed are more likely to be employed in the wake of natural disasters.
An interpretation of this phenomenon is that they increase search efforts or are more
likely to accept job offers they would not accept in the absence of natural disasters of
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Figure 3.2: Impact of the variation in natural disasters (POPAFFECsurvey)
on the variation in weekly hours of work
Note: Local linear regressions and corresponding 95 per cent confidence interval using the
rule-of-thumb bandwidth.
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top70C but not significant. Once again, this may be due to the fact that there may
be a few observations in the top 10% and we observe that standard errors inflate.
In line with previous findings on remittances, women do not adjust their extensive
margin in the wake of natural disasters.
When we look at the intensive margin, the pattern is similar but male migrants
adjust labour supply from the top 50% of disasters in the reference distribution,
which is similar to what we observed for remittances. So, men experiencing disasters
in the top 50% of their reference distribution work on average 1.9 hours more weekly.
Figures go up to more than 4 hours for men whose countries were hit by disasters
in the top 80% or 90% of their reference distributions. Considering that the average
hourly wage is around £5.29, this implies an increase in income by approximately
£40 for disasters in the top 50% and by more than £80 monthly for disasters lying
in the top 10% of their reference distribution.
One may wonder how migrants manage to increase hours of work. Indeed,
although some jobs may offer the possibility to do extra hours, not all jobs offer this
flexibility. Moreover, some jobs may not pay for extra hours. Although, it would
be of interest to understand whether migrants do work extra hours at their primary
jobs and get more money, the limitations of the data do not enable me to test this
hypothesis. Another way for migrants to increase hours of work is to get a second
job. The first 3 columns of Table 3.7 highlight the impact of natural disasters on the
probability to have a second job. Columns (1), (2) and (3) represent respectively the
impact of natural disasters on the probability of having a second job for the whole
sample, men and women. All regressions are estimated through OLS. When we look
at the whole sample (column (1)), we observe no impact of natural disasters on the
probability to get a second job. However, when we only look at men (column (2)), we
observe that when disasters are of important magnitude, migrants are more likely to
have a second job. So, when disasters are above the bottom 60% of disasters in their
reference distributions, male migrants are 4.76% more likely to get a second job.
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Table 3.6: Impact of disasters on labour supply
Employment Weekly Hours of work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
top10C 0.0176 0.0225 0.0124 1.232 1.285 2.019
(0.0267) (0.0364) (0.0372) (1.115) (1.592) (1.445)
top20C 0.00775 -0.00410 0.0341 1.108 -0.0205 1.3302
(0.0216) (0.0296) (0.0306) (0.838) (1.333) (0.809)
top30C 0.0127 0.0214 0.0207 1.164 -0.196 1.794
(0.0226) (0.0296) (0.0360) (0.829) (1.211) (1.298)
top40C 0.0195 0.0249 0.0307 1.024 0.798 1.496
(0.0220) (0.0292) (0.0326) (0.769) (0.965) (1.199)
top50C 0.0268 0.0460 0.00388 1.190 1.908* 0.403
(0.0223) (0.0292) (0.0334) (0 .791) (1.100) (1.225)
top60C 0.0143 0.0346 -0.0256 0.420 1.559 -1.052
(0.0239) (0.0319) (0.0348) (0.903) (1.267) (1.259)
top70C 0.0264 0.0771** -0.0729 0.534 3.198** 2.354
(0.0329) (0.0391) (0.0484) (1.151) (1.614) (1.552)
top80C 0.0481 0.0986** -0.0495 1.226 4.602*** -2.207
(0.0378) (0.0482) (0.0567) (1.325) (1.767) (1.900)
top90C 0.0619 0.0771 0.00152 1.333 4.062** -2.203
(0.0387) (0.0560) (0.0468) (1.323) (1.948) (1.533)
Sample All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1.796 1,084 712 1.796 1,084 712
Migrants 898 542 356 898 542 356
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital
status, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the home
country, and the log of the exchange rate.
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Figures are higher for migrants who experienced disasters above the top 70%, 80%
and 90% with an increase in the probability to get a job by respectively 7.11%, 16%
and 7.80%. Women do not seem to be more likely to get a second job in response to
natural disasters. This is in line with previous findings that showed that only men
were adjusting labour supply.
To sum up, there is evidence that male migrants increase labour supply in the wake of
natural disasters. First, results show that unemployed male migrants are more likely
to start working. This can be interpreted as an increase in their search efforts or a
willingness to accept job offers they would reject in the absence of natural disasters.
Moreover, male migrants already in employment increase hours of work through
getting a second job. Both of these phenomena explain the increase in male working
hours. Men might also increase through extra hours but the limitations of the data
do not enable me to test for this hypothesis. An important potential phenomenon
that could jeopardise these results is the fact that disasters could give rise to an
increase in migrant inflows. This could affect wages negatively and migrants could
then increase labour supply just to keep constant levels of consumption.
Figure 3.3 shows nonparametric regressions of the impact of disasters on wages.
They express whether variations in the population affected by disasters implies
changes in wages. It shows no clear pattern of a relationship between natural disas-
ters and wages.
Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 3.7 show Poisson regressions9 of the impact
of natural disasters on hourly wages. Please notice that due to missing values,
the sample size substantially goes down so results should be interpreted cautiously.
Regression results do not show any impact of natural disasters on wages.
9I use Poisson regressions due to the Poisson shape of the data that contains many
0s. Results using an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IRS) function are similar qualitatively and
presented in Table B.20 from Appendix B.
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Table 3.7: Impact of disasters on labour supply
2ndJob Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
top10C 0.0336 0.0413 -0.0176 -0.105 0.0121 -0.0634
(0.0261) (0.0297) (0.0286) (0.0745) (0.143) (0.0661)
top20C 0.00965 0.0404 -0.0163 -0.110 -0.0769 -0.0663
(0.0161) (0.0258) (0.0175) (0.0703) (0.113) (0.0716)
top30C 0.0151 0.0242 0.00249 -0.0882 -0.0107 -0.0382
(0.0175) (0.0232) (0.0250) (0.0840) (0.131) (0.149)
top40C 0.00333 0.0206 -0.00790 -0.0937 0.000452 -0.201
(0.0168) (0.0207) (0.0287) (0.0819) (0.109) (0.211)
top50C 0.00865 0.0104 0.0192 0.00629 -0.0452 0.00412
(0.0175) (0.0237) (0.0264) (0.0439) (0.0722) (0.0775)
top60C 0.0260 0.0476* 0.0220 -0.00867 -0.137 -0.386
(0.0208) (0.0274) (0.0344) (0.0368) (0.113) (0.288)
top70C 0.0342 0.0711* 0.0260 -0.232 -0.146 -0.426
(0.0266) (0.0370) (0.0441) (0.167) (0.166) (0.345)
top80C 0.0524 0.160*** -0.0125 -0.101 -0.0379 -0.298
(0.0350) (0.0528) (0.0488) (0.201) (0.185) (0.344)
top90C 0.0219 0.0780** 0.00714 -0.153 0.0639 -0.265
(0.0262) (0.0394) (0.0496) (0.167) (0.106) (0.382)
Sample All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1516 832 684 264 144 120
Migrants 758 416 342 132 72 60
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Re-
gressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status,
log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the home country
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Figure 3.3: Impact of the variation in natural disasters (POPAFFECsurvey)
on the variation in hourly wages




Not all migrants may be able to increase labour supply in order to fund re-
mittances. Moreover, some migrants may manage to do so but not as much as they
would need to fully fund remittances. For instance, a migrant may be able to do
extra hours but not as much as he needs to cover his increase in remittances. As a
consequence, migrants may need to exploit other resources to fund remittances in
the wake of natural disasters. Adjusting savings may be another way for them to do
so. Figure 3.4 emphasises that an increase in the population affected by disasters
leads to a decrease in savings. This is true for both men and women. When we
look at the whole sample, there is a clear decrease around 3%. Interestingly enough,
natural disasters start affecting savings when the latter are affecting more than 3%
of the population. This is in line with previous findings with regards to hours of
work.
Table 3.8 shows Poisson regressions with individual fixed effects on how natural
disasters affect savings 10. Since the survey data I use does not contain information
on savings in the same waves as for remittances and labour, I use waves 2, 4 and
6, which are the waves available for savings. Column (1), (2) and (3) correspond to
regression results based on the whole sample. Once again, it seems that disasters
only affect savings when the former are above a certain threshold. We observe that
migrants start decreasing monthly savings when they experienced shocks lying in
the top 50% of their reference distributions or above. Below this threshold, natural
disasters do not significantly affect savings.
When we look at the whole sample (column (1)), we observe that migrants
save 41% less when the later experienced shocks in the top 50% of their reference
distributions. Considering that the average monthly savings are £85, this corre-
sponds to a decrease in savings by almost £35. The coefficients on dummies top60C
10Once again, I use Poisson regressions due to the Poisson shape of the data that contains
many 0s. Results using an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IRS) function are similar qualitatively
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Figure 3.4: Impact of the variation in natural disasters (POPAFFECsurvey)
on the variation in monthly savings
Note: Local linear regressions and corresponding 95 per cent confidence interval using the
rule-of-thumb bandwidth.
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to top90C are all negative and significant except the one on top70C, which is not
significant. If we focus on men (column (2)), we observe the same pattern and male
migrants only respond to natural disasters when they are above the bottom 50% of
their reference distributions or above. All the coefficients on dummies top50C to
top90C are negative and coefficients increase as the magnitude of disasters increases.
For instance, male migrants who experienced disasters lying in the top 50% of their
reference distributions save 30.4% less monthly, which corresponds to almost a £32
decrease in monthly savings. Figures go up to 71.1% for disasters in the top 10%,
which corresponds to a decrease in savings by slightly less than £75. These monetary
decreases in savings are of the same magnitude as the increases in labour income
for men (£40 for disasters in the top 50% and £80 for disasters in the top 90%).
Like for men, women start savings less when disasters are above the bottom 50%.
Coefficients on disasters dummy variables are all negative from top50C to top90C.
However, only the ones on top60C and top90C are significant. So, although previous
results underlined no evidence that women were adjusting behaviour in the wake of
natural disasters, there is weak evidence that women respond to natural disasters.
Thus, unlike for remittances and labour supply results, there is no clear evidence
that men are driving the results.
Column (4), (5) and (6) show regression results for migrants in the labour
force. When we look at both male and female together (column (4)), we observe
that disasters start affecting migrants when they are larger than the 50th percentile
of the reference period. The pattern is however less clear than when looking at the
whole sample. So, only coefficients on top50C, top60C and top90C are significant.
For instance, migrants who experienced shocks in the top 50% of their reference
distributions save 42% less monthly. Like for remittances and labour outcome vari-
ables exposed previously, results show that men are driving the results. Indeed, men
in the labour force do decrease savings unlike women. The former start remitting
more when disasters are above the bottom 40% of their reference distributions and
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all dummies above (from top50C to top90C) are negative and significant. Interest-
ingly, the magnitude of the coefficients is similar to those when looking at men with
all types of occupations. So, results do not show evidence that male migrants in
the labour force increase labour supply in order to keep constant levels of monthly
savings.
Table 3.8: Impact of disasters on monthly savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Savings
top10C 0.136 -0.174 0.403 0.212 0.0724 -0.0108
(0.191) (0.142) (0.252) (0.199) (0.184) (0.166)
top20C -0.0683 -0.0168 -0.0157 -0.0257 0.0763 0.0368
(0.153) (0.173) (0.211) (0.161) (0.266) (0.121)
top30C -0.0156 -0.208 0.344 -0.0126 -0.196 -0.0261
(0.163) (0.166) (0.275) (0.164) (0.177) (0.107)
top40C -0.0631 -0.479 0.463 -0.0390 -0.465* -0.000113
(0.201) (0.234) (0.358) (0.222) (0.245) (0.101)
top50C -0.409** -0.304** -0.499 -0.418* -0.451*** -0.0272
(0.201) (0.148) (0.260) (0.215) (0.173) (0.0965)
top60C -0.417** -0.301* -0.508** -0.409* -0.488*** -0.109
(0.206) (0.165) (0.241) (0.221) (0.180) (0.104)
top70C -0.178 -0.331 -0.0673 -0.0154 -0.333* -0.113
(0.164) (0.205) (0.243) (0.152) (0.195) (0.110)
top80C -0.414** -0.439** -0.369 -0.257 -0.434** -0.134
(0.187) (0.205) (0.300) (0.192) (0.196) (0.126)
top90C -0.796*** -0.711** -0.899*** -0.609** -0.536* -0.286
(0.234) (0.319) (0.343) (0.239) (0.314) (0.176)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1,746 846 896 1,181 673 506
Migrants 747 366 379 510 295 214
Poisson regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions
include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status, monthly net
income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the home
country and the log of the exchange rate.
To sum up, results show that in the wake of natural disasters, migrants are
more likely to increase labour supply and save less. As exposed previously, men that
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face disasters in the top 50% of their reference distributions increase monthly labour
earnings by almost £40. Moreover, they decrease monthly savings by £32. This can
be interpreted as a potential increase in remittances by £72 monthly. If we look at
men who experienced disasters in the top 10% of their reference distributions, we
observe that they increase monthly labour earnings by £80 and decrease savings by
almost the same amount. This corresponds to a potential increase in remittances
by £155. To put these amounts into perspective, it is worth looking at average
amounts of remittances that migrants living in the UK send. In 2015, the Greenback
project commissioned by the World Bank carried out a survey of 602 Bangladeshi,
Ghanaian and Romanian remitters in London. They observe that Romanians sent
the largest amounts of money back home among men in the survey with more than
£290 monthly on average. Then they find Bangladeshis remit on average almost
£210 per month and Somali and Ghanaians approximately £125 monthly.
3.5.4 Leisure consumption
To bring more evidence that these changes reflect an increase in the intensive
margin of remittances, it is important to show that disasters also affect migrants’
consumption. This paper looks at migrants’ leisure consumption.
Table 3.9 shows evidence that migrants decrease leisure. More specifically, it
underlines that migrants are more likely to report no sport when they face important
disasters in their country of origin. A decrease in leisure can be either interpreted
as a decrease in money available for leisure due to an increase in remittances or a
decrease in time available due to increasing labour supply. Column (1), (2) and (3)
correspond to regression results based on migrants with all types of occupations.
Column (2) shows that men are more likely to report doing no sport in the past
12 months when facing natural disasters lying in the top 70% of their reference
distributions or above. So, men are 5.29% more likely not to do sport when natural
disasters are in the top 70% of their distribution. Figures go up to almost 12% when
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disasters are in the top 90%. Interestingly enough, once again women seem not to
adjust.
Column (4), (5) and (6) show regression results for migrants in the labour force.
Only men who experienced disasters in the top 90% are less likely to do sport. These
results suggest that male migrants in the labour force are more likely to do sport
in the wake of natural disasters compared to male migrants from the whole sample.
Since male migrants in the labour force increase labour income in the aftermath
of natural disasters and are those that are the less likely to stop doing sport, this
underlines that the decrease in leisure consumption is more due to financial reasons
than time allocation issues. However, this hypothesis has to be taken cautiously for
two reasons. First, coefficients on top70C, top80C and top90C for male migrants
in the labour force are of the same magnitude as those for male migrants from the
whole sample. More specifically, coefficients on top70C, top80C and top90C are
respectively 5.29, 7.54 and 11.9 for all male migrants and 3.72, 8.86 and 14.4 for
male migrants in the labour force. Moreover, the sample size for male migrants in
the labour force is smaller than the one for all male migrants and standard errors
are bigger, which may explain the lack of significance of the coefficients on top70C
and top80C for male migrants in the labour force. So, it is then impossible to draw
any tangible conclusions when we compare results obtained with all men or just men
in the labour force.
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Table 3.9: Impact of disasters on the probability not to do any sport in the
past 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Nosports = 1
top10C -0.00549 -0.00950 0.00189 0.00192 0.0125 -0.00672
(0.0243) (0.0381) (0.0317) (0.0352) (0.0480) (0.0519)
top20C -0.0169 -0.00384 -0.0239 -0.0245 -0.00839 -0.0433
(0.0192) (0.0295) (0.0252) (0.0283) (0.0343) (0.0410)
top30C -0.00616 0.00394 -0.00835 -0.00679 -0.00727 0.00426
(0.0181) (0.0277) (0.0238) (0.0263) (0.0365) (0.0405)
top40C -0.00266 0.0175 -0.00949 -0.0231 0.0267 -0.0422
(0.0199) (0.0302) (0.0264) (0.0284) (0.0716) (0.0457)
top50C -0.00628 0.00996 -0.0108 -0.0193 -0.000202 -0.0387
(0.0173) (0.0249) (0.0238) (0.0249) (0.0305) (0.0428)
top60C -0.000780 0.0174 -0.00788 -0.0133 0.00640 -0.0477
(0.0190) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0280) (0.0332) (0.0507)
top70C 0.00614 0.0529* -0.0219 -0.00648 0.0372 -0.0863
(0.0228) (0.0315) (0.0327) (0.0324) (0.0372) (0.0587)
top80C 0.0252 0.0754* -0.00130 0.0697 0.0886 0.0424
(0.0320) (0.0454) (0.0453) (0.0457) (0.0543) (0.0797)
top90C 0.0380 0.119** -0.0170 0.0874* 0.144** -0.00438
(0.0338) (0.0512) (0.0448) (0.0472) (0.0607) (0.0766)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 3,754 1722 2,022 1,922 1,170 750
Migrants 1,877 861 1,011 961 585 375
Linear probability model with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status,
monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP
in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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3.5.5 Financial situation
Previous results emphasise that migrants adjust behaviour in the aftermath
of natural disasters. More specifically, results show that migrants increase labour
supply, save less and consume less leisure such as sports. The underlying assumption
that may explain these modifications in migrants’ behaviour is that they increase
remittances to compensate losses caused by natural disasters in their home countries.
One way to show further evidence that migrants respond to natural disasters and
are affected by them is to investigate their financial situation. Natural disasters can
affect migrants’ financial situations in two main ways: either because they increase
remittances or because they have assets in their home country that were damaged.
Although it is not easy to disentangle the two phenomena, by looking at the
subjective reported financial situation across different groups of migrants, this paper
will show that migrants who respond to natural disasters are also those reporting the
worst financial situations. Answering this question will also shed light on whether
modifications in migrants’ behaviours enable them to fully fund remittances and
maintain a similar subjective financial situation. For instance, one might think that
migrants increase labour supply and maintain the same levels of consumption. So,
although natural disasters might affect their behaviour, increasing labour supply en-
ables them to fund remittances and to maintain similar financial situations. Table
3.10 shows the impact of natural disasters on migrants’ subjective financial difficul-
ties. Recall that Financial is a dummy equal to 1 if migrants report to be just about
getting by financially or facing financial difficulties and 0 otherwise.
Column (1) corresponds to regression results based on the whole sample. Mi-
grants report worse financial situations when they face natural disasters from the
top 30% of their reference distributions. Moreover, coefficients are all positive and
statistically significant from top60C and migrants are more than 5% more likely to
report difficult financial situations when facing natural disasters in the top 60% of
their reference distribution. Interestingly enough, when we compare results for men
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(column (2)) and women (column (3)), we observe that these results are driven by
men and we notice that natural disasters do not seem to affect women’s subjective
financial situations. Recall that male migrants are the only ones that are more likely
to remit, to increase labour supply and decrease leisure consumption in the wake
of natural disasters. Moreover, they also decrease savings to a similar extent to
female migrants. Conditional on the fact that male and female migrants have the
same probability to have assets that were affected by natural disasters, the fact that
male migrants report worse financial situation compared to women suggests that
increasing remittances negatively affects their financial situations.
By comparing regressions results between males from the whole sample (col-
umn (2)) and males from the labour force only (column (5)), one can observe how
adjusting labour supply can help migrants increase remittances without being too
affected by it financially. Results show that coefficients on top40C and top50C are
only significant for the sample with all men. This may be due to the fact that
increasing labour income helps male migrants in the labour force to fully fund re-
mittances when damages are not too important. However, when disasters are of
higher magnitude, increasing labour supply may not be sufficient to fully compen-
sate the increase in remittances since the potential earnings from labour supply may
be smaller compared to losses. However, male migrants from the labour force seem
to be more likely to report worse financial situations when disasters are very high,
i.e. that lie in the top 80% or 90% of their distributions. It might be due to the fact
that male migrants in the labour force are those that are the most expected to help.
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Table 3.10: Impact of disasters on migrants’ subjective financial difficulties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Financial =1
top10C 0.0197 0.00736 0.0337 0.00831 0.0139 0.00965
(0.0304) (0.0444) (0.0417) (0.0412) (0.0549) (0.0626)
top20C 0.00517 0.0188 -0.00413 -0.00946 -0.00468 -0.00862
(0.0250) (0.0352) (0.0354) (0.0330) (0.0444) (0.0501)
top30C 0.0333* 0.0433 0.0242 0.0100 0.0171 -0.0111
(0.0193) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0271) (0.0352) (0.0434)
top40C 0.0190 0.0517* -0.00896 0.00452 0.0330 -0.0429
(0.0189) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0343) (0.0419)
top50C 0.0281 0.0476* 0.0118 0.0159 0.0451 -0.0309
(0.0193) (0.0276) (0.0269) (0.0273) (0.0345) (0.0465)
top60C 0.0516** 0.0827*** 0.0288 0.0316 0.0868** -0.0429
(0.0206) (0.0307) (0.0281) (0.0292) (0.0380) (0.0460)
top70C 0.0612** 0.101*** 0.0345 0.0407 0.122*** -0.0760
(0.0246) (0.0382) (0.0323) (0.0358) (0.0461) (0.0572)
top80C 0.0653** 0.0746* 0.0585 0.0430 0.114** -0.0543
(0.0269) (0.0397) (0.0367) (0.0373) (0.0480) (0.0603)
top90C 0.0696** 0.0552 0.0769* 0.0903** 0.116** 0.0371
(0.0320) (0.0492) (0.0421) (0.0433) (0.0552) (0.0714)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 4,428 2,050 2,376 2,272 1,394 876
Migrants 2,214 1,025 1,188 1,136 697 438
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions
include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status, monthly net
income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the home
country and the log of the exchange rate.
3.6 Robustness checks
3.6.1 Fixed distributions
Regressions in the body of the paper rely on individual-specific disasters dum-
mies. As a robustness check, I create dummies that are still country-specific but not
migrant-specific. So, it enables me to compare current disasters, i.e. POPAFFECsurvey
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to a fixed country-level distribution. To create these country-specific distributions,
the method is slightly different than for individual-specific distribution. I use the
distribution of POPAFFECall based on administrative data between 12 months
and the past 9 years before the start of the survey data, which is the longest time
period I have in my data.
Dummies based on fixed country distributions, enable me to compare individ-
uals from the same country with regards to the same benchmark. Notice that fixing
the distribution implies that we assume that migrants are not updating their beliefs.
Another drawback of this method though is that fixing the distribution implies that
for different individuals, we compare current events with respect to a distribution
whose start can be between 1 year and 5 years before current disasters.
Table B.7 from Appendix B shows the descriptive statistics of these dummies.
Regression results using a fixed distribution with these dummies are shown in Ap-
pendix B.2 and are qualitatively similar but with coefficients that tend to be more
significant.
3.6.2 Further robustness checks
In the main regression, I use dummies based on a distribution starting one year
before the interview. I provide another robustness check and construct dummies
on distributions starting two years before migrants’ interviews. This idea is that
migrants may be affected by cumulative disasters. For instance, if disasters were
very important between 12 months and 24 months before the date of their interview,
they may have debts and the way they react to disasters within 12 months before
their interview may be different than if they were no disasters in the past. Results do
not show evidence of such a phenomenon. Due to data constraints, this implies that
the window is over 7 years instead of 8. Results are in line with previous results and




This paper shows evidence that male migrants respond to natural disasters in
their country of origin. They appear to be more likely to remit when disasters hit
their home countries. To understand how migrants may manage to fund remittances
in the wake of natural disasters, this study investigates 3 main channels: labour
supply, savings and leisure consumption. Interestingly enough, in most transmissions
mechanisms that this paper explores, only men adjust behaviour. This is in line
with the fact that only male migrants are likely to change remitting status. Another
interesting feature of the results is that migrants only respond to natural disasters
when the latter are of high magnitude, i.e. in the top 50% of migrants’ distributions.
One of the reasons to explain this is that migrants may anticipate disasters and make
ex-ante adjustments in order to smooth remittances. Since they are less likely to
anticipate extreme disasters they may not have enough money to fund remittances,
hence the need to adjust ex-post. Moreover, since natural disasters on average are
not very high, natural disasters in expectation may be low and, as a consequence,
migrants do not modify much their ex-ante behaviours. So, they may be more
likely to adjust ex-post behaviours when disasters are of high magnitude. Another
possibility is that migrants who anticipated higher levels of disasters than actual
shocks just increase consumption. Due to the limitations of the data with regards
to consumption, it is hard to test this hypothesis.
First, this paper looks at how migrants may adjust labour supply in order to
fund remittances. Results show that male migrants increase both the extensive and
intensive margins of labour supply. For instance, when men face disasters in the top
50% of their reference distributions, they work on average 1.9 more hours weekly,
which corresponds to an average £40 monthly increase in labour earnings. If we look
at men who experienced disasters in the top 10% of their reference distributions, we
observe that they work on average 4 hours more weekly for an increase in monthly
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labour earnings by £80. Male migrants in the labour force may increase hours of
work through 3 main channels. First, some male migrants in the labour force may
switch from unemployment to employment. Second, male migrants that already have
a job may get a second job. Third, male migrants may do extra hours at their job.
This paper shows that male migrants are more likely to be employed when natural
disasters are above the bottom 70% of migrants’ reference distributions. Moreover,
this study underlines that male migrants are more likely to get a second job when
natural disasters are above the bottom 60% of their reference distributions. These
results suggest that UK labour markets are flexible enough to enable them to adapt.
The limitations of the data do not allow me to test whether migrants increase extra
hours.
Not all migrants may be able to adjust labour supply in order to fund re-
mittances. Another channel through which migrants may manage to increase re-
mittances is savings. Regression results underline that migrants decrease monthly
savings in the aftermath of natural disasters. So, when men face disasters in the
top 50% of their reference distribution, they decrease monthly savings by £32. If we
look at men who experienced disasters in the top 10% of their reference distribution,
we observe that they decrease savings by £75. If we sum up the decrease in savings
and the increase in labour supply earnings, this corresponds to a potential increase
in remittances by £72 for disasters in the top 50% and £155 for disasters in the top
10%. To put these amounts into perspective, based on my own calculations using
the same disasters database, people affected by natural disasters in the countries I
focus on over the same time period faced an average economic loss of £300 monthly.
Money potentially available due to changes in migrants’ behaviours may be even
bigger since migrants report having less leisure like sport activities. However, the
data do not have information on how much migrants spend on sport activities so I
cannot quantify by how much they can potentially increase remittances by stopping
doing sport. Not surprisingly, they also declare worse financial situations.
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The fact that migrants are able to react to specific shocks means that there is
potential for increasing remittances and that policymakers in the United Kingdom
should keep on facilitating remittance transactions. Recent discussions in the UK
parliament to reform the UK remittance market to make it more competitive are
in line with this. One could also consider different financial incentives such as tax
rebates for migrants sending remittances when their countries are hit by natural
disasters. Also, the fact that migrants rely on labour markets and increase labour
supply to fund remittances in the wake of natural disasters underlines that labour
market reforms to migrants’ access to the labour market could boost remittances.
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Conclusion
Using microeconometrics methods, this thesis analyses three vulnerable groups
of people that have recently become a policy priority in Europe and that are now
at the top of the policy agenda. More specifically, it sheds light on the behaviour
of prisoners, victims of domestic abuse and migrants. Results emphasise important
factors that policymakers should consider while designing policies to support these
three vulnerable groups.
The first chapter of this thesis highlights the driving factors of partnership
decisions of former inmates for re-offending purposes. Exploiting the 2006 prison
pardon in Italy that released important groups of inmates, it shows that nationality,
age and residual sentence are key determinants of peer group formation. Mafia
criminals are more likely to partner up, and more generally career criminals, are more
likely to partner up. As for matching across crime types, there is some evidence of
complementarities, and possibly learning across crime types. With respect to crime
types we observe that career criminals are likely to influence inmates who committed
crimes that are not associated with a criminal career, like crimes committed against
the family (violence against children, incest, etc.), or crimes committed against the
order (disorderly conduct, public drunkenness, etc.).
These results have practical implications for policy purposes and can enable
policymakers to design more accurate prevention policies based on the characteristics
of the prisoners that were released with any of the other inmates who are still in
custody. For instance, if two inmates are released on the same day from the same
prison, authorities should be concerned if they have the same nationality or similar
ages. Also, since career criminals are likely to influence inmates who committed
crimes that are not associated with a criminal career, the allocation of prisoners
into cells could be optimised based on these results.
The second chapter of this thesis studies the impact of a policy to reduce
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domestic abuse in Essex. This policy informs high-risk suspects that they will be put
under higher surveillance and contact their victims and encourage them to report.
Using an RDD setup, results show evidence that suspects of domestic abuse that are
targeted by the policy are 9% more likely to be reported again for domestic abuse
events within 1 month. The effect of the policy on reporting is driven by events of
domestic abuse for which the police could not establish any criminal charges. More
precisely, results show a 10% increase in the probability that suspects targeted by the
policy are reported again for events of domestic abuse that did not lead to criminal
charges. However, there is no evidence that the policy influences the reporting of
crime. This may be due to the fact that either the policy has no impact on both
the deterrence of the suspects and on the reporting of crime or that these effects
compensate each other.
Although the fact that the policy increased reporting in the short term is
positive, results emphasise that the long-term impact of the policy depends on the
actual response of the police in the wake of the reporting. Results show that offenders
are also more likely to be reported again in the second month, conditional on being
reported within one month after the policy was put in place. These results imply
that, on average, the policy does not deter crime in the long run. However, results
also show that victims keep on reporting and, subsequently, that reporting has a gain
for them. When looking at the impact of being reported in the wake of the policy for
different levels of violence, one can observe that reporting may only deter crime in
the long run if it leads to criminal charges. On the contrary, the reporting of events
that does not lead to criminal charges appears to increase observed recidivism.
These results aim to contribute to the elaboration of cost-effective prevention
policies. Currently, there are several approaches to prevent domestic abuse that have
been developed by policy, the justice system, social workers and NGOs. For instance,
social workers engage in teaching to promote respectful and nonviolent relationships
through individual, community, and social levels changes. NGOs create protective
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environments, shelters and try to strengthen economic support for families. Many of
these methods are expensive. For example, in the UK, annual funding to provide core
support for victims and other accommodation-based services, rape support centres
and national helplines exceed £80 million (Strickland and Allen, 2017). Increasing
reporting through building trust with the police is a relatively cheap measure to
implement that can increase early reporting. By demonstrating empirically and
quantifying how an increase in the trust in the police can increase early reporting,
this paper contributes to the elaboration of cost-effective prevention policies.
The third chapter of this thesis shows evidence that male migrants living in
the UK and originating from developing countries respond to natural disasters in
their country of origin. By combining a household panel survey of migrants in
the UK and natural disasters data, I find that male migrants are more likely to
remit when disasters hit their home countries. To fund remittances in the wake
of natural disasters, I investigates three main channels: labour supply, savings and
leisure consumption. Results show that male migrants increase both the extensive
and intensive margins of labour supply. For instance, when men face disasters in the
top 50% of their reference distributions , on average they work 1.9 hours more per
week, which corresponds to a £40 increase in labour earnings per month. Results
also underline that migrants decrease monthly savings in the aftermath of natural
disasters. So, when men face disasters in the top 50% of their reference distribution,
they decrease monthly savings by £32.
To put these amounts into perspective, based on my own calculations using
the same disasters database, people affected by natural disasters in the countries I
focus on over the same time period faced an average economic loss of £300 monthly.
Money potentially available due to changes in migrants’ behaviours may be even
bigger since migrants report having less leisure like sport activities. Not surprisingly,
they also declare worse financial situations. The fact that migrants are able to react
to specific shocks means that there is potential for increasing remittances and that
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policymakers in the UK should keep on facilitating remittance transactions. Recent
discussions in the UK parliament to reform the UK remittance market to make it
more competitive are in line with this. One could also think of different financial
incentives such as tax rebates for migrants sending remittances when their countries
are hit by natural disasters. Also, the fact that migrants increase labour supply
to fund remittances in the wake of natural disasters underlines that labour market




Table A.1: Link between the risk score and the baseline control variables (OLS
regressions, different bandwidth)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female White Age Female White Age
Treatment 0.0346 0.0215 -1.487** 0.0109 0.00842 -0.553
(0.0195) (0.0161) (0.526) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.395)
Bandwidth [-10;10] [-10;10] [-10;10] [-30;30] [-30;30] [-30;30]
Observations 33,102 33,102 33,102 167,809 167,809 167,809
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the risk score level in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following controls: risk
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Figure A.1: Impact of the risk score on recidivism within 1 month (All data)
Table A.2: Summary statistics (All data)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Recidivism 0.056 n/a 1636905
Offence 0.020 n/a 1636905
Incident 0.036 n/a 1636905
Age 35.444 12.678 1636905
Female 0.258 n/a 1783966
White 0.825 n/a 1783966
RecencyScore 10.089 21.362 1464987
GravityScore 21.117 35.289 1464987
FrequencyScore 16.043 34.797 1464987
RiskScore 11.812 16.643 1464987




B.1 Further descriptive statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics: Men
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Remit (=1)1 0.31 n/a 0 1
Weekly Hours of work 30.67 15.66 0 97
Employed (=1)2 0.89 n/a 0 1
2ndJob (=1) 0.37 n/a 0 1
Hourly Wage 5.04 4.67 0 45
Monthly Savings 105.62 399.87 0 8000
Financial (=1)3 0.51 n/a 0 1
Nosports (=1)4. 0.49 n/a 0 1
Children 0.02 0.17 0 3
Married 0.69 n/a 0 1
Net income 1519.76 1445.55 0 15000
Age 45.05 16.07 16 92
Degree (=1) 0.45 n/a 0 1
ln (GDP pc) 7.95 1.30 6.32 11.12
ln (GDP) 26.63 1.69 23.21 30.49




Table B.2: Descriptive statistics: women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Remit (=1)5 0.24 n/a 0 1
Weekly Hours of work 26.34 14.51 0 97
Employed (=1)6 0.88 n/a 0 1
2ndJob (=1) 0.34 n/a 0 1
Hourly wage 5.60 14.62 0 60
Monthly Savings 68.14 473.38 0 10000
Financial (=1)7 0.51 n/a 0 1
Nosports (=1)8. 0.59 n/a 0 1
Children 0.88 1.15 0 8
Married (=1) 0.63 n/a 0 1
Net income 1056.07 991.25 0 15000
Age 44.02 15.82 16 101
Degree (=1) 0.41 n/a 0 1
ln (GDP pc) 8.10 1.38 6.32 11.12
ln (GDP) 26.66 1.78 23.21 30.49
ln (Exchange rate) 3.13 2.07 -0.36 7.86
N=2022
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Table B.3: Disasters frequency by country
Country Drought Earthquake Epidemic Extreme Flood Landslide Storm Total
Temperature
Bangladesh 1 0 0 4 10 3 16 34
China 7 38 0 3 67 22 79 216
Ghana 0 0 7 0 7 0 0 14
India 1 5 1 12 47 4 32 102
Jamaica 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 3
Kenya 3 0 6 0 14 1 0 24
Sri Lanka 2 0 2 0 15 3 3 25
Nigeria 0 0 9 0 11 0 2 22
Pakistan 0 6 1 2 20 4 2 35
Turkey 0 5 1 0 6 4 0 16
Uganda 1 0 9 0 3 2 1 16
South Africa 1 1 0 0 5 0 7 14
Total 17 55 36 21 205 43 144 521
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Table B.4: Country level distribution of POPAFFECTED: Bangladesh
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
D10 0.22 n/a 0.15 0.22
D20 0.37 n/a 0.23 0.40
D30 0.43 n/a 0.36 0.48
D40 0.64 n/a 0.48 0.99
D50 0.89 n/a 0.65 1.09
D60 1.27 n/a 0.90 1.43
D70 2.59 n/a 1.24 2.97
D80 5.41 n/a 1.88 6.16
D90 19.33 n/a 6.12 23.76
Table B.5: Country level distribution of POPAFFECTED: India
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
D10 0.48 n/a 0.35 0.60
D20 0.59 n/a 0.37 0.66
D30 0.93 n/a 0.56 1.68
D40 1.26 n/a 0.79 2.33
D50 1.55 n/a 0.97 2.69
D60 1.87 n/a 1.04 2.93
D70 2.40 n/a 1.14 4.06
D80 3.05 n/a 1.36 5.87
D90 13.95 n/a 3.00 27.78
Table B.6: Country level distribution of POPAFFECTED: Pakistan
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
D10 0.01 n/a 0.00 0.04
D20 0.04 n/a 0.00 0.09
D30 0.15 n/a 0.01 0.22
D40 0.40 n/a 0.10 0.97
D50 0.96 n/a 0.22 2.97
D60 1.55 n/a 0.75 3.18
D70 2.01 n/a 0.84 3.18
D80 3.56 n/a 3.02 4.43
D90 8.02 n/a 4.12 11.98
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Table B.7: Dummies based on country distributions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
top10C (=1) 0.83 n/a 0 1
top20C (=1) 0.80 n/a 0 1
top30C (=1) 0.63 n/a 0 1
top40C (=1) 0.53 n/a 0 1
top50C (=1) 0.48 n/a 0 1
top60C (=1) 0.39 n/a 0 1
top70C (=1) 0.36 n/a 0 1
top80C (=1) 0.19 n/a 0 1
top90C (=1) 0.11 n/a 0 1
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B.2 Robustness checks using a fixed distribu-
tion
This section includes regression results using country specific distributions.
Results are in line with main results.
Table B.8: Impact of disasters on the probability to remit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Remit = 1
top10C 0.0584 0.0509 0.0713 0.0634 0.0169 0.111
(0.0373) (0.0567) (0.0506) (0.0549) (0.0732) (0.0834)
top20C 0.0375 0.0206 0.0688 0.0337 -0.00733 0.0969
(0.0321) (0.0489) (0.0428) (0.0479) (0.0613) (0.0735)
top30C 0.00792 0.0138 0.0107 0.0269 0.0815 -0.0593
(0.0330) (0.0494) (0.0449) (0.0495) (0.0653) (0.0707)
top40C -0.0103 -0.00236 -0.0277 -0.0158 0.0193 -0.104
(0.0360) (0.0567) (0.0479) (0.0518) (0.0686) (0.0818)
top50C 0.0273 0.0634 0.00721 0.0210 0.0718 -0.0938
(0.0309) (0.0446) (0.0402) (0.0457) (0.0546) (0.0724)
top60C 0.0611 0.0972* 0.0394 0.0570 0.134** -0.0912
(0.0398) (0.0507) (0.0523) (0.0574) (0.0615) (0.0833)
top70C 0.0756* 0.127** 0.0212 0.0753 0.148** -0.0960
(0.0410) (0.0539) (0.0555) (0.0559) (0.0659) (0.0836)
top80C 0.0357 0.0763 -0.0290 0.0667 0.178* -0.154
(0.0501) (0.0719) (0.0713) (0.0708) (0.0977) (0.103)
top90C 0.0147 0.0662 -0.112 0.0662 0.143 -0.172
(0.0601) (0.0852) (0.0851) (0.0929) (0.122) (0.142)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 2.306 1,108 1,198 1,194 734 458
Migrants 1.153 554 599 597 367 229
Linear probability model with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%. Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital
status, monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of
the GDP in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.9: Impact of disasters on labour supply
Employment Weekly Hours of work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
top10C 0.000767 -0.0307 0.0373 0.490 -1.017 2.149
(0.0239) (0.0327) (0.0347) (0.991) (1.400) (1.313)
top20C 0.00953 -0.00602 0.0336 0.791 -0.0640 1.935
(0.0224) (0.0305) (0.0312) (0.888) (1.206) (1.259)
top30C 0.0187 0.0206 0.0298 1.392 1.922 1.409
(0.0306) (0.0395) (0.0497) (1.076) (1.364) (1.724)
top40C 0.0268 0.0614 -0.0125 0.265 1.933 -1.392
(0.0310) (0.0424) (0.0448) (1.052) (1.392) (1.611)
top50C 0.0358 0.0631* -0.0172 1.145 2.945** -1.370
(0.0255) (0.0328) (0.0397) (0.916) (1.269) (1.421)
top60C 0.0421 0.0854** -0.0395 1.238 3.821*** -2.296
(0.0293) (0.0373) (0.0434) (1.037) (1.192) (1.624)
top70C 0.0230 0.0627* -0.0533 0.289 2.361* -2.444
(0.0316) (0.0379) (0.0491) (1.223) (1.413) (1.824)
top80C 0.0550 0.0958** -0.0404 1.147 3.862** -1.836
(0.0366) (0.0484) (0.0539) (1.418) (1.876) (2.092)
top90C 0.0611* 0.0623 0.0181 1.158 3.807** -2.118
(0.0361) (0.0536) (0.0383) (1.337) (1.695) (1.650)
Sample All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1.796 1,084 712 1.796 1,084 712
Migrants 898 542 356 898 542 356
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital
status, monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of
the GDP in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.10: Impact of disasters on labour supply
2ndJob Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE)
VARIABLES 2ndJob 2ndJob 2ndJob Wage Wage Wage
top10C -0.00506 0.0244 0.0465 -0.0648 -0.0384 -0.0643
(0.0355) (0.0325) (0.0619) (0.0797) (0.132) (0.0594)
top20C -0.0129 -0.0191 0.0624 -0.0563 0.0288 -0.171*
(0.0333) (0.0308) (0.0634) (0.0705) (0.117) (0.104)
top30C 0.0263 0.0142 0.0698 -0.0954 -0.0290 -0.107
(0.0397) (0.0524) (0.0619) (0.105) (0.175) (0.118)
top40C 0.101** 0.112* 0.0653 -0.113 0.0882 -0.0778
(0.0494) (0.0642) (0.0735) (0.132) (0.144) (0.116)
top50C 0.0666 0.0619 0.124* -0.0449 0.0503 -0.113
(0.0420) (0.0504) (0.0721) (0.108) (0.108) (0.113)
top60C 0.115* 0.131 0.125* -0.0446 -0.0701 -0.269
(0.0596) (0.0932) (0.0673) (0.122) (0.132) (0.177)
top70C 0.145** 0.172 0.118 -0.0363 -0.0326 -0.566
(0.0672) (0.107) (0.0744) (0.146) (0.150) (0.349)
top80C -0.00673 0.0818 -0.0325 -0.0398 0.0131 -0.487
(0.0593) (0.0648) (0.0819) (0.164) (0.158) (0.299)
top90C -0.0420 0.0738 -0.102 0.0699 0.145 -0.531
(0.0626) (0.0467) (0.0876) (0.118) (0.0971) (0.382)
Sample All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1516 832 684 264 144 120
Migrants 758 416 342 132 72 60
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Re-
gressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status,
log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the home country
and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.11: Impact of disasters on monthly savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Savings
top10C -0.247 -0.233 -0.0348 -0.286 -0.0701 -0.515
(0.200) (0.211) (0.310) (0.210) (0.217) (0.323)
top20C -0.135 -0.232 0.225 -0.116 -0.104 -0.000648
(0.174) (0.181) (0.286) (0.184) (0.187) (0.316)
top30C -0.432 -0.0594 -0.591 -0.478 -0.131 -0.560
(0.306) (0.237) (0.358) (0.320) (0.246) (0.368)
top40C -0.140 -0.394* 0.283 -0.102 -0.416* 0.212
(0.185) (0.227) (0.311) (0.194) (0.238) (0.288)
top50C -0.138 -0.368* 0.164 -0.0719 -0.355* 0.416
(0.176) (0.212) (0.269) (0.182) (0.215) (0.273)
top60C -0.262* -0.318* -0.235 -0.187 -0.296* -0.0430
(0.137) (0.163) (0.238) (0.142) (0.161) (0.256)
top70C -0.315** -0.339* -0.236 -0.176 -0.326* -0.0322
(0.158) (0.180) (0.249) (0.154) (0.182) (0.269)
top80C -0.457*** -0.421** -0.548* -0.325* -0.352* -0.383
(0.170) (0.185) (0.292) (0.170) (0.182) (0.316)
top90C -0.744*** -0.646* -0.902** -0.523** -0.434 -0.703*
(0.249) (0.337) (0.357) (0.254) (0.326) (0.370)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1,746 846 896 1,181 673 506
Migrants 747 366 379 510 295 214
Poisson regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status,
monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP
in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.12: Impact of disasters on the probability not to do sport in the
past 12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Nosports = 1
top10C 0.0113 0.00595 0.0201 -0.0182 0.0159 -0.0104
(0.0217) (0.0310) (0.0300) (0.0381) (0.0414) (0.0498)
top20C -0.00363 -0.00310 -0.0239 -0.0219 0.00247 -0.0441
(0.0210) (0.0286) (0.0252) (0.0310) (0.0395) (0.0485)
top30C -0.0218 0.0159 -0.00835 -0.0395 -0.00325 -0.0843*
(0.0221) (0.0335) (0.0238) (0.0325) (0.0419) (0.0507)
top40C -0.0336 0.0133 -0.0625* -0.0570 -0.0235 -0.0865
(0.0269) (0.0408) (0.0355) (0.0378) (0.0474) (0.0625)
top50C -0.0277 -0.00881 -0.0336 -0.0444 -0.0395 -0.0263
(0.0222) (0.0329) (0.0298) (0.0318) (0.0394) (0.0545)
top60C -0.0156 0.00485 -0.0182 -0.0521 -0.0427 -0.0494
(0.0278) (0.0403) (0.0381) (0.0387) (0.0455) (0.0704)
top70C 0.00969 0.0498 -0.00761 0.00557 0.00222 0.0234
(0.0269) (0.0377) (0.0385) (0.0377) (0.0437) (0.0695)
top80C 0.00844 0.0483 -0.0108 0.0203 0.0346 0.00733
(0.0296) (0.0414) (0.0426) (0.0413) (0.0494) (0.0721)
top90C 0.0460 0.111** 0.00412 0.100** 0.141** 0.0374
(0.0365) (0.0559) (0.0487) (0.0510) (0.0664) (0.0830)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 3,754 1722 2,022 1,922 1,170 750
Migrants 1,877 861 1,011 961 585 375
Linear probability model with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%. Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital
status, monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of
the GDP in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.13: Impact of disasters on migrants’ subjective financial difficulties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Financial = 1
top10C -0.000542 -0.0217 0.0218 -0.00569 -0.0265 0.0359
(0.0296) (0.0427) (0.0410) (0.0396) (0.0529) (0.0601)
top20C 0.00885 0.0113 0.00647 0.0115 0.00272 0.0311
(0.0269) (0.0388) (0.0369) (0.0362) (0.0482) (0.0546)
top30C 0.0520** 0.0547* 0.0487 0.0265 0.0276 0.0146
(0.0224) (0.0319) (0.0312) (0.0327) (0.0409) (0.0541)
top40C 0.0209 0.0661** -0.0192 0.00721 0.0346 -0.0531
(0.0214) (0.0309) (0.0298) (0.0305) (0.0385) (0.0499)
top50C 0.0247 0.0700** -0.0153 0.0247 0.0547 -0.0422
(0.0217) (0.0324) (0.0293) (0.0321) (0.0406) (0.0548)
top60C 0.0334 0.0820** -0.00626 0.0148 0.0728 -0.0804
(0.0251) (0.0369) (0.0341) (0.0366) (0.0476) (0.0564)
top70C 0.0542** 0.0865** 0.0262 0.0187 0.0722 -0.0738
(0.0252) (0.0376) (0.0339) (0.0369) (0.0470) (0.0596)
top80C 0.0628** 0.0859** 0.0467 0.0471 0.115** -0.0519
(0.0260) (0.0395) (0.0346) (0.0373) (0.0473) (0.0616)
top90C 0.0619* 0.0545 0.0632 0.0702 0.104* 0.00431
(0.0330) (0.0498) (0.0439) (0.0448) (0.0570) (0.0733)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 4,428 2,050 2,376 2,272 1,394 876
Migrants 2,214 1,025 1,188 1,136 697 438
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions
include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status, log of the
GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the home country and the
log of the exchange rate.
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B.3 Robustness checks using a shorter distri-
bution
This section includes regressions with a different rolling window: over 7 years
starting 2 years before the interview. Results don’t change qualitatively.
Table B.14: Impact of disasters on the probability to remit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Remit = 1
top10C 0.0201 0.0182 0.0177 0.0321 -0.00698 0.0866
(0.0306) (0.0460) (0.0419) (0.0406) (0.0566) (0.0600)
top20C 0.0288 0.0298 0.0291 0.0319 0.0167 0.0496
(0.0285) (0.0417) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0547) (0.0603)
top30C -0.00721 0.000459 -0.0165 -0.0119 0.0366 -0.0888
(0.0275) (0.0412) (0.0375) (0.0422) (0.0582) (0.0631)
top40C -0.000572 0.0104 -0.00911 -0.00957 0.0245 -0.0733
(0.0285) (0.0429) (0.0390) (0.0413) (0.0545) (0.0660)
top50C 0.0265 0.0682* -0.0123 0.0279 0.0680 -0.0534
(0.0260) (0.0372) (0.0366) (0.0393) (0.0503) (0.0640)
top60C 0.0686** 0.108** 0.0321 0.0693 0.159*** -0.0764
(0.0337) (0.0465) (0.0484) (0.0478) (0.0584) (0.0757)
top70C 0.0605* 0.120** 0.00954 0.0455 0.156** -0.0446
(0.0365) (0.0512) (0.0517) (0.0502) (0.0655) (0.0851)
top80C 0.0119 0.0444 -0.0185 0.0242 0.127* -0.0798
(0.0367) (0.0545) (0.0492) (0.0552) (0.0733) (0.0870)
top90C -0.0319 0.0690 -0.120 0.00598 0.158 -0.107
(0.0593) (0.0840) (0.0780) (0.0877) (0.112) (0.120)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 2.306 1,108 1,198 1,194 734 458
Migrants 1.153 554 599 597 367 229
Linear probability model with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status,
monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP
in the home countryand the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.15: Impact of disasters on labour supply
Employment Weekly Hours of work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
top10C -0.000320 -0.00666 0.0174 0.186 -0.279 -0.297
(0.0205) (0.0288) (0.0277) (0.901) (1.276) (0.650)
top20C 0.00243 0.00249 0.0179 0.764 0.496 -0.176
(0.0212) (0.0294) (0.0319) (0.841) (1.151) (0.670)
top30C 0.0215 0.0298 0.0306 1.619* 1.426 0.919
(0.0229) (0.0311) (0.0353) (0.851) (1.112) (0.785)
top40C 0.0211 0.0308 0.0226 0.378 0.944 0.686
(0.0225) (0.0301) (0.0327) (0.771) (1.070) (0.687)
top50C 0.0318 0.0593** 0.0104 0.995 2.316** 0.536
(0.0213) (0.0286) (0.0297) (0.800) (1.120) (1.183)
top60C -0.000331 0.0536* -0.0420 0.117 2.213* -1.304
(0.0236) (0.0317) (0.0322) (0.903) (1.261) (1.149)
top70C -0.00233 0.0574 -0.0485 -0.850 2.107 -2.404
(0.0283) (0.0375) (0.0427) (1.023) (1.387) (1.604)
top80C 0.0132 0.0620* -0.0427 -0.665 2.418* -0.0740
(0.0281) (0.0365) (0.0451) (1.014) (1.353) (0.680)
top90C 0.0583 0.0958* -0.0128 0.0634 4.457** -2.199
(0.0392) (0.0550) (0.0441) (1.212) (1.753) (1.502)
Observations 1.796 1,084 712 1.796 1,084 712
Migrants 898 542 356 898 542 356
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital
status, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the home
country and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.16: Impact of disasters on labour supply
2ndJob Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
top10C 0.0305 0.0392 -0.00576 -0.0202 0.0571 -0.0643
(0.0188) (0.0326) (0.0231) (0.0671) (0.116) (0.0594)
top20C 0.00823 0.0383 -0.0210 -0.0910 0.0140 -0.171*
(0.0159) (0.0252) (0.0186) (0.0717) (0.114) (0.104)
top30C 0.0158 0.0286 0.00155 -0.0528 0.0457 -0.107
(0.0183) (0.0258) (0.0247) (0.0880) (0.153) (0.118)
top40C 0.00830 0.0306 -0.00200 -0.0395 0.0382 -0.0778
(0.0176) (0.0228) (0.0283) (0.0827) (0.114) (0.116)
top50C -0.00443 0.00478 0.00460 -0.0642 -0.00942 -0.113
(0.0163) (0.0217) (0.0263) (0.0751) (0.0872) (0.113)
top60C 0.00975 0.0386 -0.00476 -0.155 -0.129 -0.269
(0.0205) (0.0256) (0.0354) (0.103) (0.125) (0.177)
top70C 0.0247 0.0619** 0.0221 -0.102 -0.0326 -0.566
(0.0256) (0.0309) (0.0410) (0.153) (0.150) (0.349)
top80C 0.0298 0.0959** -0.0120 -0.114 0.0983 -0.487
(0.0307) (0.0420) (0.0459) (0.126) (0.119) (0.299)
top90C 0.0200 0.0828** -0.00199 -0.0603 0.145 -0.531
(0.0276) (0.0405) (0.0485) (0.165) (0.0971) (0.382)
Sample All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1516 832 684 264 144 120
Migrants 758 416 342 132 72 60
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Re-
gressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status,
log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the home country
and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.17: Impact of disasters on monthly savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Savings
top10C 0.0922 0.105 0.106 0.203 0.236 0.106
(0.160) (0.183) (0.205) (0.175) (0.197) (0.205)
top20C -0.129 -0.268 0.194 -0.0704 -0.110 0.194
(0.166) (0.174) (0.256) (0.172) (0.179) (0.256)
top30C 0.124 -0.171 0.344 0.155 -0.141 -0.0261
(0.172) (0.185) (0.275) (0.169) (0.199) (0.107)
top40C -0.393* -0.291 -0.361 -0.416* -0.318 -0.296
(0.224) (0.204) (0.280) (0.240) (0.212) (0.288)
top50C -0.387* -0.358** -0.388 -0.413* -0.428** -0.421
(0.208) (0.157) (0.275) (0.226) (0.170) (0.297)
top60C -0.321 -0.139 -0.445* -0.374 -0.341 -0.456*
(0.227) (0.196) (0.251) (0.237) (0.212) (0.265)
top70C -0.182 -0.379* -0.0225 -0.0662 -0.344* -0.113
(0.167) (0.207) (0.262) (0.162) (0.198) (0.112)
top80C -0.434** -0.525** -0.557* -0.300 -0.338* -0.400
(0.188) (0.213) (0.290) (0.193) (0.203) (0.313)
top90C -0.744*** -0.646* -0.902** -0.523** -0.722** -0.703*
(0.249) (0.337) (0.357) (0.254) (0.326) (0.370)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1,746 846 896 1,181 673 506
Migrants 747 366 379 510 295 214
Poisson regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital sta-
tus, monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the
GDP in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.18: Impact of disasters on the probability not to do sport in the past
12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Nosports = 1
top10C -0.00580 -0.0101 -6.35e-05 -0.00281 0.00397 -0.00745
(0.0216) (0.0327) (0.0292) (0.0315) (0.0431) (0.0462)
top20C -0.00446 -0.00816 -0.000210 -0.0118 -0.00656 -0.0159
(0.0187) (0.0287) (0.0246) (0.0278) (0.0375) (0.0405)
top30C -0.0136 0.00654 -0.0234 -0.0213 -0.0101 -0.0253
(0.0193) (0.0292) (0.0255) (0.0287) (0.0364) (0.0459)
top40C -0.0299 0.00350 -0.0434 -0.0416 -0.00769 -0.0742
(0.0204) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0292) (0.0372) (0.0479)
top50C -0.0142 0.00284 -0.0186 -0.0249 -0.0143 -0.0271
(0.0182) (0.0265) (0.0247) (0.0258) (0.0318) (0.0434)
top60C -0.00403 0.0296 -0.0203 -0.0235 0.00419 -0.0690
(0.0188) (0.0268) (0.0258) (0.0280) (0.0335) (0.0496)
top70C 0.00885 0.0431 -0.0108 -0.0115 0.0114 -0.0539
(0.0262) (0.0381) (0.0363) (0.0367) (0.0437) (0.0665)
top80C 0.000369 0.0311 -0.0129 0.00809 0.0208 -0.00823
(0.0295) (0.0425) (0.0418) (0.0430) (0.0525) (0.0734)
top90C 0.0398 0.110** -0.00545 0.0866* 0.141** 0.00655
(0.0361) (0.0551) (0.0481) (0.0501) (0.0651) (0.0807)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 3,754 1722 2,022 1,922 1,170 750
Migrants 1,877 861 1,011 961 585 375
Linear probability model with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%. Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital
status, monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the
GDP in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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Table B.19: Impact of disasters on migrants’ subjective financial difficulties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Financial =1
top10C 0.0188 0.000747 0.0360 -0.00579 -0.0106 0.00565
(0.0250) (0.0359) (0.0346) (0.0324) (0.0427) (0.0498)
top20C 0.0192 0.0230 0.0180 -0.00172 -0.00372 0.00805
(0.0249) (0.0355) (0.0347) (0.0333) (0.0448) (0.0500)
top30C 0.0322 0.0442 0.0213 0.0125 0.0243 -0.0151
(0.0197) (0.0283) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0365) (0.0439)
top40C 0.0237 0.0427* 0.00782 0.0108 0.0281 -0.0231
(0.0184) (0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0256) (0.0325) (0.0419)
top50C 0.0342* 0.0614** 0.0103 0.0263 0.0515 -0.0165
(0.0180) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0323) (0.0434)
top60C 0.0445** 0.0546* 0.0355 0.0259 0.0606 0.0166
(0.0200) (0.0306) (0.0265) (0.0291) (0.0377) (0.0987)
top70C 0.0559** 0.0905** 0.0295 0.0251 0.0897** -0.0744
(0.0232) (0.0356) (0.0307) (0.0339) (0.0439) (0.0539)
top80C 0.0432** 0.0743** 0.0195 0.0323 0.0913** -0.0673
(0.0218) (0.0328) (0.0294) (0.0305) (0.0377) (0.0529)
top90C 0.0545* 0.0533 0.0530 0.0480 0.115** -0.0529
(0.0308) (0.0464) (0.0411) (0.0430) (0.0531) (0.0696)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 4,428 2,050 2,376 2,272 1,394 876
Migrants 2,214 1,025 1,188 1,136 697 438
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions
include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital status, monthly
net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log of the GDP in the
home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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B.4 Further robustness checks
Table B.20: Impact of disasters on the hourly
wage (Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transfor-
mation of the dependent variable)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Wage = 1
top10C -0.0404 0.0309 -0.120
(0.0581) (0.0836) (0.0783)
top20C 0.0115 0.0117 0.0158
(0.0456) (0.0605) (0.0702)
top30C 0.00500 0.0203 -0.00981
(0.0458) (0.0587) (0.0718)
top40C 0.00797 0.00458 0.0125
(0.0431) (0.0558) (0.0684)
top50C -0.0126 -0.0289 0.0256
(0.0399) (0.0517) (0.0644)
top60C 0.000512 -0.00362 0.00243
(0.0437) (0.0573) (0.0681)
top70C -0.00341 0.0338 -0.0821
(0.0478) (0.0591) (0.0798)
top80C -0.0255 0.0842 -0.188*
(0.0701) (0.0959) (0.101)
top90C -0.0949 0.0283 -0.286**
(0.0868) (0.123) (0.113)
Sample All Men Women
Observations 264 144 120
Migrants 132 72 60
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, **
5%, *** 1%. Regressions include the following con-
trols: age, degree, number of children, marital status,
log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the
log of the GDP in the home country and the log of
the exchange rate.
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Table B.21: Impact of disasters on monthly savings (Inverse Hyperbolic
Sine (IHS) transformation of the dependent variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: IHS(Savings)
top10C -0.144 -0.343 0.0395 -0.121 -0.0947 -0.225
(0.134) (0.394) (0.184) (0.186) (0.237) (0.300)
top20C 0.0207 0.0184 0.0239 0.114 0.295 -0.128
(0.124) (0.171) (0.179) (0.178) (0.225) (0.288)
top30C 0.000451 -0.155 0.140 -0.114 -0.196 -0.0414
(0.135) (0.190) (0.189) (0.186) (0.235) (0.300)
top40C -0.0340 -0.161 0.0632 -0.0606 -0.138 0.0596
(0.112) (0.165) (0.150) (0.158) (0.201) (0.248)
top50C -0.152 -0.206 -0.105 -0.252* -0.199 -0.301
(0.0974) (0.146) (0.129) (0.146) (0.179) (0.253)
top60C -0.164 -0.123 -0.205 -0.174 -0.206 -0.152
(0.101) (0.149) (0.136) (0.149) (0.184) (0.256)
top70C -0.116 -0.0613 -0.163 -0.101 -0.126 -0.0744
(0.108) (0.159) (0.145) (0.155) (0.191) (0.269)
top80C -0.585*** -0.454* -0.413** -0.299 -0.308 -0.284
(0.213) (0.254) (0.206) (0.227) (0.330) (0.299)
top90C -0.796*** -0.466 -0.641** -0.495 -0.263 -0.867**
(0.234) (0.328) (0.275) (0.303) (0.416) (0.435)
Occupation All All All LF LF LF
Gender All Men Women All Men Women
Observations 1,746 846 896 1,181 673 506
Migrants 747 366 379 510 295 214
OLS regressions with year and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Regressions include the following controls: age, degree, number of children, marital
status, monthly net income, log of the GDP per capita in the home country, the log
of the GDP in the home country and the log of the exchange rate.
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